Showing posts with label AVE4041. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AVE4041. Show all posts

After the Break-In

Connecting Manly's and Bedford's evidence with a two-phase operation
January 17 2011
last update Feb. 10

Note 2/6: See the comments below, which address half of "the middle part" below. Rolfe has soundly debunked the build-up introduction theory and its implied conspiracy. There is, however, the option of re-positioning of the cases at that location, by the same intruder, after their introduction at Interline. I've left the text alone however, so the article and comments become a continuous learning experience.

The Defense's "Missing" Link
I’ve previously explained the security breach at Heathrow airport’s terminal three, found and reported by guard Ray Manly in the first minutes of December 21. A lock to the secured airside area was broken, leaving the way open, perhaps, for a terrorist to place an explosive device amongst the luggage out there. There was no police intervention before the bombing of Flight 103 several hours later, and Manly’s police statement about it “disappeared” afterwards.

As noted in that article, the break-in is not some lone clue floating without any context. It is in fact central to the increasingly clear London origin theory. The explosion time – 38 minutes after leaving the airport – matches with the known altimeter-based weaponry of the most logical villains aside from Libya, if it were loaded at Heathrow. Before that, but following the break-in, a pair of suitcases eerily like the one that blew up were seen around 4:40 PM. Well before the investigation’s bomb in the same case could have arrived from Malta, these appeared mysteriously within the doomed luggage container AVE 4041.

And of special interest here is the fact that Heathrow is the most logical place to load a bomb onto a London-to-NY flight. A remote loading gives numerous chances for interception, and no control over final bomb placement within the container. The bomb did wind up in the only spot of AVE 4041 from which it could do its job (lower outboard corner – see graphics below), by sheer bad luck we’re told. But in fact we have good reason to suspect intelligent terrorist hands undercover at Heathrow airside, perhaps contravening normal rules of loading.

But these are more circumstantial points. It’s in connecting Ray Manly’s report of a break-in at terminal 3 and John Bedford’s report of what could well be the primary suitcase, that the defense case, and the London theory as argued on appeal in 2002, was based. As the appeal court judges considering this at one point put it, “the appellant [Megrahi] sought to link the damage to the padlock with the Bedford suitcases” [242]

[To clarify a side-point, I proceed here on a different assumption from most. A careful reading of Bedford suggests both mystery cases he saw were the same color and style. As he said: “They were hard cases, the type Samsonite make. One was brown in color and the other one, if it wasn’t the same color, it was similar.” This plus their appearance at the same time suggests – though it doesn’t prove - a matching set from one owner, and thus both suspicious. Somehow no one else seems to read him the same way, and focuses on one of the two (which one?) that matches the official style. But I go with what I see, causing the occasional disconnect between singular and plural forms below. [also: If the case(s) were bombing-related as many suspect, it’s possible that both contained bombs (one of which didn’t fully detonate?), or more likely one was a filler, added for realism, etc. I have good reason to suspect the “one case recovered” (actually less than half a case worth of fragments) was not the bomb bag, but on the floor, beneath it - Dr. Hayes once said so.]

In connecting the ‘round midnight report of the broken lock and the late afternoon suitcase sighting by Bedford, There is the problem of elapsed hours, as brought up by the prosecution and favored by the appeal judges. Why break in, plant a bomb bag among the luggage, and then leave, only to have it loaded to the last flight of the day about 17 hours later?

It’s a fair question but not a slam-dunk. If some would-be Lockerbie bomber were on the ground cutting locks at midnight, might he not be willing to come back for a second penetration? Below is a two-phase operation scenario that I think accounts for everything as well as everything can be accounted for. It’s about what I might try for if I knew as much as I imagine this guy knew, and was evil enough to carry out such a thing. I feel that it answers all the major problems pointed out during the appeal, which I will go over for comparison following the plot outline.

Phase one: Getting the bomb to the luggage place
We start around 11:45 PM on December 20, with the terrorist mastermind - Arabic in appearance, or Persian, or blond-haired and blue-eyed, depending. He's at terminal three, standing in front of door T32a, with no one else nearby. To force open a padlock, in general your options would be:
- Sledhehammer (Loud, ineffective against rubber doors like these.)
- Hacksaw (loud and slow)
- Crowbar (loud, crude, unsure)
- Powerful (long-handled) bolt cutters.
- Other (I’m not a tool guy really)

Bolt cutters seem the quickest and quietest – a polite cough might conceal the snip from anyone down the way. Heathrow was under serious maintenance in those days, with workers coming and going all over, according to airport employees speaking at trial. So a maintenance worker could be a good costume to explain the bulky tool, the work gloves (leaves no fingerprints), and the oversize toolbox that he wouldn’t want searched. So long as he isn’t caught in mid-snip, he’d be airside in the December dark within seconds.

He could then empty his toolbox at any number of spots – one he either planned out or picks at the time. Maybe some out-of-the-way spot around a corner from a corner, the kind of place you could sneak a pee with little chance of being seen, even in the day. And behind something else within that spot - an air vent cover, or a large machine with an accessible cavity. Or anywhere that two good-sized suitcases could hide unseen for half a day in a place only he knows.

They would be fully loaded, tagged for PA103, and ready to be smuggled among the outgoing luggage. But they weren’t to be placed yet. That’s too important to be left to chance.

In court, Ray Manly said of the break-in "if somebody had done their job then maybe, maybe [the bombing] may not have happened." But in this scenario, the police would not likely find anything even if they did show up and search the airside area. The whole place would have to be almost disassembled, and all the luggage out there double-checked for purity to be sure nothing untoward was there. At the point these activities were undertaken, the bombing may, sadly, have been unstoppable under normal circumstances.

At  least, until the cases re-surfaced and ran a chance of looking odd to eyes put on the alert....  

Phase Two: Turning the bomb into luggage
Phase one accomplished and no tracks left, the bomber would calmly depart the scene, ditching the empty toolbox and bolt-cutters, but not the gloves. In case this lock-cutting was reported and then caused an alarm (it didn’t), he might give them all day to relax again when nothing happens. He’d get some sleep and allow for at least one shift change at terminal three. He’d even have time to sleep in and have a nourishing brunch of brain food in the hotel lobby, with only one other thing planned for the day.

And that would be at the airport again, coming back in the early afternoon. He’d dress in a black-market Pan Am jumpsuit for a luggage-handling disguise. And he’s carrying nothing but his black-market airside pass (hundreds were missing), appropriate fake ID in a wallet with some cash, and perhaps a pocket-knife if that’s allowed and recovery will require un-screwing. He’s carrying no bags to search. No bombs. He's waved into the secured area where he's got his bomb hidden and ready to make-believe it's someone's matching suitcases.

Upon re-entry, he’d slide over to his hiding nook to retrieve them, maintaining supreme alertness to manage it unseen. Now in a new costume, Pan Am worker bee carrying two (misrouted, if anyone asks) copper Samsonites, he’d emerge on the tarmac and just blend in.

If possible, and in general, the next thing he’d do is manually place them in the lower outboard corner (see below) of a Pan Am container, hoping for the best from there (he may have gotten it).

The middle part: Interline or Build-Up?
The middle part, just where the container would ideally be when he made his move, is more “choose-your-own-adventure,” based on some uncertainty on my on part. It’s a little complicated, and most readers can just be skip to the last paragraph here.

My previous, almost gospel, interpretation, takes John Bedford’s amazing account as literally true. This has the suitcases introduced at the interline shed, the place for processing luggage from non-Pan Am connecting flights. He says his co-worker with Alert security, the ones who x-ray the bags, had placed the matching brown Samsonites in his brief absence, although the co-worker, Sulkash Kamboj, denies this.

In this version, the Lockerbie bomber at Heathrow would have Mr. Kamboj and his x-ray to deal with, which could be dealt with in at least two ways. He could just stand outside, put the Samsonites on the belt running into the shed like any luggage, let Kamboj scan them unseen by him, and just hope they pass and are placed by luck in the right corner. He could also Step into the shed, pay the x-ray man a wad of cash to ignore his job, suggest it’s drugs in there, not bombs, and try to place them himself in the right corner. The latter would offer a better chance of success, but still has its obvious dangers – like the guy taking the cash and then removing the bags for scrutiny anyway once the intruder was gone.

