Showing posts with label Megrahi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Megrahi. Show all posts
Permanent Second-toTop-Post / Start Point
(last real update 29 November 2010)
Welcome to “The Lockerbie Divide,” a site dedicated to addressing the mountainous divide in opinion that exists over Truth and Justice regarding the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103. Some samples of the two sides can be glimpsed in a related essay, and it should be clear they are not equal in numbers or influence, nor in accuracy. One side wins on power, the other on Truth. Obviously I’m in the latter camp, but it’s more than just hyperbole at work.
The material on this site is all written by myself unless otherwise noted. My own posts vary from empty marked (incomplete) to major essays. Some is little more than "thinking out loud" and subject to change, but much else is actually at the cutting edge of what anyone knows about the case.
The original plan for this site was to gather some of the amazing talent I'd encountered on the Internet into a powerful site for crossing and wearing down the divide. And I have gratefully accepted some amazing contributions from others:
> Dr. Jim Swire, leader of the British families of PA103 group - Comment on creation of the Lockerbie Divide
> Professor Robert Black QC, Lockerbie Trial "architect" - From Lockerbie to Zeist (via Tripoli, Tunis, and Cairo) (re-published from a book, on-line exclusive)
> Robert Forester, Justice For Megrahi campaign founding member - Circumstantial Jigsaw Puzzle, and also Justice for Megrahi Campaign (details about the group)
> Barry Walker, inspired theorist - Camp Zeist: Perils and Pitfalls of a Designer Trial
> Patrick Haseldine, former public servant - The South Africans Theory with rebuttals by myself and Robert Forrester
And then, posts by others that weren't submitted, but taken by me, with generalized permission, from other sources.
>"Rolfe," JREF forum inspired researcher/commentator
- Some Background on Karol Sikora
- Rewards and Bribery
These are now both among my most-viewed posts here. More excellence from Rolfe will be coming up (with a head's-up next time).
> Various: Richard Marquise Disputes the Findings of the Zeist Court. Awesome comments from a post at The Lockerbie Case by Richard Marquise, Rolfe, Matt Berkley, Jo G, Ben Six, Ebol (the Bolliers), Full Inquiry, and myself. Subject: the FBI SCOTBOM chief's continued promotion of the evidence of "witness" Abdul Majid Giaka.
And finally, words by many people besides me skimmed from different sources, expressing doubts (or inverse certainty) about Megrahi's guilt. Recently updated, with 84 names, no Libyans or their lawyers, no known crackpots, just several QCs, lawyers, political and religious leaders, reputable journalists, academics, and experts speaking of their doubts. A varied list including Robert Baer, Noam Chomsky, David Frum, Margaret Thatcher (sort of), and Archbishop Desmond Tutu.
> No one Seriously Doubts the Libyan's Guilt?
Also, learn about the Justice for Megrahi Campaign
How this site works:
The post-dated blog format usually brings the newest post to the top, and I usually put the newest posts right beneath this. But I also reassign dates and times to bring certain articles near the top or further down. Simply scrolling the page may be confusing, especially if one is not familiar with the details of the case. The more useful organization starts here and progresses with links.
Comments and questions are encouraged wherever there's a "post a comment" type link. I offer heartfelt thanks to anyone who takes the time to read and engage this material. You’re probably here to learn something, whether you realize it or not, and I’d like to help.
The Sources
The information on this site draws from a variety of sources: official reports (PDF), books, magazine and Internet articles, opinions and commentary, digital videos, photographs, and most importantly Megrahi's second appeal paperwork (see link to the right, second from top) and the complete (?) transcripts of the 2000 trial at Camp Zeist. This is not openly available to most people, but I've been blessed with a full copy - over 10,000 inefficiently-formatted pages of people talking in great detail, for 87 days, about the evidence al Megrahi was convicted on. It's proven very useful so far in clarifying details, and will continue to offer gems to those who follow this site. Many of my sources, aside from the trial transcripts, will be gathered at the post Lockerbie Documents.
More Bite-sized
Guided tour of the case against Megrahi if you feel you're ready to look at the actual evidence.
- Images and introductions to 12 key points of the case can be found in my Lockerbie cards collection.
- And for those willing to learn but not in the mood to read, there's a page that links to numerous videos on the subject.
Anyone intrigued or infuriated or otherwise willing to give me a piece of your mind, I'm willing to accept. I can be reached by e-mail at
caustic_logic@yahoo.com
- Adam Larson aka Caustic Logic
Spokane, WA, USA
20 August 2009
MacAskill’s Two-Track Railroad: part 10/10
Leaving Glasgow
20 August 2010
Note, August 20 2011: One year ago I posted this, to mark the one year anniversary of al-Megrahi's release. Two years on, he's still alive as Libya is murdered over rumors (like sniping children, "bombing his own people," etc.), and people are still mad about what Libya's "gotten away with." Anyway, this day marks another one of shame in the long and sad history of the grinding down of Libya and its people. Mr. al-Megrahi flew home permanently guilty. The events of Agust two years ago explain how. We know why. The saga starts, as I told it a year ago, on August 3. That post is below, and links carry one through the sickening process from there.
Note, Oct. 16: I just noticed again that August 20, that fatefully two-year anniversary, was the start date of the final rebel push on Tripoli that seemed to succeed in only two days. Uncanny timing, that.
<< Previous: 19 August
One year ago today Kenny MacAskill announced and enacted the decision he made the previous day - to release Abdelbaset al Megrahi to his native Libya. At midday the BBC announced:
Another BBC story later in the day explained what came next:
That was hardly the end of the story, but it is the end of this series of articles.
Leaving Glasgow
20 August 2010
Note, August 20 2011: One year ago I posted this, to mark the one year anniversary of al-Megrahi's release. Two years on, he's still alive as Libya is murdered over rumors (like sniping children, "bombing his own people," etc.), and people are still mad about what Libya's "gotten away with." Anyway, this day marks another one of shame in the long and sad history of the grinding down of Libya and its people. Mr. al-Megrahi flew home permanently guilty. The events of Agust two years ago explain how. We know why. The saga starts, as I told it a year ago, on August 3. That post is below, and links carry one through the sickening process from there.
Note, Oct. 16: I just noticed again that August 20, that fatefully two-year anniversary, was the start date of the final rebel push on Tripoli that seemed to succeed in only two days. Uncanny timing, that.
<< Previous: 19 August
One year ago today Kenny MacAskill announced and enacted the decision he made the previous day - to release Abdelbaset al Megrahi to his native Libya. At midday the BBC announced:
[Megrahi] will be flown home to Tripoli from Glasgow this afternoon following an announcement by Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill. ... A spokesman for the administration insisted the decision had been reached "on the basis of clear evidence and on no other factors.The promised appeearance came across the airwaves an hour later, at 1300 BST, from the Scottish Government's ministerial headquarters in Edinburgh. MacAskill was in top form, explaining the decision with flourishes like "compassion and mercy are about upholding the beliefs that we seek to live by, remaining true to our values as a people..." It droned on for a bit.
Another BBC story later in the day explained what came next:
A police convoy left Greenock Prison, where Megrahi was serving his sentence, just an hour after the announcement of his release was made.With a white scarf across his face to protect from infection, Megrahi labored up the ramp, looking like a human white flag of surrender flapping in the breeze. The colorful Libyan jet took off at 1530 BST, just two-and-a-half hours after MacAskill first opened his mouth to explain. It muscled up into the sky, away from Glasgow, and banked south towards home.
It was greeting by angry jeers from a small group of local residents.
Megrahi was taken to Glasgow Airport where he boarded an Afriqiyah Airways Airbus plane bound for Tripoli, wearing a white track suit and clutching his prison release papers.
That was hardly the end of the story, but it is the end of this series of articles.
Sent Out to Lie
Review: The Loockerbie Bomber: Sent Home to Die
finished 3 October 2010
last edit 4/10
Production company: STV, Scotland.
Air date: August 2010
ex prod: Gordon MacMillan
prod: Donald John MacDonald, David Cowan
STV Youtube posting (embedding disabled)
---
I’m a little late to watch and review this video, which might just be the most strategically deceptive thing I’ve yet seen or on the subject of Megrahi’s guilt. Most of its lies are of the omission type, like ignoring the hundreds of credible critics of the official story on Pan Am 103. The lone voice they present for the other view, Dr. Jim Swire, told the crew he felt “the circumstances of my daughter’s murder have become wrapped up tissue of lies. Something terrible is being covered up.” (32:17) The video that abuses and dismisses his position at every turn is clearly a continuation of that same fabric, hoping to wrap up all his - and many others’ - outstanding questions and chuck them forever in the dust bin.
The 46 minute video is tightly–paced and split into four parts. The first covers the horror, the scale, and the loss of the bombing over and in Lockerbie. Part two relates the popular mythology of how Libya’s guilt, via Megrahi, was discovered. The investigation, indictments, sanctions (nearly a decade glossed over in two sentences), and everything up to the trial at Camp Zeist are packed in there. Part three briefly mentions the 9-month trial and then tries way too hard to clear up the continuing doubts about Megrahi’s conviction there. This is supposed to wipe the slate for the pivotal part 4, which explains how the “Lockerbie bomber” was sent home to die, but then didn’t.
The intro starts by noting the disastrous "compassionate release" all the way to Tripoli was "against the wishes of the most powerful country in the world," as if the power of those who disagree should matter. I didn't know China much cared, but the producers will have you know the SNP has made powerful enemies for the British with its stupid (or...???) decision.
The actual video opens with a long stretch on the horror of the crash, which, again, the best (discarded) evidence suggest was done by the PFLP-GC, for Iran, using a Khreesat-style altimeter bomb loaded in London. The amount of pain or fire doesn't in itself add anything to who's guilty, just to how mad you should be, at how horrible this mass murderer’s act was. Then for a change, it goes to how tragic loss of so many wonderful people was, so you can get sad before getting mad again. It’s a well done and touching segment, to be honest. Mentally, however, it’s counterproductive to thinking straight, and only primes the audience for the coming barrage of deception.
About 12 minutes in the PFLP-GC and Iran Air 655 as possible motive are mentioned, and FBI chief investigator Richard Marquise admits that sounds like a logical assumption. But the notion is here first framed as something the CIA had tried to say once, with "no evidence" of an Iran-PFLP-GC link ever found. It could be fairly said there was no proof, but much evidence exists, a bit of it presented in the preceding minute of this very video. There was not one but four radio bombs found, and a fifth that never turned up - unless it did. These were set by altimeter and a crude "timer" set to blow 35-45 min. after takeoff (that's the simple version - deeper here). PA103 blew up 38 minutes after leaving Heathrow, officially a coincidence of poor Libyan timing.
On forensic findings
Finally at 14:24, after discussing the "fortunate"bomb placement that actually best supports a London introduction, the video gets to the specific evidence that would matter for convicting Megrahi. In thirty seconds it says a lot that leaves out a lot:
And thirdly, even if Wyatt is far off, the clearest "proof" of the radio model is this, PK/689, the paper manual cover. You know it was inside the box 2" from the blast center not because it was reduced to ash, but because it's lightly singed, torn, and says, plain as day, "BomBeat." The lady that turned in PK/689 said the paper she saw was fully intact when she found it, and that hasn't been challenged. Officially then, it was made "a bit tatty around the edges" by the semtex blast, and ripped nearly to shreds by forensics tests.
The radio model thus established not only pointed away from the Iran line, but also suggested Libyan authorship. Convenient.
The scorched clothing - blue babygro, Yorkie trousers, black umbrella, slalom shirt, and others - is also challenged by Dr. Wyatt’s findings. Being at least outside the radio's cardboard box, it's to a lesser degree than the radio and timer, and I for one am agnostic on whether they’re authentic. But they were convenient also, pointing to Malta and, by extension, to Libya.