Another problem is the suitcase positions Bedford reported – position “A” in the image below, flat across the floor. The bomb was in a case of just this type, but by the evidence (and officially) in the upper of the two as shown in “B.” Both cases in B are ideally placed, against the sloped floor panel, which winds up nearest the curve of the airliner’s hull. This would only require a stacking of the two cases in “A”, nothing too extreme, really. However, that would make the one on the right in “A” the most likely to be holding the bomb (if there was only one). This is clearly not an ideal placement, suggesting the terrorist was unable to arrange them himself at interline.
An alternate narrative involves the same two cases actually being inserted at the baggage build-up area. Here baggage from Heathrow-originating passengers was consolidated into containers, and occasionally a container started at interline would be topped off or await an incoming flight here. AVE4041 was one of those. If the cases were first spotted here, that might leave Bedford’s story both literally untrue and still relevant, in a cynical but plausible situation like this:

Peter Walker, who was in charge of the build-up area, goes to take AVE 4041 out to meet the German feeder flight to be filled. But as he steps to it, he sees and makes note of the two “Bedford suitcases,” which weren’t there when Bedford dropped it off. And they’re stacked against the outboard panel as shown in “B” above.

He sees this after sitting inside for around 40 minutes, never watching the container for a moment. No one else was guarding it, and it sat unattended and wide open for most of an hour. Perhaps for fear of causing trouble he ignores the anomaly and lets it slide. (There’s probably a good reason. It’s not like we’re on high alert following a break-in or anything.) It’s taken out to K16, and filled up with items from Frankfurt, none of them holding any explosives, and then is loaded onto 103.

But after the news of what happened less than an hour later, he’d put it together. Even the placement was a clue - the bomb was in one of those cases, ideally placed nearest the hull. So he compels someone else (Bedford) to say he saw them, way over there at interline, and that Indian guy “Camjob” (as Bedford calls him) is the one who placed them. They’d be x-rayed, one would presume. (But if not, hey… it was him, not either of us.) And further, they were reported by Bedford as flat on the floor, not stacked in that optimal way.

This is a rather convoluted thing to suspect, and requires some conspiracy, but it does explain a number of things. It should be noted that Walker provided Bedford’s alibi (a tea break together) for being absent when Kamboj placed the bags. And besides the Bedford/Kamboj disagreements, there are serious inconsistencies in Walker’s statements. To police in 1989 he swore he never saw or was aware of the container at all, contradicting Bedford. In 1990, he fixed this and confirmed that Bedford had brought it over, as they had agreed to over tea. At trial in 2000 he admitted the change in stories is strange, but he said for whatever reason, "I can’t explain it."

In this scenario, the suitcases memory in Bedford’s story is accurate enough to be a clue, even if it’s not his own memory, but transferred from one mind to another. It also allows for the flat position to be an additional fudging, so that not even Kamboj facilitated their potent stacking. (That was apparently someone later down the line, if it's decided that happened at all.)

Both options involve the danger of Kamboj, Walker, Bedford, or someone else reporting or removing the bags. Every London option has that danger, and that risk is tripled in the official story through three airports, making this still preferable. Logic says they’d choose Heathrow, and less clearly it suggests the bomber would choose build-up. But Bedford suggests he chose interline. Either way, the reference to brown, hard-shell Samsonites in the deadly corner of AVE4041 shouldn’t just be presumed to be a coincidence.

Appeal judgment addressed:
Following are some excerpts from the second “Opinion of the Court” from Camp Zeist, following the appeal of Feb. 2002.

"[244] ...Moreover, although readily discoverable evidence of the break-in had been left behind in the form of the damaged padlock, the hypothesis involved that the case was not introduced into the interline shed until some fifteen hours later..."
True, but it’s no problem for the two-phase explanation - it’s the basis of it. In fact, the build-up version involves an even longer span, by as much as an hour, than the one the judges half-considered.

"...Unless the risk of opening the case airside to set the timer was to be undertaken, the timer would have had to be set before the break-in..."
Ice-cube timers that blow around 38 minutes after takeoff don’t need to be set, of course. So this point doesn’t apply to my version, nor, I think, to the case made by the defense.

"... No method of arranging for the bag to pass through the system to the interline shed had been identified..."
Perhaps not by the defense, but I propose the method was manual placement supported by psychological deception.

"... The intruder would have required either to wait for fifteen hours himself, or to have the assistance of an accomplice..."
Either works. I’m betting on one well-trained operative with the requisite patience.

"... No place of concealment for the intruder or the suitcase had been identified..."
No place identified? I suspect the intruder was an out-of-towner, and concealed himself at a hotel for that time. As for the bomb suitcases, no one has shown any reason to rule out all potential hiding spots, like those mentioned above or a dozen others. Do they imagine there would be no suitable spots? Aren't they presuming they were "hidden" right inside the interline shed?

"... There was nothing in the evidence to explain why a suitcase, brought through T3-2A between 2205 and 0030 hours, would not be placed in the interline shed in time for either of the two earlier PanAm flights. On the hypothesis under examination, the suitcase had been tagged for flight PA103, although there were two earlier flights that would have involved a shorter period of concealment of a suitcase containing an armed explosive device... "
Again with "armed" and time spans. Unless the airport suddenly levitates a few thousand feet, the bomb is stable. Remember, it's altimeter-triggered, in this non-Libyan plot. If the bomb is concealed and ready for a phase two, no one but him will put it in the shed, on no timeline other than his own. There’s no need to rush things; even doing it the same day is unnecessary. And besides, they may have been targetting Flight 103 itself for some specific reason.

"... Yet there was no evidence that there was anything about flight PA103 or its passengers that singled it out as the target."
This is widely disputed, but for my part I take no stock in certain individuals (Charles McKee, etc.) being targeted. But here are other reasons I could see why they might choose to wait for this one, depending what they knew from advanced research:
- the plane’s age (it was one of the oldest around) and its brittle skin. (see this frightening video)
- its inhabitant’s average youth, to maximize the sense of loss.
- its lateness, last flight of the day. As explained above, giving time for security to relax, for sleep, and for a costume change.

"...Moreover, if an accomplice with airport identification, genuine or false, was involved, there was no need to break in to airside..."
Except to have no friggin' bomb on him when he showed his pass and perhaps was subjected to search prior to entering a secured area… which of course was not secure at this point, and he may have had a bomb waiting for him inside.

"...All that was required was to smuggle the components of the explosive device through an access point, such as T3-2A, where persons with appropriate identification were not searched..."
Even the  stray suitcases they're bringing in aren't searched? I don't know - I imagine a ready-made bombs aren't smart to bring through, and the judges agree, speculating "component parts" being smuggled and then assembled out on the tarmac somewhere. (???) For the bomb’s entry behind the perimeter, where worker-looking people are generally trusted, I think an unacknowledged sneak-job of the ready package would be wisest. A break-in at midnight would be genius.

"... The effect of all these points, the Advocate depute submitted, was to show that the hypothesis that the break-in at T3-2A was the means of infiltrating one of the Bedford suitcases was so weak and flawed that the additional evidence could not pass the Cameron test..."
My theory has it introducing both of them. I didn't read just what "the Cameron test is," but it's from a case involving someone named Cameron, and probably means a point doesn’t hold up under scrutiny, compared to something else already "established." At least, not when the scrutiny is as skewed as their Lordships' is. When they say “the Advocate depute submitted” they also seem to be saying “we think.” But the A.D.’s job is to argue his case, however unsupported, and their job is to judge fairly, not just agree with the one line of argument as if it were a self-evident truth.

"[251] In our view the Advocate depute was right in submitting that the additional evidence did not demonstrate any link between the break-in at T3-2A and the Bedford suitcases..."
Perhaps not, but now I have. A potential one at least.

"... It might be said that there was a temporal link, in the sense that the break-in occurred some fifteen hours before the Bedford suitcases appeared in the interline shed..."
Yes. In a 17-year career, the worst security breach Manly ever saw, and the worst terrorist bombing in UK history, happening within the same 17-hour span, is definitely a temporal connection.

"... It seems to us, however, that that interval of time, so far from pointing to a connection between the two events, casts considerable doubt on whether they can have been connected..."
"Can have been connected?" Wow. No imagination at all.

"...The lapse of time after a readily detectable break-in, creating a period during which the infiltrator and the case (or, if there was an accomplice, the unaccompanied case) would require to be concealed in the airside area, points away from a connection..."
Again, the lapse of time after the detectable event is explained by me as a cool down period in case the detection raised an alarm. Sixteen or so hours is, if anything, a bit short for this purpose, but it apparently worked.

"...Moreover, any attempt to link the Bedford suitcases with the break-in raises unanswered questions as to why the infiltrator ignored the baggage build-up area, and introduced the cases into the considerably more remote interline shed..."
Any attempt? Not my variation where the bomb is introduced at build-up. They're the same suitcases then, just the "Walker suitcases" instead of the Bedford ones.

In addition, given the evidence as to the ability of a person with airport identification to pass through T3-2A during the day without being subjected to search, and given the evidence led at the trial and mentioned by the trial court in para [24] about the substantial number of such passes unaccounted for, it is not clear why a break-in would have been seen as necessary, since the components of the explosive device could have been smuggled through an access point.
Repeated just to emphasize the bolded, to remind the reader how easy it would be for a terrorist to sneak back into the airside area where he'd earlier hidden the bomb he meant to get onto Flight 103.

Addendum: Completely unaware of the break-in that changes the whole scene for the imagine Heathrow intruder, the Zeist judges put the situtation pretty well in their paragraph 24 (in its entirety)
[24] It emerges from the evidence therefore that a suitcase which could fit the
forensic description of the primary suitcase was in the container when it left the interline shed. There is also a possibility that an extraneous suitcase could have been introduced by being put onto the conveyor belt outside the interline shed, or introduced into the shed itself or into the container when it was at the build-up area. To achieve that, the person placing the suitcase would have had to avoid being detected, but the evidence indicates that a person in possession of a pass for the airside area would not be likely to be challenged, and there were a very large number of passes issued for Heathrow, a substantial number of which were not accounted for. The person placing the suitcase would also have required to know where to put it to achieve the objective.
---

Video: Two Hard Cases Solve Another

January 31 2011

Here is my latest Youtube video, relating the account of John Bedford and its potential relevance to the bombing.


It's not the most visually interesting, and the music's a little weird. But I think the soundtrack adds some drama to a pretty detailed narrative. I hope it all comes together well enough to raise a few new question marks - or even exclamation marks - out there.

See also the actual Youtube page for the video to help get the views up. Comments open to all here and there, welcoming constructive criticism and all. I plan to remake all my videos some day, or something to that effect, so feedback is always valued.

Visualizing the Bedford Story

last edits 3 November 2010

This post will help establish a visual grasp of the evidence of Pan Am luggage loader John Bedford, and its possibly huge relevance to the Lockerbie bombing. [general post: the Bedford suitcase(s)] This is best understood if one has read the statements Bedford and a coworker made to London police shortly after the attack. The timeline of 21 December at the interline shed is also pivotal, but will be worked into this post as we go. In short, on that afternoon, a pair of brown, hard-shell Samsonite suitcases appeared in the same luggage container the blast would later occur in. And that has been ruled to be a brown hard-shell Samsonite case. No other such bags were found in that container. Neither of the two baggage handlers who worked at interline would say just where these bags came from, as their stories conflicted and shifted over time.  

So just to be able to better "see" what this might mean...

The Container
The aircraft in question, known as Clipper Maid of the Seas, was a Boeing 747-121 model. According to Wikipedia, a 747-121 holds 30 cargo containers of the LD1 or LD3 style, fifteen along each side of the hold. A cross-section photo there helps explain the containers' non-rectangular shape - the lower outer corners are "cut off," creating a slanted portion of floor on the outboard (closer to the hull) end of the container.

Container AVE 4041 was blown out at just that end, the unluckiest of spots as far as the plane and those in it are concerned. To visualize this, AVE 4041 was a Pan Am-owned model LD3 container (or load device unit), of aluminum contruction, with the following dimensions, per a Wikipedia page:
base width / overall width - 61.5 / 79 inches
depth - 60.4 inches
height - 64 inches
The dimensions given in the AAIB report of 1990 are slightly different, and included in the figure below. The opened loading side is secured for flight with a blue sheet attached to cables that pulls down and latches. This open side is called the front by Loaders.

Below is one of these containers, used by Dr. John Wyatt in his recent fragment survivability tests. He's filled it with luggage and one case with a bomb, for the finale of a 20-test series. Note here the cases are not stacked spines down but flat-down. It's possible anyone could have rearraged the bags after Bedford's and Kamboj's placements - and a flat-stacked approach seems the best fit for the evidence - in the position here of the second lowest left-hand case, if slid to the left a bit. This image also helps establish a rough average suitcase thickness of around 8 inches, which I use below.

Visualizations
Using the dimensions of the pallet's base, as seen from above, it's possible to get some grasp of hw this would actually look. Below I've done some muck-ups, using the floor damage sketches from the AAIB's appendix F. The post linked there is another important part of being able to visualize this scenario. The blast damage to the container is crucial to understanding where inside of it the blast happened.


First, just the base we'll be working with. On the main floor, the blue area is the outer edge of floor deformation from the blast itself; other deformations were likely from the fall and the landing. The yellow is an "area of intense distortion, influenced by aircraft structure under panel." This was apparently shielded from direct blast effects by the lower suitcase beneath the primary one. Red is the area where the base edge member is "severely blast damaged." Areas slant-shaded are those never found (I re-did the overhang to ignore Claiden's silly PI/100 inclusion). Most of this panel was obliterated and never found, the rest  was blown outward.

At left is the container as Bedford left it around 4pm, to have tea with his boss Peter Walker, leaving his coworker Kamboj alone at the Pan Am station. The exact number of bags he placed has never been pinned down, "four or five" total (per Kamboj), or a high "8-10" after Kamboj's two additions (per Bedford). Five to start plus the two is the estimation I chose. "Spines down handles up" was Bedford's style, he said, and placing them "along the back of the container" is best read as shown here. A left-to-right order isn't specified or necessary, but it does fit the other clues a bit better than right-to-left scheme.

The sample size I'm using for these filler cases is 16x24x8 inches. It's reasonable but quite imprecise, and in reality different bags will be different sizes and shapes. Please note the rough correlation of the area covered by these and the area not as blast-warped. The yellow and blue tend to a circular pattern radiating from the center, except where these upright bags were. These would transfer force much differently from flat laid cases beneath the bomb.

Upon Bedford's return around 4:40 pm the arrangement was something like this. Two new "hard cases, the type Samsonite make" had been added on the floor as shown here. I'm using the primary case dimensions - silhouette 4000 series, 26x22x9 inches (see link at top, above the video). We cannot say that's not what he saw. With the same style and color (brown or maroony brown) and their appearance together they might well be a matching set, which is worthy of note (and yet little noted thus far). Laid side by side, at the front of the container, to the left, handles pointing towards the back, "they took up the remaining base area of the tin," Bedford told police. These do just that.

We know they weren't left here, so close to the later explosion, or they'd turn up bomb damaged, which they didn't. Or perhaps they did, as this whole exercises is premised on wondering...

To conserve space, a later worker may have rearranged the cases like the mock-up at left: stacked together and slid left and back against the other cases and the overhang floor. Geometrically, it puts the upper case's (approximate) middle in the IED location (the flare here). Given the nearly-square shape of the primary case, there is little difference between them ending up long end sticking outboard (as shown here) or the other way around (as shown below). In both arrangements, a 180 degree rotation is also just as good a fit, giving us four possible variations.

The arrangement at left with an added 90-degree rotation (this or its base-out inversion) has the blast area more high-centered than left, and makes a little more sense in a way. But good clues I stumbled across suggest the above image or its reverse might have to be it. It seems that parts from both the handle and hinge (bottom) ends of the case left pieces blasted into surrounding luggage. Pieces of the lock wound up in a suitcase from within this container, and a piece of the bottom wound up in the container over (down as shown here), and apparently piercing a "purple holdall." Both are consistent with handles-in placement like Bedford saw.

Finally, the obvious point that we're visualizing two cases, while only the remains of one were recovered. So it seems. Consider this hypothesis - approximately one-and-a-half of these two cases was basically vaporized by a blast maybe 50% more powerful than believed. Highly energized suitcase material wouldn't disappear, but may alight in a variety of states you'd never recover: drifting flakes of melted plastic, and small non-descript "pebbles" that vanish into sandy mud. Drifting might continue to the North sea, or into a loch.

Larger pieces can and would be recovered, and here we see a couple dozen bits less than an inch in size, but most of these were found blasted into other suitcases, not laying in the grass, or caught in a tree's canopy. The nearly 1/2 of an entire suitcase assembled (mock-up at left) is primarily just five fragments, one nearly a foot square. And there is a 20-inch span of gossamer fabric lining. Which half of the primary case could that be from?   Top or bottom? Any takers? Why the asymmetry?

And that large chunk at upper left, PI/911, has an extremely interesting history of its own - RARDE first said it was from a case beneath the primary one and was touching the floor. Wait 'til you see why that changed.

Investigators had no way of knowing such rearrangements didn't happen, but by accepting Bedford's story, had to presume these cases had been near that corner and were then moved somewhere. They were never able to find where these cases went  to if not where these above images show. Yet they ruled out the possibility by concluding a bomb case that wasn't touching the (main) floor, and had to have come from Frankfurt, in a third brown hard-shell Samsonite to have occupied that corner.