To Malta and Gauci
The story of the clothes’ identification and tracing to Malta seems to be conveyed fairly, although the details, relying on the recall of detective John Crawford, are a bit fuzzy. The trousers in particular led them to the Yorkie clothing factory on the tiny island nation, who had the papers to show the very few pairs of that batch were sold to one shop only – Mary’s House in Silema, run by the Gauci family. One fateful pair was apparently bought there brand new by someone linked to the bombing and f*****g stupid. The clarity of the lead was the "stuff of detective novels," says George Esson, Chief Constable of Dumfries and Galloway Police in 1991. It was all "fantastic," "almost unbelievable." Why "almost," George?
Starting at 15:45 they discuss the pivotal witness Tony Gauci, the shopkeeper on duty at Mary's House when those clothes were sold, and his supposed identification of Megrahi as the bird-brained buyer. As the video later notes, Gauci's reliability remains hotly contested, and he “has never said with absolute certainty that al Megrahi was the man" who bought the trousers and babygro.
In fact he’s never said he was the man at all, who he says was at least 4 inches taller and 14 years older than our villain. Just going on faces, he pointed at a photo of Megrahi in 1991 and said it was "similar to the man ... He would perhaps have to look about ten years older,” which he didn’t. Later in 1999 at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands, he pointed to the by-then famous “Lockerbie bomber” in person and said "“not exactly the man I saw in the shop.” Clearly Detective Crawford’s take “when he got to number 8, he said “that’s the man,” is misleading. (18:10)
At 17:29, Richard Marquise says again that Megrahi "had been in Malta the day the clothing purchase was made, December 7." This is a big lie and he’s had that pointed out to him prior to this interview. Note he emphasizes “actual immigration records,” as if that's the issue. In fact, the top Scot on Malta, Harry Bell, essentially admitted in 2007 that Megrahi's presence on December 7 was the reason the date of purchase was changed. Gauci clearly describes November 23, when Megrahi has an alibi, but there was a very slim case for it being December 7, and that’s what it became. Gauci can be observed at trial being more vague on all the points that conflict between the two days. But the judges seem to have missed that (see link for details).
And the money situation ... we'll return to that one.
A bomb from Malta
Having "established" Megrahi’s link to the clothing, at 22:07 crown prosecutor John Logue cogently relates the official story of the unaccompanied bag from Malta. The tight and coherent evidence from Air Malta's end says clearly there was no such suitcase on KM180, and opposing it we have wishful thinking plus one unusual record from Frankfurt, with all supports and comparison records somehow vanished with no clear explanation. If it weren’t for the fluke of the computer printout for PA103A, salvaged from an airport employee's locker, investigators would have no record at all of what happened at Frankfurt that day. Air Malta had everything and it was in order, but it differed from what the locker-paper said, so was pushed aside by investigators, by Scottish judges, and certainly by crown prosecutors in between them.
After ignoring these troubles with the notion of a bomb from Malta getting onto 103, the video turns to the evidence that Megrahi was at the airport on Malta December 21 - under a false name. This seems to be solid, and at 22:25 he is caught in a lie to a journalist, denying his presence there. This secrecy probably was related to the false passport and the secret mission he was likely on for Tripoli, and it was unwise to continue denying at the time of that interview in 1992.
But as far as we can tell, Megrahi's unrelated secret mission on that day is precisely why he was chosen as the route to frame Libya, and why evidence pointing to Malta was concocted. It could also explain why Mohammed Abu Talb was chased for a while, but that's too esoteric for most. At any rate, the missing context is the lack of any good evidence his mission was to blow up a plane, and the presence of any bomb on Malta that morning is what’s solidly in question here.
The locker-paper from Frankfurt had suggested (but far from proved) an unaccompanied item from Malta getting onto the doomed 747, but not what kind it would be. This was previously filled in by a witness who said he saw Megrahi with a brown hard-shell Samsonite - like the bomb was packed in - the day before the bombing, on his arrival from Tripoli. Unfortunately, the witness, Abdul Majid Giaka, made this story up for the FBI only in 1991, after learning what type of case he needed to "remember." (And after being given no choice but to come up with something just like that.) The judges dismissed this point of evidence, as well as the rest of what Giaka had to say (and it was a lot) at trial in 2000. As far as I can tell, Giaka and his claims are entirely absent from this video, as if he never existed - another lie of omission, and a rather glaring one.
On the timer fragment
(18:40) The video's approach is standard and brief. A piece of circuit board dubbed PT/35(b) was discovered, and later matched to a timer called MST-13, made by Mebo, a company with links to Libya. This information was obtained from the CIA, who held a comparison model. Identifying FBI agent, "Tom" Thurman, related again his 1990 epiphany comparing a photo to something under a microscope (there are many versions he's told). He explained "I could not believe it under any circumstances, and it was there," so he believed it and so did everyone else.
Myriad logical problems and questions plague this alleged timer (see PT/35(b) link). Why was it set so early, when a couple more hours would safely bury the evidence at sea? Why is the corner they found the only one so distinctly recognizable? The narrator starts by describing the prominent 1/2"square fragment as "tiny," and Marquise later implies that contrary to what critics say, it was not too small to have been found - because it was found, duh!
In fact the key problem for this item is that it's far too large to have been inside the bomb, maybe 2 inches from at least 450 grams of semtex. Dr. Wyatt's tests cited above in relation to the radio itself, were publicized in January 2010 in connection with this crucial evidence more than with the radio. As his work strongly suggests, this thing was put into the wreckage by something (or someone) other than the bomb. Therefore, its ability to implicate Libya might be better evidence for a frame-up than for a bombing.
On the conspiracy theorist
Part three starts with the trial’s end (around 24:15). Megrahi was now ruled guilty, and his accomplice Fhimah was somehow found not guilty. To mention why would require bringing in Giaka, and raise troubling questions. The video does not mention why he was found not guilty, probably some technicality.
"But not everyone was convinced," the narrator ominously intones, turning to Dr. Jim Swire. He's not only a critic of the official story, but feels Libya and Megrahi were consciously framed by the US and UK governments. This blogger agrees that, politically correct or not, tha' the most logical explanation for what happened. The editors selected a video of Swire solitarily approaching a podium on the court's expansive plaza, and then mentioned no one else who holds views like his. With both of these choices, the video creates the impression that Swire is the only one who needs convincing and what the hell's wrong with him?
Just before introducing the loner, US family member Bob Monetti said “if you follow it every day and have an open mind, it became overwhelmingly obvious that Megrahi was guilty.” But Swire insists it was close attention to the trial that solidified his doubts about Libya’s guilt. Having read much of it myself by now, I agree with him, and I suspect Mr. Monetti did not follow as open-mindedly as he claims.
Further, Dr. Swire’s lone claims "infuriate" the leaders of the investigation that led to Megrahi being blamed. Top Scot, SIO Stuart Henderson, says at 26:21:
Lawyers are then called on – even those who support Megrahi’s innocence – to strengthen the stance that there was no conspiracy here. As expected, they won’t admit, for reasons of being lawyerly, that fakery and framing are bleeding obvious. Megrahi’s counsel Tony Kelly argues that his client is innocent and wrongly charged, but apparently on accident. He didn't see “any major conspiracy, or attempt to frame a particular person.” (26:42) "Megrahi's own lawyer rejects the conspiracy theories," the narrator can triumphantly say, and even his more banal protests could just be invented to justify his paycheck. Swire's looking pretty lonely now.
Kelly further emphasizes that “it’s the legal process that matters,” not theorizing about what might have really happened. I take his point that legal truth does decide things here on Earth, even if it's unjust in its mechanics, like at Camp Zeist, and on Megrahi's first appeal. Call me old fashioned, but I say truth matters more than this fickle legal process – at least in some abstract way that should matter more.
On the Official Review
One bright point where the legal process and revealing truth partially merge is Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission (SCCRC), covered in the video at 25:40. They looked at the case for almost four years and, like Kelly, said they found no sign of evidence being planted (rather I suspect they didn’t look for any). But they did find in mid-2007 reason to conclude Megrahi might have suffered a miscarriage of justice, again presumably by accident.
They referred it, on a conservative six grounds, to the appeal court. A spokesman, Gerard Sinclair, told the film that research suggests “there's about a 64% chance of that being successful" once they’ve sent it back to the courts. This statistic is presented as ominous, spliced with secret video of a jubilant Megrahi, alerted of the commission’s finding.
To its credit, Sent home to Die does acknowledge the finding that the Maltese clothes were bought "when Megrahi wasn't on the island." It's obvious to anyone who reads the evidence with clear eyes, and kind of proves that Marquise lied to the camera at 17:29, but the video already accepted that untruth as a basis for presenting the conviction as sound.
The SCCRC’s findings of American payouts to Tony Gauci of at least $2 million is mentioned (but the further $1 million or more to his brother Paul is neglected). No one will flat deny that such money was dished out to the brothers following the verdict, but on the question of what they knew before that remains hotly debated, for obvious reasons. The promise of money for a conviction against the man in photo #8 has the manifest potential, at least, to alter Gauci’s evidence. And as noted above, he altered his evidence in ways that seem not so much random as strategized to help convict Megrahi.
Marquise fudges, in a way that's effectively a lie (30:00). "Not one witness was ever promised money or did they ask for money in exchange for saying anything." The contrary evidence can be read right from Scottish police records here. Money concerns are there from day one, first seeded by the Americans in 1989 (“endless money” offered, $10,000 upfront) and couched in indirect language elsewhere. Tony himself usually kept mum, but his brother Paul was noted as a money-grubber. Behind the scenes, the ongoing quest for cash was clearly an open secret, gutting Stuart Henderson's ridiculous rebuttal. He told the crew that Tony was not only unaware of the coming reward, he was in fact "well aware that there was no such thing as a reward being handed to him ... Didn't enter his head."
Sent Home to Die gives the commission a semblance of respect in its filming and mention of the more important findings. But ultimately, it brushes their work aside as niggling questions surrounding a rock-solid conviction that had been assembled by solid men like Henderson and Marquise, and accepted by eight judges. However, between the Zeist verdict and the SCCRC’s review, only one has been legally ruled a “possible miscarriage of justice,” and the other is clean as a whistle.
On the appeal/Conclusion
The respect shown to the SCCRC is carried over into the results of its process, Megrahi’s second appeal. It’s a solemn process the prisoner is entitled to, to be looked at by five more judges. It’s acknowledged that this moved rather slow, and then somehow it was buried under the noise of imminent release.
The prisoner transfer agreement is raised first, emerging as it did in 2007 and part of a lucky streak along with the SCCRC review. But as a less-lucky terminal case of cancer entered the picture in 2008, so did compassionate release, and a second way home. Both routes are mentioned, with few details, and it fell to justice secretary MacAskill to chose, and he met the prisoner at the jail.
Then, the narrator says, “just days before MacAskill announced his decision, Megrahi gave up his appeal.” Margart Scott, QC, is shown passing along his officially inexplicable “belief that these instructions to abandon his appeal will assist in the early determination of those [release] applications.” The move is not explained or dwelled over any. Maybe he thought he or his successor would lose the appeal. Again, the Crown prosecutor John Logue is called on (32:00)
finished 3 October 2010
last edit 4/10
Production company: STV, Scotland.
Air date: August 2010
ex prod: Gordon MacMillan
prod: Donald John MacDonald, David Cowan
STV Youtube posting (embedding disabled)
---
I’m a little late to watch and review this video, which might just be the most strategically deceptive thing I’ve yet seen or on the subject of Megrahi’s guilt. Most of its lies are of the omission type, like ignoring the hundreds of credible critics of the official story on Pan Am 103. The lone voice they present for the other view, Dr. Jim Swire, told the crew he felt “the circumstances of my daughter’s murder have become wrapped up tissue of lies. Something terrible is being covered up.” (32:17) The video that abuses and dismisses his position at every turn is clearly a continuation of that same fabric, hoping to wrap up all his - and many others’ - outstanding questions and chuck them forever in the dust bin.