It's utter hogwash thinking of a suspiciously wishful sort.  How early did the police bosses know London must be cleared, and for what reason?
---

Yet another Red Flag From Heathrow

The Evidence of Peter Walker
June 8 2010


Previously at this site, the various accounts of two Pan Am employees, John Bedford and Sulkash Kamboj, have been laid out. While Bedford's statements offer an invaluable clue, collectively their testimonies were riddled with inconsistencies. Both insisted they always told the truth before, even when two truths conflicted, and their memory is too hazy now to help. Recounting the events in the interline shed of terminal three - on the afternoon before Pan Am 103 fell apart upon leaving there - should have been of immense importance. But with attention drawn to points east, these and other Heathrow clues were left hanging and clouded.

Yet another red flag appears just down the way from their workplace, with Mr. Peter Walker, who ran the “baggage build-up area” at terminal three. Here baggage from Heathrow-originating passengers was consolidated into containers, and occasionally a container from interline would be topped off or await an incoming flight here. Walker was mentioned previously as Bedford’s supervisor and casual friend. By Bedford’s story, the two had tea together in the late afternoon of December 21, and Walker gave Bedford leave to go home around 5pm, telling him to bring near-empty container AVE4041 to build-up on his way out.

The main thing about this is the container just sitting there, in the open, not visible inside the build-up office, but accessible to any terrorist who could blend in. Bedford's clues point to the bomb getting in the tin back at interline, but the extra opportunity of this long unattended span (perhaps 45 minutes) must be considered by those thinking about London origin.

But my point here is an inconsistency in Walker’s testimony that eerily recalls Beford and Kamboj. JREF forum member “Buncrana” tipped me off that in this case, Walker first swore he made no such arrangement with Bedford and had no clue a container (“tin”) had been left at build-up at all. And yet a year and a half later casually claimed to recall just what Bedford had said.

[Source throughout: Camp Zeist trial transcripts. Day 43, August 24 2000.
pp 6246-6292]

(from) Production 1227; statement of Peter Walker to DC Adrian Dixon. January 10, 1988 [sic] Original reference number S2206
I have been asked about an AVE tin that came from interline to baggage build-up. I understand that a tin was brought round from interline, but I have no knowledge of who brought it round or what time this would have been. I can't recall seeing it in baggage build-up.

Earlier that afternoon, I think about 3.30 p.m., John Bedford, the loader working in interline, came to my office. This is a quiet period in interline, and he came for a cup of tea. I did not make any arrangements with John about him bringing the tin across from interline.

I again saw John Bedford at about 5.00 p.m.. He was on his way home.
I have been informed * that an AVE tin came from interline to luggage build-up and then to Kilo 16, where it was filled with Frankfurt to New York baggage. I have no knowledge of this and do not recall seeing this AVE tin.
* Q Then part of the next sentence appears to be deleted:
I have been told ... And then it goes on instead: I have been informed -- do you see that? --
A Yes.

(from) Production 1221
Transcript of the Fatal Accident Inquiry, 1990
Peter Walker testimony, page 4170


Q Did you see Mr. Bedford at any time in the course of that afternoon?
A Yes, I did.
Q What time was that at?
A Approximately 3.30, 3.45.
Q And was there any particular reason for his visit at that point?
A We had a cup of tea together.
Q It was simply a social call?
A A social call, yes.

Q Did you see him again in the course of that afternoon?
A Yes, I did.
Q And what time was that at?
A Somewhere between 5.00 and 5.15.
Q And what was the reason for his visit then?
A He brought some bags round that he had at the interline, and then he went home.
Q Were these bags which were simply lying individually, or were they in a container?
A They were in a container. 
Q Did you see the container that Mr. Bedford brought round?
A Yes, I did.
Q Where did he leave that container?
A Outside my office.
Q Did you have a clear view?
A Not clearly entirely, no.
Q Did you see how many bags were in the container?
A I was told; I didn't see them personally. I was told there was approximately six.
Q Was that information Mr. Bedford gave you?
A Yes, he did.
Camp Zeist Trial, Cross-examination by Mr. Davidson for the accused, following police statement
Q Now, did you say that to the police?
A Yes.
Q And that was the truth?
A Yes.
Q And to remind ourselves, this was on the 10th of January 1989, I think we can safely assume?
A Yes.
Q So as of that date, Mr. Bedford [sic], you are effectively saying to the police that you didn't know anything from your own knowledge about any such tin, or through any conversation with John Bedford?
A Yes.

Mr. Davidson, following FAI testimony
Q Now, do you accept that you made all these answers to these questions, Mr. Bedford [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you accept, then, Mr. Bedford [sic], that that represents quite a significant departure from the position that you adopted when first interviewed by the police on the date already quoted -- I think it was the 10th of January 1989.
A Yes.
Q Are you able to explain for the Court's benefit, please, Mr. Walker, what it was that caused such a change of position on your part?
A I can't answer that.
Q You've already told us that you didn't have any discussion with Mr. Bedford of any significant nature about this disaster; is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And, I take it, it follows from that answer that you didn't have any discussion with him about what he could recollect about that day in relation to containers from the interline shed and when he brought it and what number of bags he told you, none of that --
A Yeah.
Q -- occurred by way of conversation with Mr. Bedford; is that so?
A Yes.
Q But, apart from that, you are not able to assist us, explain this apparent change of position?
A I can't explain it.
Q You can't. Would you accept, on the face of it, it seems a bit unusual?
A Yes.

Q So is the position this, Mr. Walker: That you did not see any container that afternoon brought around from interline shed destined for the New York flight by Mr. Bedford?
A I can't honestly remember, sir.
Q You see, when you were interviewed by the police, and you effectively told them that, you said that that was the truth that you told the police?
A Yes.
Q A matter of three weeks, perhaps, approximately, after the incident?
A Yes.
Q Is that correct? And for some unexplained reason your position changed quite radically by the time you came to give evidence --
A I can't explain that. I'm sorry, I don't know why that happened.
Q All right, Mr. Walker. Thank you.
By all accounts, Walker would have to approve Bedford going home, and even in the first, most distanced version, he admits seeing Bedford going home. He would have been aware of timetables, and that flight 103A hadn’t arrived yet, so whatever Bedford had been loading at interline wouldn’t be out on the tarmac meeting it yet and it wouldn't be left alone at interline. He swore he knew nothing of a container at build-up, but simple deduction should have left Walker suspecting one was sitting out there.

And besides the logic of his police statement, there’s Walker telling a different story, one consistent with Bedford’s, to the FAI in 1990. He says he told the truth both times, but can’t explain how that’s possible, and can’t now remember what happened at all. So we’re left on our own.

Early ’89 and late 1990 are two quite different times, and I’m inclined to favor the latter statement as more truthful. One salient difference is that in January, Walker wouldn’t know that a Heathrow origin for the bomb would be ruled out. By the later testimony, everyone knew it came in from Frankfurt with its abysmal security. So there was less pressure to disavow anything you had thought might have to do with the bomb.

We know that when he talked to the cops, Peter Walker knew more about AVE4041 and its contents than he told them. The pertinent question now is how much more did he know?
---

The London Origin Theory

The First Causualty of the Investigation was Truth
(incomplete)
last update July 30 2010


“I want to know when the bomb was placed on the plane and by whom. We have to look more closely into the "London theory" – that the bomb was placed on the plane at Heathrow and not in Malta.” - Hans Köchler, independent UN observer at Zeist trial, 21 Aug 2009 (Source)


"If I was determined to bring down an airplane, I would have put [the bomb] on in London." - Robert Baer, 'former' CIA agent and weapons expert, who doesn't buy the Libyans-did-it story line.

The London Origin theory has emerged as the most logical explanation for what happened to Pan Am 103 on December 21 1988. The official story, all the most widely-seen revisionist arguments, and even Megrahi's defense team's curious "special defense of incrimination" drew on elements of the drug swap theory, with the bomb coming in from Germany or further afield. Megrahi's counsel William Taylor QC did however give reasons to suspect a  London origin (some below) to the trial judges and summarized at trial's end in 2001:
“My submission is that all of the above render the choice of Heathrow a much more likely one [than Malta]. And when that possibility is considered, one finds that there is a compelling body of evidence that points to Heathrow as being the point of ingestion.” [day 82 p 9862]

But in the earliest days of the investigation, January and February 1989, British investigators labored to clear Heathrow Airport of any lapses and ensure that the bomb's origin would have to be found elsewhere. Years of confusion ensued... (see "Counter-Arguments" below for more on the dismissal of the London theory).

Direct Evidence For the Theory
Among the first clues came from finding where the plane failed, and what luggage container the blast originated in. Container AVE4041 in forward left cargo hold, position 14L, was decided within a few days. The container's blasted out remains were found and reassembled enough to show the blast was down at the bottom of the container, in the aft outboard corner. It had been in the spot closest to the hull, only 25" from the thin and aged skin of Maid of the seas.

Unfortunately, the exact placement, origin, or even number of suitcases in that box was hard to pin down. Records and witnesses helped decide 4041 was loaded with a few bags (6-8 or so) of (apparently) interline luggage, then filled up with a few dozen cases from the feeder/first leg flight 103A out of Frankfurt. But within this generally imprecise body of memories, one stands out as of amazing possible significance.

> The Bedford Suitcase(s)
This was always the hard part to get around in order to reject the initially obvious Heathrow introduction theory. A Pan Am worker mentioned to police right after the attack said he saw two brown hardshell samsonite suitcases, placed on the floor of container 4041. The position of these was side-by-side from the far left of the floor, at the (loading) front of the container. If the bags had been later stacked one on the other and the top bag slid a few inches left, it would be in the perfect spot to match the explosion center - aft outboard corner, second suitcase from the bottom - where just such case detonated.

An amazing lead, investigators almost seem to have tried to not follow this one.  Since the cases Bedford saw were on the floor when he saw them, and the blast seemed to have happened one layer up from that, they decided these cases were a coincidence. They must have been moved across the container, and replaced in that lower corner with an identical case from Germany, on top of some other damaged Frankfurt-originating luggage. The leaps of faith here are simply alarming.

The Bedford story is covered in great detail at this site, with the works so far compiled at the link above.

> Break-in Reported
A security Guard at heathrow Airport reported a break-in at terminal 3 around 12:30 am on  December 21. Ray Manly's report, of a padlock on the floor "cut like butter" was covered up for over a decade. Even at trial in 2000, the defense was not allowed to know of this. Manly came forward in 2001 with the story, soon verified by the long-suppressed police reports. A post is up but empty - anyone care to help? I'll get to it later.

Mentioned in: Appeal Court Dismissal of the Heathrow Theory

Circumstantial Evidence For the Theory


> The 38-Minute Coincidence
Aside from its crew and perhaps some cargo that (probably) doesn't matter here, the 747 Clipper Maid of the Seas landed empty at London's Heathrow airport mid-day December 21, 1988. There the plane took on a load of 243 passengers and their luggage, and took off at 6:25 PM for New York as Pan Am Flight 103. Clearly, the bomb went on the plane at London, but the question that comes quickly behind it is where did it come from before that? A van in the parking lot, or another plane?

Such clues were vital to tracking down the perpetrators, and should be embraced when they're found. The time of explosion itself is a valuable clue - 38 minutes after leaving the ground - is a known hallmark of the altimeter bombs made just weeks earlier by terrorist bomb-maker and "double agent" Marwan Khreesat. He had produced four altimeter-triggered, radio-disguised bombs, set to detonate less than an hour after takeoff. Each of the others was a bit different, but the one that was captured and tested thoroughly would have blown up about 45-50 minutes after takeoff.  

The timing compatibility with a Khreesat bomb loaded at London notwithstanding, it's been officially decided and legally established that was a Libyan-ordered and set MST-13 timer that told the bomb to go off over Lockerbie. Officially, legally, by the evidence led at trial, it's an asbolute coincidence the timing so resembles the method first suspected. 

> Operational Security
When confronted with the official story of a Malta-Germany-London, the most obvious averse reaction of those who know air travel operations is to ridicule the notion that an airline bomb would make any sense being trusted to so many switches. Any functional security screen or time delay along the way coulld screw up the whole operation with a timer-based device as alleged. A trip from Frankfurt only is often suggested to replace this, but it too has one too many stops for a Khreesat bomb, and still a high chanced of the bomb being delayed or intercepted. If one could pierce security at any of the three airports, and it obviously happened at one of them, Heathrow would give one the best chance for success and the only way for a Khreesat bomb to have done what happened.  

Former head of security for British Airways, Denis Phipps, Maltese Double Cross:
“If a device had been infiltrated into the system at Malta, it would have been necessary for that device to have been carried in an aircraft in the sector from Malta to Frankfurt, to have gone through a handling process, been carried on an aircraft through the sector from Frankfurt to Heathrow, and then timed to detonate during the final sector, Heathrow to New York, presumably whilst the aircraft was over the ocean to avoid discovery of forensic evidence …  one has to say, um, are - terrorists  - idiots? Don’t terrorists plan to have a reasonable degree of success?"  

> Explosive Efficacy
If one places a device at the airport the target leaves from, rather than remotely through multiple flights, a new ppossibility is opened up - depending on the nature and depth of his penetration, a determined terrorist could place the bag himself and chose where in the container it went. As it happened, the bomb in PA103 was placed in the best spot (for the terrorists), and one of the few that could have even worked - the lower outboard quadrant, more or less on the sloping floor nearest the hull. Figure F13 (below) of the AAIB's report shows the deduced center of explosion that officially was achieved by accident. Considering even there, all that was blows from the hull was a chunk the size of a dinner plate. That's all it took, but it wouldn't happen at all if the bomb had wound up in the upper inboard corner, or even in the middle.

It is true, as some have pointed out, that there'd be no guarantee any cases placed in that deadly corner would stay there. But terrorists simply can't wait for guarantees. Certainly having it in the right spot, for sure, at one point, is better than relying on pure chance. Perhaps with this in mind, famous former CIA agent Robert Baer, who may have direct experience in this for all we know, has said:
"I used to teach explosives. The last thing you want to do is put a bomb on in a place like Malta and have two stops along the way ... you couldn't count on this thing hitting its target. ... Malta would not have been my first choice. It would have been London. If I was determined to bring down an airplane, I would have put it on in London." Flight into Darkness video, part two, 5:25

Counter Arguments Addressed
Forensics and the Frankfurt Link to the Rescue
UK and Germany had both been unsettled by the possibility their security forces had allowed the horror of Lockerbie to pass through. Some of their early wrangling is addressed in the post "What did the Germans Know?" British investigators decided the blast - 10 inches above the container floor - was above any possible non-Frankfurt luggage and therefore had to be some other brown, hardshell Samsonite from the one(s) Bedford described, that must have been from the feeder 103A. It was unsound reasoning and wishful thinking until the Erac printout emerged months later, showing an item apparently coming from Malta, to PA103, via Frankfurt.

The Malta Link to the Rescue
The Erac printout, emerging months after the attack from an employee's locker after all official copies somehow disappeared, sealed the deal for Malta origin. But the tiny island nation had already been mentioned in the evidence, as the place of manufacture for some of it. As it so happened, the Erac (Frankfurt) printout in August 1989 spurred a closer look, and the clothes were traced to a store on Malta where Tony Gauci was found...

Malta-based Libyan defector Abdul Majid Giaka was already on file with the culprits - Megrahi and Fhimah - that some hoped Tony saw one of. By late February 1991, they had a sort of identification of Megrahi from the shopkeeper.  A few months later, Giaka was finally removed to safety and first mentioned the suitcase - possibly the same model Bedford reported - seen on Malta the day before it reappeared on that dubious printout leaving there. The story is clearly false, but formed one basis of the U.S. indictment against Megrahi and Fhimah in November 1991.

And finally, Air Malta has airtight records that the 55 bags on flight 180 were all claimed by its 39 passengers. They've shown this in court, like in their libel suit against Granada television. How the bomb was sneaked around Air Malta's system was never explained or substantiated even back when Fhimah was accepted as an accomplice. Investigators tried to find evidence of Maltese collusion or corruption or incompetence, but came up only with 'well, they must have done it somehow.' After the dismissal of Giaka's Malta stories, the Zeist judges  found that accomplice not guilty, further complicating the feat for Megrahi. They admit it's hard to see just how he did it, but he must have. Guilty.

See also: JREF Forum discussion thread on the London Evidence - great discussion

Container Geometry and Blast Location

July 14

This post is just to visually work out some doubts I had about suitcase arrangement in container AVE 4041. The premise I've been thinking of is the two suitcases reported by John Bedford, taken as matching, and as both matching the single identified model - Samsonite Silhouette4000 series hardshell case, antique copper/maroony brown in color, 22x26 inch frame. (further details)

The official findings of the UK Air Accident Investigation Branch established the approximate blast center within the container. In Appexdix F of their 1990 report, Thomas Claiden placed the event near the outboard end, and near floor level - the most potent nexus, slosest to the plane's own fragile skin. Its height was found to be around ten inches above the pallet's floor level, in a suitcase placed on top of another, rather than on the floor itself. In general, I agree with these findings so far. The floor panel seems to have been shielded from the blast, and my own view will be generally the same, give or take a few inches.