The 46 minute video is tightly–paced and split into four parts. The first covers the horror, the scale, and the loss of the bombing over and in Lockerbie. Part two relates the popular mythology of how Libya’s guilt, via Megrahi, was discovered. The investigation, indictments, sanctions (nearly a decade glossed over in two sentences), and everything up to the trial at Camp Zeist are packed in there. Part three briefly mentions the 9-month trial and then tries way too hard to clear up the continuing doubts about Megrahi’s conviction there. This is supposed to wipe the slate for the pivotal part 4, which explains how the “Lockerbie bomber” was sent home to die, but then didn’t.
The intro starts by noting the disastrous "compassionate release" all the way to Tripoli was "against the wishes of the most powerful country in the world," as if the power of those who disagree should matter. I didn't know China much cared, but the producers will have you know the SNP has made powerful enemies for the British with its stupid (or...???) decision.
The actual video opens with a long stretch on the horror of the crash, which, again, the best (discarded) evidence suggest was done by the PFLP-GC, for Iran, using a Khreesat-style altimeter bomb loaded in London. The amount of pain or fire doesn't in itself add anything to who's guilty, just to how mad you should be, at how horrible this mass murderer’s act was. Then for a change, it goes to how tragic loss of so many wonderful people was, so you can get sad before getting mad again. It’s a well done and touching segment, to be honest. Mentally, however, it’s counterproductive to thinking straight, and only primes the audience for the coming barrage of deception.
About 12 minutes in the PFLP-GC and Iran Air 655 as possible motive are mentioned, and FBI chief investigator Richard Marquise admits that sounds like a logical assumption. But the notion is here first framed as something the CIA had tried to say once, with "no evidence" of an Iran-PFLP-GC link ever found. It could be fairly said there was no proof, but much evidence exists, a bit of it presented in the preceding minute of this very video. There was not one but four radio bombs found, and a fifth that never turned up - unless it did. These were set by altimeter and a crude "timer" set to blow 35-45 min. after takeoff (that's the simple version - deeper here). PA103 blew up 38 minutes after leaving Heathrow, officially a coincidence of poor Libyan timing.
On forensic findings
Finally at 14:24, after discussing the "fortunate"bomb placement that actually best supports a London introduction, the video gets to the specific evidence that would matter for convicting Megrahi. In thirty seconds it says a lot that leaves out a lot:
Forensic scientists decided the Lockerbie bomb had been hidden inside a different radio cassette player from the one used by the Palestinians. Packed into the Samsonite suitcase, it exploded in the plane’s forward hold, close to the skin of the fuselage. Charred fragments of clothes from the suitcase took the inquiry in a completely new direction. This label from a babygro [“made in Malta”] was the first connection to the island of Malta. Then a distinctive logo [“Yorkie”] led to the firzsst major breakthrough.This is the one of the parts where they tell you that science has spoken, but as I’ve noted elsewhere, what it said doesn’t make any sense. The PFLP-GC link was weakened by the identification, from scattered fragments, of a different radio than the “one” the PFLP-GC used (actually 3 different models and a computer monitor). First, I invite anyone to closely examine how this other radio – Toshiba BomBeat RT-SF16 - was identified. Consider the chronic inconsistencies in this detailed timeline, reconstructed from trial transcripts. Secondly, Dr. John Wyatt's tests suggest an explosion of the scale needed wouldn't leave any such readable debris, meaning investigators would really have no clue what radio - if any - was used.
And thirdly, even if Wyatt is far off, the clearest "proof" of the radio model is this, PK/689, the paper manual cover. You know it was inside the box 2" from the blast center not because it was reduced to ash, but because it's lightly singed, torn, and says, plain as day, "BomBeat." The lady that turned in PK/689 said the paper she saw was fully intact when she found it, and that hasn't been challenged. Officially then, it was made "a bit tatty around the edges" by the semtex blast, and ripped nearly to shreds by forensics tests.
The radio model thus established not only pointed away from the Iran line, but also suggested Libyan authorship. Convenient.
The scorched clothing - blue babygro, Yorkie trousers, black umbrella, slalom shirt, and others - is also challenged by Dr. Wyatt’s findings. Being at least outside the radio's cardboard box, it's to a lesser degree than the radio and timer, and I for one am agnostic on whether they’re authentic. But they were convenient also, pointing to Malta and, by extension, to Libya.
To Malta and Gauci
The story of the clothes’ identification and tracing to Malta seems to be conveyed fairly, although the details, relying on the recall of detective John Crawford, are a bit fuzzy. The trousers in particular led them to the Yorkie clothing factory on the tiny island nation, who had the papers to show the very few pairs of that batch were sold to one shop only – Mary’s House in Silema, run by the Gauci family. One fateful pair was apparently bought there brand new by someone linked to the bombing and f*****g stupid. The clarity of the lead was the "stuff of detective novels," says George Esson, Chief Constable of Dumfries and Galloway Police in 1991. It was all "fantastic," "almost unbelievable." Why "almost," George?
Starting at 15:45 they discuss the pivotal witness Tony Gauci, the shopkeeper on duty at Mary's House when those clothes were sold, and his supposed identification of Megrahi as the bird-brained buyer. As the video later notes, Gauci's reliability remains hotly contested, and he “has never said with absolute certainty that al Megrahi was the man" who bought the trousers and babygro.
In fact he’s never said he was the man at all, who he says was at least 4 inches taller and 14 years older than our villain. Just going on faces, he pointed at a photo of Megrahi in 1991 and said it was "similar to the man ... He would perhaps have to look about ten years older,” which he didn’t. Later in 1999 at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands, he pointed to the by-then famous “Lockerbie bomber” in person and said "“not exactly the man I saw in the shop.” Clearly Detective Crawford’s take “when he got to number 8, he said “that’s the man,” is misleading. (18:10)
At 17:29, Richard Marquise says again that Megrahi "had been in Malta the day the clothing purchase was made, December 7." This is a big lie and he’s had that pointed out to him prior to this interview. Note he emphasizes “actual immigration records,” as if that's the issue. In fact, the top Scot on Malta, Harry Bell, essentially admitted in 2007 that Megrahi's presence on December 7 was the reason the date of purchase was changed. Gauci clearly describes November 23, when Megrahi has an alibi, but there was a very slim case for it being December 7, and that’s what it became. Gauci can be observed at trial being more vague on all the points that conflict between the two days. But the judges seem to have missed that (see link for details).
And the money situation ... we'll return to that one.
A bomb from Malta
Having "established" Megrahi’s link to the clothing, at 22:07 crown prosecutor John Logue cogently relates the official story of the unaccompanied bag from Malta. The tight and coherent evidence from Air Malta's end says clearly there was no such suitcase on KM180, and opposing it we have wishful thinking plus one unusual record from Frankfurt, with all supports and comparison records somehow vanished with no clear explanation. If it weren’t for the fluke of the computer printout for PA103A, salvaged from an airport employee's locker, investigators would have no record at all of what happened at Frankfurt that day. Air Malta had everything and it was in order, but it differed from what the locker-paper said, so was pushed aside by investigators, by Scottish judges, and certainly by crown prosecutors in between them.
After ignoring these troubles with the notion of a bomb from Malta getting onto 103, the video turns to the evidence that Megrahi was at the airport on Malta December 21 - under a false name. This seems to be solid, and at 22:25 he is caught in a lie to a journalist, denying his presence there. This secrecy probably was related to the false passport and the secret mission he was likely on for Tripoli, and it was unwise to continue denying at the time of that interview in 1992.
But as far as we can tell, Megrahi's unrelated secret mission on that day is precisely why he was chosen as the route to frame Libya, and why evidence pointing to Malta was concocted. It could also explain why Mohammed Abu Talb was chased for a while, but that's too esoteric for most. At any rate, the missing context is the lack of any good evidence his mission was to blow up a plane, and the presence of any bomb on Malta that morning is what’s solidly in question here.
The locker-paper from Frankfurt had suggested (but far from proved) an unaccompanied item from Malta getting onto the doomed 747, but not what kind it would be. This was previously filled in by a witness who said he saw Megrahi with a brown hard-shell Samsonite - like the bomb was packed in - the day before the bombing, on his arrival from Tripoli. Unfortunately, the witness, Abdul Majid Giaka, made this story up for the FBI only in 1991, after learning what type of case he needed to "remember." (And after being given no choice but to come up with something just like that.) The judges dismissed this point of evidence, as well as the rest of what Giaka had to say (and it was a lot) at trial in 2000. As far as I can tell, Giaka and his claims are entirely absent from this video, as if he never existed - another lie of omission, and a rather glaring one.
On the timer fragment
(18:40) The video's approach is standard and brief. A piece of circuit board dubbed PT/35(b) was discovered, and later matched to a timer called MST-13, made by Mebo, a company with links to Libya. This information was obtained from the CIA, who held a comparison model. Identifying FBI agent, "Tom" Thurman, related again his 1990 epiphany comparing a photo to something under a microscope (there are many versions he's told). He explained "I could not believe it under any circumstances, and it was there," so he believed it and so did everyone else.
Myriad logical problems and questions plague this alleged timer (see PT/35(b) link). Why was it set so early, when a couple more hours would safely bury the evidence at sea? Why is the corner they found the only one so distinctly recognizable? The narrator starts by describing the prominent 1/2"square fragment as "tiny," and Marquise later implies that contrary to what critics say, it was not too small to have been found - because it was found, duh!
In fact the key problem for this item is that it's far too large to have been inside the bomb, maybe 2 inches from at least 450 grams of semtex. Dr. Wyatt's tests cited above in relation to the radio itself, were publicized in January 2010 in connection with this crucial evidence more than with the radio. As his work strongly suggests, this thing was put into the wreckage by something (or someone) other than the bomb. Therefore, its ability to implicate Libya might be better evidence for a frame-up than for a bombing.
On the conspiracy theorist
Part three starts with the trial’s end (around 24:15). Megrahi was now ruled guilty, and his accomplice Fhimah was somehow found not guilty. To mention why would require bringing in Giaka, and raise troubling questions. The video does not mention why he was found not guilty, probably some technicality.
"But not everyone was convinced," the narrator ominously intones, turning to Dr. Jim Swire. He's not only a critic of the official story, but feels Libya and Megrahi were consciously framed by the US and UK governments. This blogger agrees that, politically correct or not, tha' the most logical explanation for what happened. The editors selected a video of Swire solitarily approaching a podium on the court's expansive plaza, and then mentioned no one else who holds views like his. With both of these choices, the video creates the impression that Swire is the only one who needs convincing and what the hell's wrong with him?
Just before introducing the loner, US family member Bob Monetti said “if you follow it every day and have an open mind, it became overwhelmingly obvious that Megrahi was guilty.” But Swire insists it was close attention to the trial that solidified his doubts about Libya’s guilt. Having read much of it myself by now, I agree with him, and I suspect Mr. Monetti did not follow as open-mindedly as he claims.
Further, Dr. Swire’s lone claims "infuriate" the leaders of the investigation that led to Megrahi being blamed. Top Scot, SIO Stuart Henderson, says at 26:21:
"I’m sick and tired of saying this. What - is - in - it - for me to try and fit somebody up to go behind bars for forty years. You must be joking. Anybody that makes suggestions like that has got to be rather twisted. Because we were being watched on a daily basis. The whole world was watching us."I can't say what's in it for anyone in particular, nor do I have reason to suspect Henderson himself took part in the most important bits of dishonesty. But the whole world was not watching them. I don't recall seeing the live footage at RARDE’s laboratories showing all comings and goings, or transcripts of the first police interactions with Mr. Gauci. There’s no audio tape of agent Tom Thurman’s meeting with Orkin, or secret video of the session where PT/35(b) was cut, scratched up, and burnt to look realistic enough to plant. But Henderson would have us believe all these things would be known if they happened, so they must not have happened. It's a poor argument to say the least.