The neighboring container AVN 7511 bore a 5-inch hole straight across from this blast center. Some item(s) apparently entered the fiberglass back wall of 7511. A piece of AVE4041's aluminum outboard panel, and two fragments of the primary suitcase's hinge end wound up embedded in the luggage of Heathrow-originating passengers in the next container. The hole was centered 10 inches up, and was the main fact cited by the AAIB to establish the blast height. Below, a side-by-side. "CL Estimate" explained below (see "vertical difference")  

After some reflection I've decided the clue is more ambiguous than it seems. It presupposes a directly lateral blast with no vertcal angle - a 2-d solution to a 3-d problem. A normal explosion tends to be omnidirection of course, so debris and force can travel in any straight line, so long it's generally OUT. They really have no reason to be certain of the exact height.

This comparison of Claiden's figures F-10 (inverted) and F-13 show how much ambiguity there is in the "official story." F-13 is working with an extra 25" measure to aircraft skin, which would be a bit further if that red dot were also shown 10"above the floor as labeled, not 7.5" as shown.  Compare the two10"lines at left and right F-10 is also wrong in the report, but corrected in this remix (left,backwards) At right is F-13's wrong measure.)

Inboard-Outboard Placement
Claiden's official decision was that the blast was  2"outboard - that is, towards the hull - of the upright door edge member. That is shown in F-13 (right) and would put it just behind the small outboard panel, the only metal span on that whole face, near its bottom pointed end. The AAIB's Thomas Claiden decided this because the blast had to be outboard of the vertical door edge member. That bar suffered direct blast  damage on the inner side, but not on its inboard face (right side here)

However, note in the comparison above, the outboard  edge of that yellow-shaded hole in 7511 (left edge here) is a bit outboard (left) of the door edge. The two sketches did not fit exactly, so the degree is unsure. It's nearly 2"in, so it may be significant. The apparent center of the hole, marked "+" by Claiden, suggest a blast just barely inboard (right) of that member. If so, no metal was between the blast's dead center and that fiberglass wall, aside from the suitcase frame. And its blast line would then angle slightly left, and would explain  the door edge's "shadow" being a bit outboard from straight across, as it seems to be.     

This wouldn't really conflict with Claiden's damage-based assessment, and the image at right, of different positions in the container, shows why. He called it 2"outboard only because the inboard face of the door edge member was not blast-damaged (image), and center #1 is roughly what Claiden decided. Clearly it would not impact the right hand face of that bar, but neither really would blast center #2,  which I propose. The inboard face would  technically recieve the blast, but only glancingly, not enough interference to invite pitting or burning of any notable degree. The green arrow here leads (roughly) to the sudden edge of the hole in AVN7511, a bit outboard of the blast. Only center 3 as shown here would clearly conflict with Claiden's findings and really blast that inner surface. I'm sure this isn't precise, and in fact I ammend my proposal to a hair left of the #2 as shown. But that's the concept to consider.

Vertical Difference
My proposal is of course a matching set of cases stacked one on the other, and so the thickness/depth of the model is important. At trial this was given as 8.9 inches, which I've rounded to nine. In fact, however, it might be rounded down, given the several cases stacked on top of them would cause a slight compression. This should be noted, because generally, two cases this thickseems a minor problem. If the blast height was10", it wouldhave to be centered at the very bottom of the upper case, rather than dead-center inside it.

It's not a huge problem, obviously, but one I wanted to tackle. The explosive center of the bomb radio could have simply been placed right along the bottom. But one clue complicates that: a purple case dubbed PH/137, which was probably in AVN 7511,  was apparently pierced by two pieces of the IED suitcase(s). Specifically, those pieces were from the case's magnesium alloy frame, which runs around the middle, base/hinge end. Bedfrod reported his Samsonite style brown cases as laid handle ends in, so bases towards  ANV 7511. This is consistent with them being stacked but not  rotated.

The distance between containers is unknown - I lost where I did the math on the forward hold in Fig F1, but it's not precise to begin with. It came out a tight squeeze - for  eight rows of LD3 containers, leaves about 2 inches average between the rows. I used a 1.5" and 3" distance below, app. Considering both container distance and IED placement within the suitcase, these are the approximate closest and furthest scenarios below. Note that nether is implausible, and both put the neighboring damage lower than the blast center.

The relevant line passes through the middle frame to carry a piece through that hole and intoPH/137. This is now about 15 or 16 inches above the container floor. It's way off from what the AAIB said, but  can anyone show how it must be wrong?

A Problem on the AVE 4041 Side
A possible complication arises from the face across from 7511. The closes (aft-facing) face of container AVE 4041 PA is shown diagram by Mr.Claiden, figure F-5, below. The outer frame and left-hand (outboard) panel, plus the bar across the middle, are all the metal here. The large middle span with the X would be a retractable door of blue tarp, easily shredded away by a Semtex blast. 

Intriguingly, this is the only face with no photograph present in appendix F. The image below is a screen cap of an online re-showing of an old ABC News segment. It seems to show the same things about the outboard panel: top peeled back, a large span missing in the middle, and one solid sheet, bowed out a bit, in front of the bomb position.
Why was that upper middle span never recovered? Was there another bomb on the fourth level up? And why is the lower portion, right in front of half the explosion, in one piece?  At the very very bottom, a foot below the bomb, one small spot seems missing from the outside. But one solid sheet, not even torn by the bomb so near, rests above it. From the inside, the bottom couple inches of the vertical bar are severely pitted. This is shown at right, with the mysterious panel not attached (so no interior view of it). This extremely low damage is puzzling in any scenario I favor so far.

But the intact panel is strangest of all. It is more consistent with my inboard blast center notion, in which the dead-center at least is not behind the panel. But it's not consistent enough. That too would at least tear that panel severely. And there was that piece of container skin that was found stuck in the heel of a shoe within the next container  - where did it come from if not this span between the low-level bomb and the hole into AVN 7511?

Perhaps there's a simple explanation, but it eludes me for now.

AVN 7511 PA and its Clues

June 25 2010

This site has previously covered aluminum luggage container AVE 4041 PA, which clearly had contained the explosive device that destroyed Flight 103. Of the many other container in the hold as the bomb went off, only one has any investigative importance – AVN 7511, same model but made of fiberglass, was parked next to the blast container, immediately aft, in position 21L.

Below are two illustrations from the AAIB’s report – a sketch by Mr. Claiden, and a photograph. This what would normally be called the back face of the container’s back wall, but was forward-facing when loaded. This surface was just inches from AVE 4041’s front side when the blast happened.
A container’s front (loading) side is open – apart from a small outboard side panel, it’s essentially one absent wall, with the bags secured in flight using a retractable blue tarp door that latches at the bottom. This would provide little protection to AVN 7511, but might help cause the dark spatters at lower right, directly opposite the blast zone. The marked cut-off of the mess on the right-hand side is the edge of the door/flap, where the metal side panel starts.

This whole container wall is cracked in several areas, and exactly what here is blast damage vs. damage from the fall and landing is unsure. But we know the bomb suitcase in the lower outboard corner of its container, roughly ten inches above floor level. Note a span of damage near the bottom, starting at about that height (I measured it). The outer layer of glossed fiberglass is removed, leaving the fibrous under-layer exposed. And at the right end of that, something seems to have punched a small hole clear through the container’s back wall (highlighted yellow in Claiden’s sketch).

This damage is in fact directly across from the precise blast center. Its sudden right vertical edge marks about the dead center, again cut-off by the door edge. Claiden cites this five-inch hole as the main clue establishing the level of the blast inside AVE 4041, consistent with a flat-laid case on the second level up. The reasoning seems sound enough. The hole itself by my measurement starts ten inches up, and its center is about 12.5 iches, suggesting the blast center is a tad higher than Claiden found, which I already suspected.

What punched the hole?
One explanation mentioned for this puncture is the securable metal end of AVE 4041’s retractable tarp door. This seems to ne the main explanation, and seems plausible enough, but this lone entry has some competition for what made it.

One piece of damaged luggage – a purple canvas carryall labeled PH/137 – held a clue. Actually it held two clues, pieces of magnesium suitcase frame called PT/22, found to be from the bottom (hinge) end of the primary suitcase. PH/137 was the subject of some contention at trial, being both London-origin luggage and apparently blast-damaged. It’s generally thought that all damaged luggage was in container AVE 4041 and none of that was of London origin. (This will be explained better elsewhere).

I’ve already posted some strangely evasive statements by Allen Feraday about his and Dr. Hayes’ treatment of this case. In the broader discussion I hadn’t seen then, the nagging question no one could answer clearly was whether this bag had been inside AVE 4041 or AVN 7511. No one can say for sure, but it does seem possible that those bits called PT/22 created that hole before burying themselves in that purple bag next door. Otherwise, it was in the same container, and raises some questions about what was in 4041.