Lawyers are then called on – even those who support Megrahi’s innocence – to strengthen the stance that there was no conspiracy here. As expected, they won’t admit, for reasons of being lawyerly, that fakery and framing are bleeding obvious. Megrahi’s counsel Tony Kelly argues that his client is innocent and wrongly charged, but apparently on accident. He didn't see “any major conspiracy, or attempt to frame a particular person.” (26:42) "Megrahi's own lawyer rejects the conspiracy theories," the narrator can triumphantly say, and even his more banal protests could just be invented to justify his paycheck. Swire's looking pretty lonely now.
Kelly further emphasizes that “it’s the legal process that matters,” not theorizing about what might have really happened. I take his point that legal truth does decide things here on Earth, even if it's unjust in its mechanics, like at Camp Zeist, and on Megrahi's first appeal. Call me old fashioned, but I say truth matters more than this fickle legal process – at least in some abstract way that should matter more.
On the Official Review
One bright point where the legal process and revealing truth partially merge is Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission (SCCRC), covered in the video at 25:40. They looked at the case for almost four years and, like Kelly, said they found no sign of evidence being planted (rather I suspect they didn’t look for any). But they did find in mid-2007 reason to conclude Megrahi might have suffered a miscarriage of justice, again presumably by accident.
They referred it, on a conservative six grounds, to the appeal court. A spokesman, Gerard Sinclair, told the film that research suggests “there's about a 64% chance of that being successful" once they’ve sent it back to the courts. This statistic is presented as ominous, spliced with secret video of a jubilant Megrahi, alerted of the commission’s finding.
To its credit, Sent home to Die does acknowledge the finding that the Maltese clothes were bought "when Megrahi wasn't on the island." It's obvious to anyone who reads the evidence with clear eyes, and kind of proves that Marquise lied to the camera at 17:29, but the video already accepted that untruth as a basis for presenting the conviction as sound.
The SCCRC’s findings of American payouts to Tony Gauci of at least $2 million is mentioned (but the further $1 million or more to his brother Paul is neglected). No one will flat deny that such money was dished out to the brothers following the verdict, but on the question of what they knew before that remains hotly debated, for obvious reasons. The promise of money for a conviction against the man in photo #8 has the manifest potential, at least, to alter Gauci’s evidence. And as noted above, he altered his evidence in ways that seem not so much random as strategized to help convict Megrahi.
Marquise fudges, in a way that's effectively a lie (30:00). "Not one witness was ever promised money or did they ask for money in exchange for saying anything." The contrary evidence can be read right from Scottish police records here. Money concerns are there from day one, first seeded by the Americans in 1989 (“endless money” offered, $10,000 upfront) and couched in indirect language elsewhere. Tony himself usually kept mum, but his brother Paul was noted as a money-grubber. Behind the scenes, the ongoing quest for cash was clearly an open secret, gutting Stuart Henderson's ridiculous rebuttal. He told the crew that Tony was not only unaware of the coming reward, he was in fact "well aware that there was no such thing as a reward being handed to him ... Didn't enter his head."
Sent Home to Die gives the commission a semblance of respect in its filming and mention of the more important findings. But ultimately, it brushes their work aside as niggling questions surrounding a rock-solid conviction that had been assembled by solid men like Henderson and Marquise, and accepted by eight judges. However, between the Zeist verdict and the SCCRC’s review, only one has been legally ruled a “possible miscarriage of justice,” and the other is clean as a whistle.
On the appeal/Conclusion
The respect shown to the SCCRC is carried over into the results of its process, Megrahi’s second appeal. It’s a solemn process the prisoner is entitled to, to be looked at by five more judges. It’s acknowledged that this moved rather slow, and then somehow it was buried under the noise of imminent release.
The prisoner transfer agreement is raised first, emerging as it did in 2007 and part of a lucky streak along with the SCCRC review. But as a less-lucky terminal case of cancer entered the picture in 2008, so did compassionate release, and a second way home. Both routes are mentioned, with few details, and it fell to justice secretary MacAskill to chose, and he met the prisoner at the jail.
Then, the narrator says, “just days before MacAskill announced his decision, Megrahi gave up his appeal.” Margart Scott, QC, is shown passing along his officially inexplicable “belief that these instructions to abandon his appeal will assist in the early determination of those [release] applications.” The move is not explained or dwelled over any. Maybe he thought he or his successor would lose the appeal. Again, the Crown prosecutor John Logue is called on (32:00)
We were ready, willing, and able to defend Mr. Megrahi's conviction in the appeal court, and would have done so had that appeal continued. We were confident in the conviction, and confident that we were able to defend it during the appeal.Logue is just parroting the bluff of departing Lord Advocate Elish Angiolini. The Crown was not ready or able to defend the case, at least not by normal evidentiary means. Consider this recent assessment of a renowned defense layer:
Michael Mansfield QC, one of the country's best-known defence lawyers, said a full judicial inquiry was required to settle the doubts over the case. Mansfield said he had no doubt that the evidence given to secure Megrahi's conviction was "entirely unsustainable". [source]But part three ends with “20 years after Pan Am 103 fell from the sky, Megrahi’s legal battle was over. Only one question remained – where would the Lockerbie bomber be allowed to die?” The following part four is interesting in its own right, but I’ll leave it be as based on a false premise, as there are far more, and more relevant, questions than that one, as another prominent lawyer recently noted. Citing the SCCRC’s doubts about the case, the head of the Scottish human rights commission professor Alan Miller said [per the Guardian]:
The row over Megrahi's medical status was an "undignified and unhelpful distraction" from the more important issue of addressing unresolved questions about his guilt.The situation that needs resolved in 2010 is the continued denial of truth and thus justice while nearly everyone turns a blind eye and maintains the charade. In pushing the groundless presumption that Megrahi actually is the bomber, Sent Home to Die cannot be of any use in that resolution. It might just do for someone’s political agenda, but that’s no surprise – Lockerbie has always been taken for all its worth to advance unstated aims.
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Tony Gauci's "Identification" of Megrahi
posted Jan 17 2010
last update 23 December
Maltese shopkeeper Anthony "Tony" Gauci's supposed identification of al Megrahi (as the buyer of clothes found in the bomb suitcase) is a key plank of the Libyan's conviction for the bombing of PA103. In fact, it's the only evidence that the Zeist judges actually accepted that explicitly ties him to the physical evidence in any way. After the fanciful tales of "star witness" Giaka were dismissed, Gauci's evidence became of crucial importance at the 2000 trial - he became "the real star witness," as the BBC's Conspiracy Files put it.
He is not to be confused with the great Maltese singer Tony Gauci, L-Kampanjol, who passed away in March of this year.
The fallibility of eyewitness evidence is well-enough known, and many others have done a splendid job exposing the incredible weakness of Gauci's fingering of Megrahi. A standard internet search will do well enough on this issue, without my needing to offer but a few special links. One would be this re-posting of the Gauci sections from Paul Foot's Lockerbie: Flight from Justice (2001). So I needn't reinvent the wheel altogether here, but I will briefly outline the problems with Gauci's evidence for those unfamiliar and link to my few detailed posts along the way.
The Basics and Prosecution’s Case
Tony Gauci is the son of Edward Gauci, proprietor of clothiers Mary's House in Silema, Malta. His sons Tony and his brother Paul usually ran the shop, with Tony working alone December 7 1988. He says a strange Libyan man came and bought most of the items found bomb-damaged shortly after around Lockerbie. He later identified Megrahi in a photo lineup as most resembling the buyer, and did the same in a physical lineup in court.
Problems with the Evidence
1 - The Alleged Logic of Megrahi's Purchase
There are many, and cheap, and anonymous ways for an Arab agent and terrorist mastermind to secure clothing to stuff a bomb case. Going to Mary's House when and how the mystery shopper did, is not a very smooth one. Rolfe explains this point quite well throughout this JREF forum thread. This is an important consideration but in itself doesn't prove a darn thing. Megrahi could make really bad tactical choices and still be guilty. So, moving along...
2- Weakness of Libyan identification
3 - Gauci was non-specific, and that's putting it generously
For having identified this man as THE buyer, Gauci's statements are surprisingly devoid of anyhthing as simple as "that's the man." On seeing Megrahi's photo in February 1991, in the news as "Lockerbie bomber," a photo spread was hastily called where Gauci found the same photo in a lineup of others was most:
“not exactly the man I saw in the shop. Ten years ago I saw him, but the man who look a little bit like exactly is the number 5 [Megrahi]”
http://www.mathaba.net/news/news1/lockerbie/gauci.htm
4 - Physique, complexion, age
5 - He Identified Abu Talb, too
Mohammed Abu Talb (or just Abu Talb) is a PFLP-GC connected suspect found to possess some clothes from Malta and share links with those busted in the Autumn Leaves op. Arrested in Sweden and considered suspect no. 1 for a while. Gauci enthusiastically fingered this man as the buyer. He had a return plane ticket that might have gotten him to Malta for free that day, but no evidence he used it. Abu Talb is himself even younger than Megrahi, and has a plausible alternate story for how he got those clothes (including many at home that matched none of Gauci's story). This blogger doubts either of the men Gauci identified was the clothes buyer, and I'm not convinced that Tony's story of one discrete buyer is even true. [See: Abu Talb and Tony Gauci]
6 - He Had Two Million Reasons to Fudge it
Mr. Gauci was eventually paid $2 million by the US government, following the trial, and given a new life and identity in Australia. His brother Paul Gauci was never called to testify, despite being an assett to the investigation." (note: not to be confused with the Maltese clothing maker Paul Gauci who did testify at Zeist) He's been suspected of helping coach his dim brother into affirming the police story, but whatever his role, it earned him a million of his own and a slot next to Tony among the Aussies. (Detailed post on the payments aspect)
The prize was no surprise - money talks happened from the beginning, with the Gaucis' mentioning the danger they were in by exposing Libya's plot, and Scots police acknoweldging large payments might help grease the story along. Wouldn’t a huge cash reward and the weight of a world-class terror investigation be expected to crush the reliability from his fragile memories? Sure, but the thing to focus on is what's crushed in.
7 - Photo Spread / Lineup Procedures and Tainted Memory
Most famously, Mr.Gauci was shown a photo of Megrahi, in a news magazine, as Lockerbie suspect. Days later he pointed straight to al Megrahi after traveling to Camp Zeist. But beyond this, there are some great observations of lineup procedure contained in reports commissioned for the convict's second appeal. These are available at Megrahi My Story [Valentine and Clark reports]. The details I haven't studied, but it seems on several fronts, both the 1991 photo lineup and 2000 in-person version at camp Zeist, there was a leading arrangement notably regarding subject ages. Recall that Megrahi at the time was about 15 years younger than Gauci's buyer (36 compared to app.50).
Anthony Gauci testimony, Camp Zeist, day 31, July 11 2000
Statement to police, 15 Feb 1991:
8 - Discrepancies, uncertainties in sold items recall
Gauci initially gave authorities a reportedly perfect list of items recovered - tied up with a bow and cash totals tendered, tax, minor discount and change returned. The only discrepancy I'm recalling at the moment is that he first insisted no shirts were in the order. This was a problem, as at least one piece of "Slalom" shirt collar had contained the miraculous timer fragment PT/35(b).
No problem, they could just say Megrahi bought a few of the items elsewhere, but too late. Mr. Gauci changed his story to reflect the sale of said shirt (as well as I believe one or two other shirts that had turned up), and revised all the neat math to reflect the new total. The second time, after marinading a while in close proximity to police evidence, is more accurate, we are to believe.
Also, one must wonder how they got Gauci's memory rolling in the first place without mentioning at least some of the items he needed to remember. I hear that dozens of police chats/interviews were either not recorded or had the records lost, including the first talks where Gauci initially decided on the laundry list. But then again, if he were coached, why wouldn't the Slalom shirt be included in the first list he came up with?
9 - Date of Purchase - Best Evidence that Gauci's Testimony specifically Ruled out Megrahi before it implicated him
Eyewitness evidence is never very solid to begin with, but here we have the most reliable (early) memories sidelined when convenient. Tony Gauci's initial identification evidence – before he was just pointing at faces and still giving details - rainfall, the Christmas lights, and the football game his brother Paul was watching at home - pointed to a purchase on November 23, 1988. I mean, clearly and with no room for doubt, pointed at the 23rd.
Megrahi was simply not on Malta at all that day. Investigators and the Gaucis instead have fudged things to fit an alternated date of December 7, when their villain was nearby. The mental gymnastics required to do so are astounding. This is the one point I felt is strongest in indicating Megrahi's innocence of this on solid link to the crime. And since this post is long enough, that explanation will reside in this long post of its own.
---
last update 23 December
Maltese shopkeeper Anthony "Tony" Gauci's supposed identification of al Megrahi (as the buyer of clothes found in the bomb suitcase) is a key plank of the Libyan's conviction for the bombing of PA103. In fact, it's the only evidence that the Zeist judges actually accepted that explicitly ties him to the physical evidence in any way. After the fanciful tales of "star witness" Giaka were dismissed, Gauci's evidence became of crucial importance at the 2000 trial - he became "the real star witness," as the BBC's Conspiracy Files put it.
He is not to be confused with the great Maltese singer Tony Gauci, L-Kampanjol, who passed away in March of this year.
The fallibility of eyewitness evidence is well-enough known, and many others have done a splendid job exposing the incredible weakness of Gauci's fingering of Megrahi. A standard internet search will do well enough on this issue, without my needing to offer but a few special links. One would be this re-posting of the Gauci sections from Paul Foot's Lockerbie: Flight from Justice (2001). So I needn't reinvent the wheel altogether here, but I will briefly outline the problems with Gauci's evidence for those unfamiliar and link to my few detailed posts along the way.
The Basics and Prosecution’s Case
Tony Gauci is the son of Edward Gauci, proprietor of clothiers Mary's House in Silema, Malta. His sons Tony and his brother Paul usually ran the shop, with Tony working alone December 7 1988. He says a strange Libyan man came and bought most of the items found bomb-damaged shortly after around Lockerbie. He later identified Megrahi in a photo lineup as most resembling the buyer, and did the same in a physical lineup in court.
Problems with the Evidence
1 - The Alleged Logic of Megrahi's Purchase
There are many, and cheap, and anonymous ways for an Arab agent and terrorist mastermind to secure clothing to stuff a bomb case. Going to Mary's House when and how the mystery shopper did, is not a very smooth one. Rolfe explains this point quite well throughout this JREF forum thread. This is an important consideration but in itself doesn't prove a darn thing. Megrahi could make really bad tactical choices and still be guilty. So, moving along...
2- Weakness of Libyan identification
Gauci's first statement to Scottish police, 1 September 1989:
He was speaking "Libiyon" to me. He was clearly from Lbiya. He had an Arab appearance and I would say he was in fact a "Libyon" I can tell the difference between "Libyons" and "Tunisians" when I speak to them for a while. Tunisians often start speaking French if you start talking to them for a while.
There is of course no Libyan language - it's Arabic. The only specific clue he cites is that he heard no French so the guy was probably not Tunisian. It would be a good guess, as Libyans were the most common Arabic speakers on the island, but as evidence it doesn't count for even a penny rounded up.
3 - Gauci was non-specific, and that's putting it generously
For having identified this man as THE buyer, Gauci's statements are surprisingly devoid of anyhthing as simple as "that's the man." On seeing Megrahi's photo in February 1991, in the news as "Lockerbie bomber," a photo spread was hastily called where Gauci found the same photo in a lineup of others was most:
“... similar to the man who bought the clothing. The hair is perhaps a bit long. The eyebrows are the same. The nose is the same, and his chin and shape of face are the same. The man in the photograph is in my opinion, in his thirty years. He would perhaps have to look about ten years older, and he would look like the man who bought the clothes. It's been a long time now and I can only say that this photograph resembles the man who bought the clothing, but it is younger.”Wow. Did you catch the whole subtext where he's comparing two different men? In ten years he'll look like the guy I saw is what he said. After the witness parade April 13 2000:
“not exactly the man I saw in the shop. Ten years ago I saw him, but the man who look a little bit like exactly is the number 5 [Megrahi]”
http://www.mathaba.net/news/news1/lockerbie/gauci.htm
4 - Physique, complexion, age
The buyer was "about six foot or more in height," "well-built" and big in the chest for the 42" jacket he bought, 36" waist, 16-17" collar, Gauci first said. Mr. al-Megrahi was 5'8" tall, and average-slight build. Gauci first said the man seemed to be around 50 years of age. Megrahi was 36 at the time. The man was dark complected, with a tight afro. Megrahi had long wavy hair and was fairer. At trial, Gauci fudged each of these closer to the man in the dock with mantra-like repetition. "I'm not an expert on these things. I think he was below six feet. I'm not an expert on these things." [on age] "I said before, below six -- under 60. I don't have experience -- I don't have experience on height or age." [trial transcripts, p 4752-53] Baloney. He was a clothier. He measured people for a living. The mixing up of "below six" and "under sixty" is interesting, joined with a double renunciation of age AND height expertise. It suggests a mantra he was remembering to stick to.
5 - He Identified Abu Talb, too
Mohammed Abu Talb (or just Abu Talb) is a PFLP-GC connected suspect found to possess some clothes from Malta and share links with those busted in the Autumn Leaves op. Arrested in Sweden and considered suspect no. 1 for a while. Gauci enthusiastically fingered this man as the buyer. He had a return plane ticket that might have gotten him to Malta for free that day, but no evidence he used it. Abu Talb is himself even younger than Megrahi, and has a plausible alternate story for how he got those clothes (including many at home that matched none of Gauci's story). This blogger doubts either of the men Gauci identified was the clothes buyer, and I'm not convinced that Tony's story of one discrete buyer is even true. [See: Abu Talb and Tony Gauci]
6 - He Had Two Million Reasons to Fudge it
Mr. Gauci was eventually paid $2 million by the US government, following the trial, and given a new life and identity in Australia. His brother Paul Gauci was never called to testify, despite being an assett to the investigation." (note: not to be confused with the Maltese clothing maker Paul Gauci who did testify at Zeist) He's been suspected of helping coach his dim brother into affirming the police story, but whatever his role, it earned him a million of his own and a slot next to Tony among the Aussies. (Detailed post on the payments aspect)
The prize was no surprise - money talks happened from the beginning, with the Gaucis' mentioning the danger they were in by exposing Libya's plot, and Scots police acknoweldging large payments might help grease the story along. Wouldn’t a huge cash reward and the weight of a world-class terror investigation be expected to crush the reliability from his fragile memories? Sure, but the thing to focus on is what's crushed in.
7 - Photo Spread / Lineup Procedures and Tainted Memory
Most famously, Mr.Gauci was shown a photo of Megrahi, in a news magazine, as Lockerbie suspect. Days later he pointed straight to al Megrahi after traveling to Camp Zeist. But beyond this, there are some great observations of lineup procedure contained in reports commissioned for the convict's second appeal. These are available at Megrahi My Story [Valentine and Clark reports]. The details I haven't studied, but it seems on several fronts, both the 1991 photo lineup and 2000 in-person version at camp Zeist, there was a leading arrangement notably regarding subject ages. Recall that Megrahi at the time was about 15 years younger than Gauci's buyer (36 compared to app.50).
Anthony Gauci testimony, Camp Zeist, day 31, July 11 2000
Statement to police, 15 Feb 1991:
The first impression I had was that all the photographs were of men younger than the man who bought the clothing. I told Mr. Bell this. I was asked to look at all the photographs carefully and to try and allow for any age difference. I then pointed out one of the photographs, and I later counted the photographs from the left as number 1 to the photograph at number 8."Tony usually sounds like an idiot, but this is clarity in action – a textbook description of a slanted line-up. Witness to young? Compare him to men younger yet, and have the witness pick the closest one. This is just how the pivotal September 15 "identification" of al-Megrahi was achieved. He was photo number 8, an unusual picture, in part, for looking almost nothing like al-Megrahi. [See: Gauci and the Czexh photo]
8 - Discrepancies, uncertainties in sold items recall
Gauci initially gave authorities a reportedly perfect list of items recovered - tied up with a bow and cash totals tendered, tax, minor discount and change returned. The only discrepancy I'm recalling at the moment is that he first insisted no shirts were in the order. This was a problem, as at least one piece of "Slalom" shirt collar had contained the miraculous timer fragment PT/35(b).
No problem, they could just say Megrahi bought a few of the items elsewhere, but too late. Mr. Gauci changed his story to reflect the sale of said shirt (as well as I believe one or two other shirts that had turned up), and revised all the neat math to reflect the new total. The second time, after marinading a while in close proximity to police evidence, is more accurate, we are to believe.
Also, one must wonder how they got Gauci's memory rolling in the first place without mentioning at least some of the items he needed to remember. I hear that dozens of police chats/interviews were either not recorded or had the records lost, including the first talks where Gauci initially decided on the laundry list. But then again, if he were coached, why wouldn't the Slalom shirt be included in the first list he came up with?
9 - Date of Purchase - Best Evidence that Gauci's Testimony specifically Ruled out Megrahi before it implicated him
Eyewitness evidence is never very solid to begin with, but here we have the most reliable (early) memories sidelined when convenient. Tony Gauci's initial identification evidence – before he was just pointing at faces and still giving details - rainfall, the Christmas lights, and the football game his brother Paul was watching at home - pointed to a purchase on November 23, 1988. I mean, clearly and with no room for doubt, pointed at the 23rd.
Megrahi was simply not on Malta at all that day. Investigators and the Gaucis instead have fudged things to fit an alternated date of December 7, when their villain was nearby. The mental gymnastics required to do so are astounding. This is the one point I felt is strongest in indicating Megrahi's innocence of this on solid link to the crime. And since this post is long enough, that explanation will reside in this long post of its own.
---
Owning the Comments
On American Media Coverage of Swire's Libya Visit
22 September 2010
last edits 6 Feb. 2011
About a week ago, British family leader of PA103 victims Dr. Jim Swire made an unusual visit to Libya, to meet the convicted "Lockerbie bomber" he and so many believe is innocent. Within the UK, discussion about this and related developments is animated, as can be glimpsed at Professor Black's blog. The Scotsman coversthe visit, and The Firm talks about Swire'splan to revive Megrahi's appeal in his name.
In step with following American media reports on the issue of Megrahi, I've done that here. Relatively few US outlets that have picked this up. Most have focused on Swire's rare news that Megrahi is still alive and, while sick, able to stand and walk. And not dead. This was bound to piss people off over here, but the first article was New York Daily News. Being about Swire, New Yorkers I guess get it to keep the criticism muted - a touch of either silent awe or awkward silence. I added a sixth comment and it stopped there. The usual NYDN reader brand of ugly stayed mostly at bay, aside from the one guy calling Swire a "useful idiot." The other comments were actually sympathetic. Strange.
On the article itself, I was surprised. Just mentioning the visit and Swire's unusual belief is itself rare, but the article actually cited a support for it:
CNN's report was actually worse than NYDN's, mentioning no support, but did discuss the notion of Swire reviving the killed appeal of conviction. Its target audience perhaps can be gauged by the slew of flippant comments, well over 200 when I set in. Most of these basically said "not dead yet? He should die ...no wait, live and suffer ... I hope someone kills him ... I hope he's tortured," and so on, amid lectures about Islam, softness, Obama and the Brits and oil and lots of uninformed opinion in general. One called Swire a "limey suck-up," and another said "Gee, Jim, with a Daddy like you, Flora hardly needed a plane crash!" I called that one out solidly.