A stranger culprit can be found in TSH/346, a severely distorted steel suitcase frame, found to be 2030 millimetres in length. That’s 80 inches, nearly seven feet. It was originally from a 29-inch blue, softshell American Tourister brand suitcase, apparently blasted open and flayed out. This important piece of luggage (as explained in a separate post) is thought to have been right under the bomb suitcase.

But among the items removed from this mammoth TSH/346 was PT/39(c), “a fragment of fibreglass/plastics from AVN 7511 PA.” Is it possible this whole length of frame was hurled across and smacked the top off that fiberglass? The whole broad strip of damage runs across about 55 inches, or nearly the whole door width.

Unlikely. The rough strip is neither above nor below the blast, as that American Tourister was thought to be. What should hit along that line is superheated debris from the Samsoinite holding the bomb, high-pressure explosive gasses, and a shower of melting tarp. Perhaps TSH/346 just partially impacted that lower portion in the center. And perhaps there’s a bit of theater in that fiberglass find. It wouldn’t be the first time something shady happened around that luggage.

Lightly Explosion Damaged

Two Scientists, a Purple Bag, and a Possible Clue
Adam Larson / Caustic Logic
First posted Nov 29 2009
re-posted here March 23 2010


Going through the court transcripts of the Lockerbie trial at Camp Zeist, one point of interest that I ran across concerns the testimony of RARDE scientist Allen Feraday. This was on June 15 2000, day 21 of the trial (read the LTBU daily report in .doc format, outlining some of the controversies). The witness himself reportedly has little in the line of formal qualifications, citing a “higher certificate in applied physics” as his qualifications; He’s still conceivably capable of brilliant professional work; but judging by some previous high-profile anti-terrorism cases he’s been involved in, he could be seen as more of a “manager” of evidence than a reasonable assessor of it.

Feraday’s scientific findings relating to the Lockerbie investigation are inextricably linked and confused with those of his underling, Dr. Thomas Hayes, who has a proper PhD. I don’t know the arrangement, but Ferraday mentions analysis of the luggage and clothing that “was essentially done relatively early on, by Dr. Hayes, and then, obviously, checked by me.” (p 3328) The two are more famous for their handling of the miraculous timer fragment PT/35(b); Hayes found it in a shirt collar and alerted Feraday, who passed the news on to Williamson, and thence to Henderson, Marquise, Thurman, “Orkin” and the history books. In testimony Feraday also clarified the interchangeable nature of their collaboration “I did not always, when I was looking at [evidence], make any difference between myself and Hayes” (p. 3332)

The prosecution generally seemed to feel the same way; their habit of asking questions of Feraday better suited for the earlier witness led Mr. Keen to lodge for private audience with the judges. Once Feraday was sent from the room, Keen argued in part:
According to the evidence of this witness, he prepared the final report on the basis of his examination of certain matters, and by considering Dr. Hayes' notes. What my learned friend appears to be inviting is hearsay evidence […] I object to the Crown canvassing hearsay evidence, even in the context of what is referred to as a joint report, in respect of such a matter. If they wish to take direct evidence on this issue, then they had ample opportunity of doing so with Dr. Hayes. And in my submission, it is not competent for them to take hearsay evidence on this matter from Mr. Feraday. (pp 3215-3216)

Nonetheless the questioning continued in a similar line, a hundred pages later coming to my point of interest, the unusual collaboration on another piece of evidence: a damaged piece of luggage, described as “a purple-coloured holdall” and labeled PH/137. This bag, Feraday had wrtten in his final report of 1989, had within it two metal fragments “which both originate from the primary IED suitcase,” so it should be of some interest. Mr. Keen for the Defense addressed Dr. Hayes' draft report during his questioning of Feraday. He cited page 23 as listing categories including "Likely Explosion Damaged Luggage,” and noted that one item listed in that heading is PH/137. Feraday confirmed these facts while comparing with his own copy.
Q So from Dr. Hayes' draft report -- and I think you just told us he prepared this part of the report -- we can see that he designated this as explosion-damaged luggage?
A I think it was lightly --
Q Lightly explosion-damaged luggage?
A Yes.
(pp 3330-3331)

This attitude would help explain Feraday’s own notes, Production 1498, in which Keen noted “that nowhere in the index” and in fact “nowhere in your examination notes does the item PH/137 appear.” The witness confirms to both “that's correct, sir. Yes.” Of course lightly blast-damaged was a fudging statement and further probing shows him to believe it wasn’t in the explosion damage at all. Next Mr, Keen pulled up a photograph of this item. (Production 181, photograph 91)
Q It is apparent, is it not, Mr. Feraday, that you have not signed the label as it is photographed in photograph 91?
A That's correct, sir. Yes.
Q But your signature now appears on the label PH/137 in court?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you sign that label, Mr. Feraday?
A When I had the bag back to write this -- the final report.
Q And what date was that, Mr. Feraday?
A I can't tell you without looking it up again on a list, I'm afraid.
Q Are you saying that that was before December 1991?
A I think it must be, yes. I finished the report by then, so yes.
Q And are you saying that you examined PH/137 before you finished the report?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where are the notes of that examination, Mr. Feraday?
A Well, there aren't any, because as I said, I did not always, when I was looking at them, make any difference between myself and Hayes -- although in this instance I did, and I told him so, that in my opinion you couldn't necessarily put that in the explosion damage. I couldn't convince myself that it was explosion damage. Prior to that, Hayes had written this preliminary report for another purpose -- I think the Fatal Accident Inquiry --
(pp 3331-3333)

So if I’m reading this right, he disagrees with the actual PhD scientist, but did no detailed, documented, admissible examination of his own to back this up. He couldn't recall when he made his divergent inspection, but did immediately recall that he made no notes for it. His lack of notes in turn is justified "because" they agree on things, "although" not in this case. Got it.

Notes or not, the reason for Feraday’s divergence seems to be an unexplained lack of conviction, with which Hayes lodged no disagreement:
Q And you recall --
A Sorry, I'm waiting for the --
Q I don't think you had finished, Mr. Feraday, so do finish your answer if you wish.
A Sorry. I came to the conclusion that I couldn't myself put it in the explosion – necessarily in the explosion-damaged baggage. I'm not saying it isn't, but I couldn't convince myself. And I still can't. And for that reason, I had a word with Hayes, and we agreed to put it in the second section.
Q So you -- you recall discussing this with Dr. Hayes, do you?
A At some stage I discussed it with Dr. Hayes, but I can't remember exactly when or if, in fact, it was when the -- I wrote the final report. And then Hayes certainly came in, obviously, and read it all and then signed, and we went through each item then. We through the report, if you like, line by line.
Q Line by line, Mr. Feraday?
A Well, he read through it, obviously, line by line.
(pp 3333-3334)

This implies no disagreement; Hayes was able to check Feraday’s findings and found no problem with the exclusion of PH/137 that Feraday had already decided on and reported. Next, Mr. Keen turned to Feraday’s given reasoning, in that report, to support his agnosticism.
Q If you would like to turn for a moment, Mr. Feraday, to your report 181 at page 51.
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, we can read this section for ourselves, but I'd like to look in particular at the third paragraph on that page, which you corrected during your examination in chief chief [a meeting just before his questioning - ed] by proposing the insertion, after the fourth word in the first line, of the word "other"?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, taking the paragraph, of course, in its context, can we read that corrected paragraph. It states: "As there are no other penetration holes in either the holdall or the plastics bag, it appears most likely that these two fragments, which both originate from the primary IED suitcase, were picked up and placed inside the plastics bag, which was then itself
placed inside the purple holdall for convenience of carriage."
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, I have to suggest, Mr. Feraday, that if you insert the word "other" into that paragraph in the context of this section, the paragraph is deprived of sense or content.
A Is ... ?
Q Deprived of any sense or content. It tells us absolutely nothing if you correct it in that way. What do you say to that?
A I am not sure what you mean. But what it would then say is as there are no other penetration -- at the top of the page, I am talking about the ragged horizontal cuts which, obviously, one can see as penetrations. I see them as cuts. Now, in dealing with, first of all, the holdall, there are no other penetration holes in it, other than those that I've already said about the cuts. And in the plastics bag, there were none, the plastics bag which contained the two fragments of metal from the suitcase. So I was left scratching my head as to how they can get inside there, in a plastics bag, if they didn't come through any part of the bag.
Q Do you --
A I can't convince myself they come through the ragged cuts.
Q You recollect the label attached to the plastics bag, Mr. Feraday, having said "two pieces of metal, charred, found within baggage."
A Yes, I do, sir.
Q And you recollect finding penetrations in the side of the bag that went right through to the interior of the bag?
A Horizontal cuts, yes, sir.
Q But you felt it pertinent to remind us that there were no other penetrations in the bag, Mr. Feraday; is that right?
A Not big enough for the -- for anything to do with the two pieces of metal. That's correct, sir, yes.
Q But the penetrations you'd already found were big enough for the penetration of the two bits of metal?
A Oh, yes, sir.

Q Well, that might be an appropriate point, My Lords, if there is to be a short adjournment.
LORD SUTHERLAND: Yes, very well. We'll adjourn for 15 minutes.
(3334-3336)


I can only paraphrase Michael Palin in The Holy Grail “what a strange person.” Mr. Feraday’s stated reasoning then seems to be that even though these shards could fit through the penetrations if explosively hurled there, he couldn't convince himself this was what happened and chose to think of them as surface "cuts." Who knows what caused these cuts - perhaps the hold-all fell through a tree before landing. And the two unrelated IED suitcase bits were found elsewhere and simply put in the bag far carrying, with no note about being found elsewhere. His report first supported this saying there were "no penetrations" in the bag, corrected only in his examination in chief (a meeting just before his questioning) to "no other pentrations," aside from the "cuts" that they probably did enter through.

His references to the plastic bag is curious. This would clearly seem an ad hoc evidence bag (probably not a proper one or he’d teerm it as such), into which the shards were placed after being found. This would be a careless and illogical move, but I don't see anything else making sense. Transferring these also into a bag they weren’t found in makes this faux pas worse – something Mr. Feraday should have reported rather than just using it as he did to remove the explosion from PH/137. A lack of damage to this evidence bag is also cited as a clue these didn't fly in thru the cuts: “[T]here are no other penetration holes […] in the plastics bag […] which contained the two fragments of metal from the suitcase. So I was left scratching my head as to how they can get inside there, in a plastics bag, if they didn't come through any part of the bag.” This in particular is a ridiculous non-sequitur, but another clue to Feraday this was not explosion damage.

In the most rational explanation for this thought process, perhaps he just meant, "obviously, the bomb didn't put these metal shards in the plastic bag, one of our people did. Therefore, they probably got the scraps from somewhere else, but threw them in there instead." And perhaps if we could see the evidence we'd see why he felt the shards did not just enter through the tears. But for whatever intention, he effectively erased this piece of evidence from the bomb site picture – where Dr. Hayes had already placed it - based on his unexplained solution.

Although he comes across looking incompetent – nearly always looking at the wrong exhibit and frequently befuddled - I suspect Feraday is not actually an idiot. Therefore, if he seems like one, he may be playing dumb and that's often a clue. However I simply don't have the information to know just what this might mean. Detailed information on loading procedures at Heathrow could tip us off to where this bag might have wound up. Was the location of this item relative to, say, the Bedford suitcase, troubling in some way? Considering Feraday's strained logic over this issue, I suspect we may be looking at a valuable clue, if just another on the pile indicating he was not playing on the level with this investigation.

The "Elimination" of the Bedford Suitcase(s)

(almost complete article in progress)

Note: Having a look now at David Leppard's book, I've decided to split the old post into two new ones, joined here. The first comments below reflect the previous version. This post will discuss both tracks, an official report and a dramatic blowing-up of things by political scientists, in general terms, how they relate in altering the course of the investigation. The switch was from an obvious and useful lead that neither the Americans nor Brits wanted to follow. And it was to a confusing muck in which a new plot could eventually be "discovered" and followed.

Also, here I'll address the decidedly non-scietific aspect in how this valid forensics work was twisted to insist something it simply couldn't do - "the bomb bag had to have come from Frankfurt and before that... we'll think of something. Just give us some time, okay?"

Shuffling Aside Bedford's Baggage
Not a whisker of the Libyan guilt storyline could have emerged if not for a key decision made early on about where the bomb came in from before being loaded onto PA 103. The official presumption was that the bomb had arrived in London on Pan Am 103A, a feeder flight / flirst-leg originating in Frankfurt, West Germany. Acceptance of this premise allowed a bag from Malta, and all that was attached to that, and eventually a guilty verdict for al Megrahi,

It was clear which luggage container had held the bomb; that was named AVE4041PA, and had been loaded first with various luggage at Heathrow, then filled with bags from PA 103A. As it was finally loaded, most luggage in 4041 was from Frankfurt, so by sheer numbers the bomb would more likely be in the majority batch. Perhaps riding on that wave of thought, on March 28 1989 Senior Investigating Officer (top Scot) John Orr told investigators gathered at the Lockerbie Incident Control Center (LICC):
“Evidence from witnesses is to the effect that the first seven pieces of luggage in the container belonged to Interline passengers and the remainder was Frankfurt luggage. […] To date 14 pieces of explosive-damaged baggage have been recovered and enquiries to date suggest that on the balance of probabilities the explosive device is likely to be amongst the Frankfurt baggage items. Of all the currently identified explosion-damaged luggage all but one item originated from Frankfurt.” [1, bold was LICC italics in original]
In this Frankfurt/London distinction for those damaged, one must wonder how he categorized the “primary suitcase,” the only brown, hardshell Samsonite among them. It matched the description and approximate location (see below) of the two maroony-brown hardshell Samsonites John Bedford reported as being in the container. These were loaded well before the German feeder arrived, and as blogger "Baz" points out, the "effect" that this was all interline baggage was not from "evidence from witnesses" but from the name of the shed (interline) where the suspect bags were inserted. They therefore constituted unwanted baggage that would have to be factually shuffled aside before the eventual story could unfold as it did.

The Sciencey Stuff - Two Tracks
Two tracks we can assess in some detail are covered that way in separate posts. First I recommend
part 1
the investigation, images, and explanations of Mr. Thomas Claiden. He assembled appendix F for the UK Air Accident Investigation Branch report on the Lockerbie non-accident. Based on decent forensics reasoning, he concluded the suitcase with the bomb was almost certainly not directly on the main floor panel, but otherwise at almost floor level, outboard aft quarter, or just above the left-hand Bedford suitcase, and slid a little left into the sloped-floor overhang area. This was only published in 1990, but it's more visual, which helps one form their own opinion from the damage. I don't disagree with anything of the essence here, it just doesn't say anything.

Track two is the Indian Head Forensics Tests of 1989. The tests showed that the reading inherent in the AAIB report was correct - the bomb was one layer up and not on the main floor. So the results were the same, if more dramatic and less public in their documentation.

Ultimately, the conclusion that Frankfurt was indicated relies on a stated assumption that the Bedford cases could not possibly have been stacked one on the other. If someone had stacked them, perhaps to make room for their feet as they prepared to load from 103A, the top one would be in the exact spot of the detonation. I suspect that's what happened.

Zeist Judges' Speculation
The judges at the 2000 trial explained the significance, by universal custom taking Bedford's cases as singular, in their final opinion.
It was argued on behalf of the accused that the suitcase described by Mr Bedford could well have been the primary suitcase, particularly as the evidence did not disclose that any fragments of a hard-shell Samsonite-type suitcase had been recovered, apart from those of the primary suitcase itself. [para 25]
Bedford then took container 4041 with 6-7 cases, to the "build-up area" and went home. It was taken to meet Pan Am 103A, and the case against Megrhahi was based on the "primary suitcase" being loaded from that luggage, and that based on the fact that it wasn't on the floor. For such an important aspect of the case, the exact details of where such a bag would end up later are hard to predict well, and impossible to predict with certainty. The judges are clearly aware of this:
"It was submitted that there was evidence that an American Tourister suitcase, which had travelled from Frankfurt, fragments of which had been recovered, had been very intimately involved in the explosion and could have been placed under the suitcase spoken to by Mr Bedford."
That might seem like a good clue why this bag wasn’t on the floor, but with a usual spherical propagation, the blast could cause the same damage if this suitcase was above it, below it, or beside it, depending on how they were arranged. That non sequitur leads to mental gymnastics to the effect that if a Frankfurt bag got under the ones Bedford saw, then anything is possible and two Samsonites are thus smeared out of relevance to make way for their brown Samsonite (I'm fairly sure it's the one reported by Giaka).
"That would have required rearrangement of the items in the container, but such rearrangement could easily have occurred when the baggage from Frankfurt was being put into the container on the tarmac at Heathrow. It is true that such a rearrangement could have occurred, but if there was such a rearrangement, the suitcase described by Mr Bedford might have been placed at some more remote corner of the container."
They might have been pushed over there, and never seen since, who knows. But we're quite certain they were not simply stacked up and pushed a few inches to the nearest 'corner.' The only thing solid they seemed to have was “the effect of forensic evidence was that the suitcase could not have been directly in contact with the floor of the container.” Emphasis mine, wishful reasoning theirs. See the above section for what that was all about.

Nowhere along the line were intact suitcases matching Mr. Bedford's story ever been produced intact and explained away. It's as if they both just disappeared. Or blew into tiny bits.