Before long I was correcting a lot of people and being a real pest, leaving over 30 comments among over 300 now. Few responses. There are a few smart people there who acknowledge doubts, but these were piled on with attacks. One member suggests they were family of a victim, and berated another member for expressing such doubts, and for being a "worthless piece of crap."
Epoch Times' report was bland. It didn't anger me, and it didn't have any deep insight, nor anything suggesting Megrahi's innocence aside from mentioning Swire's strange views. Seattle Times covered it as well, blandly, and I left the sole comment. Oh, I see Faux News is covering it. I might not even bother with that one...
Update, later: Interestingly, I tried to comment at Faux News. I registered, then had it tell me I had to log-in to comment. I logged out and back in, same thing. Logged out to check to 50 or 60 comments there earlier, all gone. 0 comments listed, no new ones allowed. Very strange...
Update again: I was allowed to submit a comment - in case it doesn't take or doesn't stay, it said this:
22 September 2010
last edits 6 Feb. 2011
About a week ago, British family leader of PA103 victims Dr. Jim Swire made an unusual visit to Libya, to meet the convicted "Lockerbie bomber" he and so many believe is innocent. Within the UK, discussion about this and related developments is animated, as can be glimpsed at Professor Black's blog. The Scotsman coversthe visit, and The Firm talks about Swire'splan to revive Megrahi's appeal in his name.
In step with following American media reports on the issue of Megrahi, I've done that here. Relatively few US outlets that have picked this up. Most have focused on Swire's rare news that Megrahi is still alive and, while sick, able to stand and walk. And not dead. This was bound to piss people off over here, but the first article was New York Daily News. Being about Swire, New Yorkers I guess get it to keep the criticism muted - a touch of either silent awe or awkward silence. I added a sixth comment and it stopped there. The usual NYDN reader brand of ugly stayed mostly at bay, aside from the one guy calling Swire a "useful idiot." The other comments were actually sympathetic. Strange.
On the article itself, I was surprised. Just mentioning the visit and Swire's unusual belief is itself rare, but the article actually cited a support for it:
Swire, however, met with al-Megrahi in a Scottish prison in 2008 and told the Daily Record he believed the testimony of one of the witnesses, Maltese shop-owner Tony Gauci, was paid for by prosecutors. He visited Libya last week at al-Megrahi's invitation and called for investigators to overturn the verdict.There was no mention of the SCCRC deciding the same thing and making it one of six reasons to order a second appeal. But on the other hand, they included a poll about megrahi'sguilt - the one allowing doubts actually got about 20% ("who cares"got 25%).
CNN's report was actually worse than NYDN's, mentioning no support, but did discuss the notion of Swire reviving the killed appeal of conviction. Its target audience perhaps can be gauged by the slew of flippant comments, well over 200 when I set in. Most of these basically said "not dead yet? He should die ...no wait, live and suffer ... I hope someone kills him ... I hope he's tortured," and so on, amid lectures about Islam, softness, Obama and the Brits and oil and lots of uninformed opinion in general. One called Swire a "limey suck-up," and another said "Gee, Jim, with a Daddy like you, Flora hardly needed a plane crash!" I called that one out solidly.
Before long I was correcting a lot of people and being a real pest, leaving over 30 comments among over 300 now. Few responses. There are a few smart people there who acknowledge doubts, but these were piled on with attacks. One member suggests they were family of a victim, and berated another member for expressing such doubts, and for being a "worthless piece of crap."
Epoch Times' report was bland. It didn't anger me, and it didn't have any deep insight, nor anything suggesting Megrahi's innocence aside from mentioning Swire's strange views. Seattle Times covered it as well, blandly, and I left the sole comment. Oh, I see Faux News is covering it. I might not even bother with that one...
Update, later: Interestingly, I tried to comment at Faux News. I registered, then had it tell me I had to log-in to comment. I logged out and back in, same thing. Logged out to check to 50 or 60 comments there earlier, all gone. 0 comments listed, no new ones allowed. Very strange...
Update again: I was allowed to submit a comment - in case it doesn't take or doesn't stay, it said this:
Hey weren't there about 60 comments here recently, ranting about death and pain and especially Hell, plus Islam and liberals and Obama? Why is this the first comment now? Well I'll take the slot - what do we have for actual evidence this man is even guilty? Let's look at witnesses - Abdul Majid Giaka and Tony Gauci. Giaka was a Libyan defector, telling the CIA what he knew (little)about JSO on Malta. He had a whole pile of overly-juicy details of the plot that appeared just in time to form the indictments and then sanctions. But these were all dismissed at trial in 2000 - the star witness was shot down by the all-wise judges. “Information provided by a paid informer is always open to the criticism that it may be invented in order to justify payment, and in our view this is a case where such criticism is more than usually justified […] we are unable to accept Abdul Majid as a credible and reliable witness on any matter except his description of the organisation of the JSO and the personnel involved there.” They knew about his CIA payout, various other help, his relocaion to America to escape Libya, his salary for testifying, and witness protection. They did not know about an additional $2 million reportedly given by the DoJ. (search "rewards for injustice"). He's hardly mentioned after 2000, but was the smoking gun before that.
The scorched clothes that were found were traced right to the shop where investigators found Tony Gauci. He clearly described Nov 23 as the date of purchase (weather records, TV schedules, and Silema Christmas decoration schedules establish this). But Megrahi wasn't there that day, so investigators changed it to Dec 7 (there's a case to be made for that date, but a very slim one with too many presumptions - search "date of clothing purchase" + Gauci) Besides the date discrepancy, which is dynamite, Gauci never even identified Megrahi. The buyer he described was at least 4 inches taller and 14 years older than our villain,observations Tony has fudged in the years since ("under six feet, under sixty" was his mantra at Zeist). Once in 1991 he pointed at a photo of Megrahi and said "similar to the man ... He would perhaps have to look about ten years older ... this photograph resembles the man who bought the clothing, but it is younger.” Note he's comparing two separate men. All the men shown that day were too young, and Megrahi was the oldest among them. Later in 1999 at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands, he pointed to the guy in person (famous by then) and said "“not exactly the man I saw in the shop. Ten years ago I saw him, but the man who look a little bit like exactly is the number 5 [Megrahi]” And he was paid $2 million,I guess just to not protest at the abuse of his evidence, while his brother scammed another $1 million. (search: "yes, millions to Malta") That's as good as the evidence against Megrahi gets. But he was (wrongly) convicted and so he killed all those people and deserves to die in pain and suffer in Hell, right? Because of a legal technicality?Update: Of course they didn'tpublish it. It's a zero-comment article. CNN's new comments halted with the appearance of TerpMole, aka Kaddafi Delenda Est, come to criticize me. I've left I think 49 comments there now.
Why Bollier Suspected the Libyans
The MEBO Files, part 2
July 4 2010
last updates/edits July 10
In the early 1990s, long before he came out of the closet as a Libya-Megrahi supporter with reams of accusations against Scots-American investigators, Swiss merchant Edwin Bollier sneakily told these same authorities that he actually believed the Libyans were behind the bombing. Now, he had said just that in early 1989 with his semi-famous “catch-letter,” but that was only because a shadowy CIA man had told him to do it.
But his continuing charade, as he explains his helpful phase, went beyond the terms behind that note and raises questions. For example, was it the same agent’s nefarious demands each time he spoke up, or was there a whole team steering the poor man towards implicating Libya? Or was he, as the rest of this article presumes, more self-motivated than all that?
In a January 14 1991 interview with the FBI and Swiss authorities, Bollier said he had written that letter two years earlier to get the investigators “away from the wrong track and to bring them onto the Libyan track." It goes beyond giving the mystery man what he demanded; Bollier says (up to 2000 anyway) that on Jan 5 he himself felt that Libya was the right track to investigate.
Something Was Going On
It was a gut-feeling Swiss suspicion, or “Swisspicion” as it will now be called, that prompted a phone call to his acquaintance Abdelbaset al Megrahi, somewhere around Christmas (see below). He was driven partly by an odd “impression that something was going on,” he recalled at trial a decade later, and cited two powerful clues while apparently meaning to cite only one. “[W]hen this mystery man came along -- or when I found that the timer had been programmed, we ourselves,” meaning he and Mebo co-founder Erwin Meister, “believed that the Libyans were involved.”
The reason he started giving was the mystery man and his alleged visit on the morning of December 30, which was of course after the call in question. The man, who perhaps didn’t exist, had started by telling Edwin that he’d been selling timers to Tripoli for years, and had just been there to sell more right as Lockerbie happened. Chilled to the bone to realize the CIA was monitoring arms sales to Libya, Bollier was then told, as he recalled at trial, “and I can tell you that the Libyans are connected with this attack." All he needed Edwin to do was write a fabricated letter to the CIA telling them what they were already sure of. And this he finds convincing?
No, he had cut himself off, remembering it was the timer re-set, not the CIA man’s statement, that had sparked up his swisspicion. This requires some explaining.
The Olympic Clue
Around December 1, Bollier says (unconfirmed as far as I know) the Libyans told Mebo they wanted 40 more MST-13 units like the ones thay had bought 20 of in 1985. He didn’t have any handy and couldn’t make any more soon enough, so he bought 40 Olympus timers (sometimes translated as “watches” during the trial) on the open market. As he was getting this story on record with the FBI in January ’91, Bollier said “prior to my departure, I did a final check on all timers and reset them to zero."
As he flew out December 18, Bollier brought these fully blank timers in his carry-on luggage (his checked luggage being its own story). He tried to sell them to the Libyans, marked up too much. They wanted MST-13s, these were too expensive, they would keep them anyway, and Abdelbaset al Megrahi would hand over the money, he was told (this allegation will also be addressed separately). He left the timers with alleged Libyan bigwig Ezzadin Hinshiri the 19th, but then had Megrahi flake out on the money meeting. Not having been paid, Bollier says he collected the timer/watches back from Hinshiri in the morning, and wound up bringing back home in failure on December 20, the day before Lockerbie.
Within a few days after this trip, Bollier told investigators, he had looked at one of these fully blank units handled by Hinshiri and found its screen showed a peculiar setting: “Wednesday,” being December 21, and a time - 7:30 pm - exactly 27 minutes after the detonation on board PA103. This could only come from Hinshiri’s hands, connected to his brain, and his brain to the bombing plot, Bollier apparently deduced.
At trial in June 2000 (Day 26) Edwin still swore by this find; “That is true. Yes. That the timer was programmed; that is true.” He says he removed the battery and told his partner, Mr. Meister about the unusual setting but did not show it to him. Meister, however, had already recalled at trial (Day 22) Bollier actually showing him the timer with its setting, which he agreed said Wednesday and 7:30. As the Zeist judges summarized in their Opinion of the Court, paragraph [46]:
This was therefore not accepted as evidence against the Libyan Hinshiri, but it wasn’t for a lack of trying on Mebo’s part. Now if they had accepted it as consistent, it might seem a fair reason for Bollier to suspect Libyan involvement, ring them up suspiciously, and then compliantly write a letter on his imaginary friend’s advice. (The judges do also dismiss the “mystery man” as fiction of the “spy thriller” sort). Just what that clue would mean, if accepted, is a little less promising. All I can see in it is one of four possibilities:
A) It was coincidence based on the visit’s timing; Hinshiri wanted to see if it could be set for, say, two days from now – which just happened to be the day that PA103 blew up. (the time mismatch would support this)
B) Hinshiri, a PA103 plotter, was practicing to see if this Olympus timer/watch would work for the bombing two days away, but then let it go as too expensive for the destruction of an American airliner. And just forgot to re-set it to zero.
C) Less directly, he was just typing the bombing time into unrelated electronics at random to make sure he has it memorized (he didn't - 27 minutes off), or something to that effect. And again, he just forgets to re-set it to zero before he hands it back, knowing the bombing will shock the world two days later.
D) As Bollier now says (see comments below) "someone else" aside from a Libyan, might have put that data there for him to see.
I’m unsure if he was trying to imply option B) or C) above, but Bollier would apparently have the Judges believe that Hinshiri had just handed him a major clue to sell to the Americans. I rather prefer the version where he counterfeited this bill of exchange from thin air.
Something Had Happened
Set ablaze by his timer discovery, Bollier says, he placed unusual phone calls (unverified) to both Ezzadin Hinshiri and the man he knew as Abdelbaset, perhaps one week after the Lockerbie bombing. He emphasizes at trial that he was calling to complain about not being paid – for the timers he had brought back with him. But he had complex reasons for these calls, he told Swiss authorities, including:
---
July 4 2010
last updates/edits July 10
In the early 1990s, long before he came out of the closet as a Libya-Megrahi supporter with reams of accusations against Scots-American investigators, Swiss merchant Edwin Bollier sneakily told these same authorities that he actually believed the Libyans were behind the bombing. Now, he had said just that in early 1989 with his semi-famous “catch-letter,” but that was only because a shadowy CIA man had told him to do it.
But his continuing charade, as he explains his helpful phase, went beyond the terms behind that note and raises questions. For example, was it the same agent’s nefarious demands each time he spoke up, or was there a whole team steering the poor man towards implicating Libya? Or was he, as the rest of this article presumes, more self-motivated than all that?
In a January 14 1991 interview with the FBI and Swiss authorities, Bollier said he had written that letter two years earlier to get the investigators “away from the wrong track and to bring them onto the Libyan track." It goes beyond giving the mystery man what he demanded; Bollier says (up to 2000 anyway) that on Jan 5 he himself felt that Libya was the right track to investigate.
Something Was Going On
It was a gut-feeling Swiss suspicion, or “Swisspicion” as it will now be called, that prompted a phone call to his acquaintance Abdelbaset al Megrahi, somewhere around Christmas (see below). He was driven partly by an odd “impression that something was going on,” he recalled at trial a decade later, and cited two powerful clues while apparently meaning to cite only one. “[W]hen this mystery man came along -- or when I found that the timer had been programmed, we ourselves,” meaning he and Mebo co-founder Erwin Meister, “believed that the Libyans were involved.”
The reason he started giving was the mystery man and his alleged visit on the morning of December 30, which was of course after the call in question. The man, who perhaps didn’t exist, had started by telling Edwin that he’d been selling timers to Tripoli for years, and had just been there to sell more right as Lockerbie happened. Chilled to the bone to realize the CIA was monitoring arms sales to Libya, Bollier was then told, as he recalled at trial, “and I can tell you that the Libyans are connected with this attack." All he needed Edwin to do was write a fabricated letter to the CIA telling them what they were already sure of. And this he finds convincing?
No, he had cut himself off, remembering it was the timer re-set, not the CIA man’s statement, that had sparked up his swisspicion. This requires some explaining.
The Olympic Clue
Around December 1, Bollier says (unconfirmed as far as I know) the Libyans told Mebo they wanted 40 more MST-13 units like the ones thay had bought 20 of in 1985. He didn’t have any handy and couldn’t make any more soon enough, so he bought 40 Olympus timers (sometimes translated as “watches” during the trial) on the open market. As he was getting this story on record with the FBI in January ’91, Bollier said “prior to my departure, I did a final check on all timers and reset them to zero."
As he flew out December 18, Bollier brought these fully blank timers in his carry-on luggage (his checked luggage being its own story). He tried to sell them to the Libyans, marked up too much. They wanted MST-13s, these were too expensive, they would keep them anyway, and Abdelbaset al Megrahi would hand over the money, he was told (this allegation will also be addressed separately). He left the timers with alleged Libyan bigwig Ezzadin Hinshiri the 19th, but then had Megrahi flake out on the money meeting. Not having been paid, Bollier says he collected the timer/watches back from Hinshiri in the morning, and wound up bringing back home in failure on December 20, the day before Lockerbie.
Within a few days after this trip, Bollier told investigators, he had looked at one of these fully blank units handled by Hinshiri and found its screen showed a peculiar setting: “Wednesday,” being December 21, and a time - 7:30 pm - exactly 27 minutes after the detonation on board PA103. This could only come from Hinshiri’s hands, connected to his brain, and his brain to the bombing plot, Bollier apparently deduced.
At trial in June 2000 (Day 26) Edwin still swore by this find; “That is true. Yes. That the timer was programmed; that is true.” He says he removed the battery and told his partner, Mr. Meister about the unusual setting but did not show it to him. Meister, however, had already recalled at trial (Day 22) Bollier actually showing him the timer with its setting, which he agreed said Wednesday and 7:30. As the Zeist judges summarized in their Opinion of the Court, paragraph [46]:
We do not accept the evidence of either of these two witnesses about this alleged discovery. It was established, and Mr Meister was forced to accept, that the Olympus timer was incapable of showing a date. Moreover, the evidence of both witnesses about what they claimed to have seen and the circumstances in which they claimed to have made the discovery was so inconsistent that we are wholly unable to accept any of it.---
Update July 7: Bollier alerts me the Zeist judges were wrong to dismiss this clue. He sent me a low resolution picture (inset, cleaned up a bit) of the model in question, TM2. There is no date display as in 21/12, but that not what He and Meister said. It was the day name Wednesday. Bollier cites: "LC Display Window ; Display selector switsch; Mode selector; Select button; Set button; Hours>>Minutes (: Seconds); ON Time, Off Time; AM > PM; At the bottom left hand corner > Day of the week = ( SUN > MON > TUE >WED >THU >FRI > SAT" Indeed. The one shown seems to say "SUN" (highlighted). So, Bollier stands by his claim of what he saw, that someone other than him entered this day/time - and not necessarily a Libyan (see comments below)
---This was therefore not accepted as evidence against the Libyan Hinshiri, but it wasn’t for a lack of trying on Mebo’s part. Now if they had accepted it as consistent, it might seem a fair reason for Bollier to suspect Libyan involvement, ring them up suspiciously, and then compliantly write a letter on his imaginary friend’s advice. (The judges do also dismiss the “mystery man” as fiction of the “spy thriller” sort). Just what that clue would mean, if accepted, is a little less promising. All I can see in it is one of four possibilities:
A) It was coincidence based on the visit’s timing; Hinshiri wanted to see if it could be set for, say, two days from now – which just happened to be the day that PA103 blew up. (the time mismatch would support this)
B) Hinshiri, a PA103 plotter, was practicing to see if this Olympus timer/watch would work for the bombing two days away, but then let it go as too expensive for the destruction of an American airliner. And just forgot to re-set it to zero.
C) Less directly, he was just typing the bombing time into unrelated electronics at random to make sure he has it memorized (he didn't - 27 minutes off), or something to that effect. And again, he just forgets to re-set it to zero before he hands it back, knowing the bombing will shock the world two days later.
D) As Bollier now says (see comments below) "someone else" aside from a Libyan, might have put that data there for him to see.
I’m unsure if he was trying to imply option B) or C) above, but Bollier would apparently have the Judges believe that Hinshiri had just handed him a major clue to sell to the Americans. I rather prefer the version where he counterfeited this bill of exchange from thin air.
Something Had Happened
Set ablaze by his timer discovery, Bollier says, he placed unusual phone calls (unverified) to both Ezzadin Hinshiri and the man he knew as Abdelbaset, perhaps one week after the Lockerbie bombing. He emphasizes at trial that he was calling to complain about not being paid – for the timers he had brought back with him. But he had complex reasons for these calls, he told Swiss authorities, including:
“I had a feeling that there was a connection between Libya and the crash of Pan Am 103. I wanted to hear them. Experience has shown me that people can no longer be reached when something has happened. This was certainly the case after the American air strike on Libya.”Or, conversely, after a hypothetical Libyan air strike against America. He couldn’t recall the exact date, but it was “between the 21st -- or between Christmas and New Year,” but prior to the mystery man, so December 29 at the latest. On the call to Megrahi, he said “I telephoned, and he wasn't there. Somebody took the telephone off the hook. But I cannot confirm 100 percent whether it was Mr. Abdelbaset's voice. Anyway, I was told that he was not there.” Well, if people can’t be reached after something has happened, it would seem that something had happened - some unknown event involving timers and December 21 and, apparently, both Hinshiri and Megrahi.
---
Evidence Reconsidered: Date of Clothing Purchase
First Posted January 17 2010
last updates Jan 5 2011
Among other points raised in a letter re-posted by Victims of Pan Am 103 Inc., Richard Marquise mused: “It was strange that of all the people in the world, Mr. Megrahi was in Malta the same day the clothing was purchased and was there the same day the bomb left on its fateful journey.” (emphasis mine)
1) A Choice of Two Days
Tony Gauci's initial recall of the date of purchase was vague - late November or perhaps early December, or a few weeks before the bombing. It was a football game played on the day (see below) that really narrowed it down to 23 November or 7 December 1988. He recalled the purchse as on a weekday, and specifically "mid-week." In his 2000 testimony, Gauci clarified this meant, exactly, Wednesday. [Day 31, pp 4820-21] Both possible dates were Wednesdays, so that's no help, but the distinction is crucial; as Marquise points out, Megrahi was on Malta on the 7th and so could possibly be the buyer (or to some minds, he clearly is).
If, on the other hand, this supposed purchase occurred two weeks earlier, it had to be someone else; Maltese immigration records and all sources on all sides agree Megrahi had a solid alibi for 23 November. We know the official decision - the purchase happened the 7th. And we know how that helps the prosecution case. But what does the actual evidence offered by Tony, and his brother Paul for that matter, and others, actually say on the subject?
2) Christmas lights
Paul Foot's amazing 2000 booklet "Lockerbie: The Flight From Justice" reports:
Clearly the earlier version, before he became muddled with an awareness of contradiction, is more trustworthy, and the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission, announcing a possible “miscarriage of justice” in 2007, found support for this. Among other alarming problems, they unearthed additional specific evidence giving a start date for the Christmas light erection – the 6th of December:
3) Weather records vs. Gauci's evidence
Gauci’s first statements to the police cited the weather as a clue to the day of the purchase. When the mystery shopper came in, it was raining enough for him to buy, in addition to the memorably random assortment of clothing, a single item of utility; an umbrella. From his first statement, 1 September 1989:
Remnants of a black umbrella were found in Scotland and presumed to be from the bomb bag. This looks like a good connection, but the items bought are covered in a separate post. For this post it establishes that Gauci’s story, however true or relevant it really was, featured significant rainfall.
During the 2000 trial, the issue was raised by defense for the first accused (Megrahi). They called as a witness one Major Joseph Mifsud, a Maltese meteorologist who gave evidence on 5 December 2000. He discussed rainfall records kept at the airport. Every three hours (usually), there was a measurement taken, entered in the "Rainfall" on the charts, showing as some entries discussed:
6 Dec 21.00 GMT - "Nil"
7 Dec 00:00 GMT – “Nil”
7 Dec 06.00 GMT – “Nil”
7 Dec 09:00 GMT – “T/R” Mifsud explained the mark “TR” as “a trace of rainfall, less than 0.5 of a millimetre.” This reading refers apparently to a one minute light shower recorded from 8:44 to 8:45 am GMT, ten hours prior to the alleged December 7 purchase. The closest time to that, for 18.00 GMT, Mifsud clarified, showed “a nil entry” for the airport. [Transcripts, Day 76, p 9192-93] All other samples aside from 09:00 were equally dry.
Above: Police records for Malta, December 1988. From Foot, Flight from Justice, p21. Maj. Mifsud testified to records the airport at Luqa (highlighted) and recorded TR (trace rainfall) Dec 7. Rain in Silema (highlighted) Dec 7 is the issue and it, like all others aside from the airport, was left blank. December 6 is similarly dry-looking - these blanks mean either “nil," or everyone else just took these day off.
Note in the chart how these are daily totals, and do not reflect changes in rainfall at points during the day, so the “TR” at Luqa could be used to argue for light rain at Silema around 7pm, even though its daily total shows as blank, or nil. In fact, Foot noted how some did argue “the blank referred to the period from noon on the previous day (6 December) to noon on the 7th. So it could still have been raining at the time the clothes were sold – at about 6.30pm on the 7th.” But this is obfuscation. The As foot noted, Mifsund was quite clear on what the hourly returns meant:
The prosecution asked the witness it could rain in Silema, which is right on the coast, but not the airport, approximately four miles inland (southwest). He admitted “I do not altogether exclude the possibility that there could have been a drop of rain here and there,” and estimated “the possibility that there would be some drops of rain, about ten per cent possibility.” [Foot 21] It’s precipitously less likely to have been enough to warrant buying an umbrella, and only a major screw-up in records-keeping could explain such a rain on the 7th not being recorded.
It can’t be ruled out that Gauci was eventually made aware of this disconnect and pressured to shift his story. One can observe subtle changes in the witness' recall of rainfall over subsequent statements made to DCI Harry Bell, who was leading the Scottish police effort on Malta and was Gauci’s usual contact. Two of these later read in court include:
A decade later Gauci tried valiantly to minimize rainfall further in his pivotal trial testimony. The Court summarized his take into this finding, from paragraph 56 of their final opinion: [OoC 56] “When asked about the weather he said “When he came by the first time, it wasn’t raining but then it started dripping. Not very -- it was not raining heavily. It was simply dripping...” What the actual transcripts show is a little weirder. It was delivered in his native Maltese, and translated for the court.
It was barely raining, had just started, just stopped, drizzling, ground barely wet, etc. None of it fits well with December 7, when rain on Silema would be described as “maybe a few drops, but not that I noticed.” The records for November 23, not surprisingly, are a direct fit for his freshest memories. Major Mifsud, again, from the transcripts: [Day 76, Pp 9207-09] “Light intermittent rain at noon” was recorded, a condition that “persist right down the column until 16.15,” onto the next page to at least 18.00 GMT, 19:00 local, almost the minute of any alleged 6:50 purchase that day. This slot measurement shows .6 of a millimeters of rain was taken at the airport.
Results in Silema, a bare four miles distant, were likely the same - light but notable. And the buyer noticed enough to buy and use an umbrella. What this evidence shows then, is the unknown purchaser of 23 November, if he really existed, was a bit of a pansy regarding rain.
4) Football games and Paul’s absence at 6:50 pm
Tony Gauci's first statement of 1 September 1989 offered as a clue of the date “I had been working alone in the shop. It was about 6:50 pm just before closing time at 7pm." He was alone because his football fanatic brother had skipped out to watch a game at home. A portion of his first statement, read back in court, said:
Indeed. Paul was spoken to and recalled the match he took an evening off early to watch - it was Rome vs. Dresden. It can be surmised he was rooting for Rome. “Paul Gauci was duly listed by the prosecution as a witness,” wrote Foot, but “was not called to give evidence” at the trial, that had just finished as he wrote [Foot p 21]. [Note: There was a separate Paul Gauci (one presumes) called, in connection with his company Big Ben (of Malta) manufacturing the "blue babygro" of the type found at Lockerbie, and selling some to the other Gaucis at Mary's House] In fact, Paul had the contents of his police records selectively ignored, it seems. Private Eye, the publishers of Foot’s booklet, obtained copies of these reports and shared part of one from 19 October, 1989. This recorded a meeting with DCI Harry Bell that made it clear why, despite his specific and useful memory, “Paul Gauci was not called to give evidence for the prosecution.” Paul stated that day, in support of Megrahi’s 7 December shopping spree:
Despite Paul's, and his opinion's, absence from the trial, the issue of game timing was not ignored. Television records were called on, and they tell the same story but without stating an opinion on "the day in question."
- 23 November. Dresden and Roma. The broadcast was ... 16.55.45 to 18.44.00 hours local time.
- 7 December. Roma and Dresden. The broadcast was ... 12.55.30 to 14.53 hours local time.
The purchase Paul missed out on was about 1850 local, just as the November game had ended, or four hours after, if on December 7. On its own, that's not conclusive; he could have just gotten lazy and skipped the chance to help Tony for the last hours and for closing. But all things considered, Gauci himself felt the November game was the one that made him miss the fateful purchase.
5) Why doesn’t November 23 work again, aside from Megrahi not being there?
I almost left this section blank, to emphasize that I’ve seen no reasonable excuse yet offered as to how these clues add up to 7 December. Paul Foot’s 2000 booklet brilliantly outlined the evidence for 23 November, which I've drawn heavily from, and summarized:
Further, Paul's apparent story change between mid-October and mid-December hints at - but far from proves - an intention somewhere to shift the scope onto Megrahi (and thus the date to 7 December), an intention that had somehow influenced Paul to report the other day despite everything.
Additions, Jan 5 2011
6) The Last Pajamas
This is a point I at first glossed over, mentioned by Edwin Bollier ("ebol" in comments, NOT "Ebol"). But it was also argued at trial, and to that I turn. The Opinion of the Court summarized it thus:
The judges were faced with further corroboration, in quadruplicate now, of the day they refused to see. So they found a reason to dismiss this one too, and continued their paragraph 66:
If it had been put to him, he would most likely have fudged it to support 7 December. On the second, he would have said that, but awkwardly, again contradicting his own better statements from a decade earlier. Thirdly, unmentioned, there was no documentary evidence for or against a December re-order that might, by luck, illustrate another sale of the last pairs on December 7. I don't see a reason to suspect there would be - Tony doesn't seem to specify the pajamas were the last in stock. But it would have been on the prosecution to show that. As Megrahi's counsel William Taylor put it:
Perhaps it's useful to look at it this way: It was open to the Crown to prove the next invoice;
they did not do so. They were alive to the point. And I can address you as judges rather
than as the tribunal of fact, just as the Advocate Depute did: If the Crown had led evidence,
it would not have created an inference as to the 7th of December.
The prosecution's (Crown's) failure to locate any mid-December re-order indicates there wasn't one, leaving one wondering why the judges left themselves wondering about one.
7) Harry Bell's First Reason
Considering the quote above by DCI Harry Bell, the date 7 December was clearly chosen to fit Megrahi. One must presume this decision was made prior to his citing it, in his police diary, as reason #1 to identify Megrahi. On the day of Tony's "ID," February 15 1991, Bell wrote in support that "He arrived in Malta on 7th December '88. This was the date of the purchase of the clothing." Nabbed. Bell that is, using criminally circular logic he thought would never be exposed. (This is explained in a separate post.)
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last updates Jan 5 2011
Among other points raised in a letter re-posted by Victims of Pan Am 103 Inc., Richard Marquise mused: “It was strange that of all the people in the world, Mr. Megrahi was in Malta the same day the clothing was purchased and was there the same day the bomb left on its fateful journey.” (emphasis mine)
I reminded him of the statement in the comments section at Professor Back’s blog, and posed the following five questions to him. Apparently he never caught them, as he never offered an answer. My own answers follow.
1) Is it not strange that of all the days in the subset November 23 and December 7 you and the investigation had to pick the latter as the best fit for the purchase, even though that choice requires badly misreading the actual evidence?
2) What did the SCCRC find about the Christmas light going up?
3) What do local weather records say for rainfall on Dec 7 vs. Nov 23?
4) What do football schedules (Rome-Dresden) say about Paul’s absence at 6:50 pm? What does Paul say?
5) Why doesn’t November 23 work again, aside from Megrahi not being there?
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1) Is it not strange that of all the days in the subset November 23 and December 7 you and the investigation had to pick the latter as the best fit for the purchase, even though that choice requires badly misreading the actual evidence?
2) What did the SCCRC find about the Christmas light going up?
3) What do local weather records say for rainfall on Dec 7 vs. Nov 23?
4) What do football schedules (Rome-Dresden) say about Paul’s absence at 6:50 pm? What does Paul say?
5) Why doesn’t November 23 work again, aside from Megrahi not being there?
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1) A Choice of Two Days
Tony Gauci's initial recall of the date of purchase was vague - late November or perhaps early December, or a few weeks before the bombing. It was a football game played on the day (see below) that really narrowed it down to 23 November or 7 December 1988. He recalled the purchse as on a weekday, and specifically "mid-week." In his 2000 testimony, Gauci clarified this meant, exactly, Wednesday. [Day 31, pp 4820-21] Both possible dates were Wednesdays, so that's no help, but the distinction is crucial; as Marquise points out, Megrahi was on Malta on the 7th and so could possibly be the buyer (or to some minds, he clearly is).
If, on the other hand, this supposed purchase occurred two weeks earlier, it had to be someone else; Maltese immigration records and all sources on all sides agree Megrahi had a solid alibi for 23 November. We know the official decision - the purchase happened the 7th. And we know how that helps the prosecution case. But what does the actual evidence offered by Tony, and his brother Paul for that matter, and others, actually say on the subject?
2) Christmas lights
Paul Foot's amazing 2000 booklet "Lockerbie: The Flight From Justice" reports:
On 19 September, 1989, Gauci asserted in a statement to police: “At Christmas time we put up the decorations about 15 days before Christmas. The Christmas decorations were not up when the man bought the clothes.” On 10 September, 1990, Mr Gauci told DCI Bell of the Scottish police: “I’ve been asked to try again and pinpoint the day and date I sold the man the clothing. I can only say it was a weekday; there were no Christmas decorations up, as I have already said, and I believe it was at the end of November.” [p 21 - emphasis mine]But ultimately another day was needed, a day by which the town would normally have its halls partly decked. By the time Mr. Gauci made it to trial in 2000, judging from the stretches of Q and A I’ve been going over, he was taking every opportunity to fudge the two versions closer together, on this issue and others. The Court’s summarized final opinion document (31/1/01) stated:
“In his evidence in chief, Mr Gauci said that the date of purchase must have been about a fortnight before Christmas. He was asked if he could be more specific under reference to the street Christmas decorations. Initially he said “I wouldn’t know exactly, but I have never really noticed these things, but I remember, yes, there were Christmas lights. They were on already. I’m sure. I can’t say exactly.” [paragraph 56]Of course among the first things he remembered, that helped mark the memory, was the decorations “were not up when the man bought the clothes.” After this contradiction “had been put to him” by the defense, the Court continued, “he said “I don’t know. I’m not sure what I told them exactly about this. I believe they were putting up the lights, though, in those times.” [para 56]
Clearly the earlier version, before he became muddled with an awareness of contradiction, is more trustworthy, and the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission, announcing a possible “miscarriage of justice” in 2007, found support for this. Among other alarming problems, they unearthed additional specific evidence giving a start date for the Christmas light erection – the 6th of December:
New evidence not heard at the trial concerned the date on which the Christmas lights were illuminated in the area of Sliema in which Mary’s House is situated. In the Commission’s view, taken together with Mr Gauci’s evidence at trial and the contents of his police statements, this additional evidence indicates that the purchase of the items took place prior to 6 December 1988. In other words, it indicates that the purchase took place at a time when there was no evidence at trial that the applicant was in Malta.
3) Weather records vs. Gauci's evidence
Gauci’s first statements to the police cited the weather as a clue to the day of the purchase. When the mystery shopper came in, it was raining enough for him to buy, in addition to the memorably random assortment of clothing, a single item of utility; an umbrella. From his first statement, 1 September 1989:
“I even showed him a “Black coloured (umbrella?) and he bought it. … The man said he had other shops to visit and he picked up the “umbrella” and he said he would come back shortly … [and] walked out of the shop with the “Umbrella” which he opened as it was raining.”
Remnants of a black umbrella were found in Scotland and presumed to be from the bomb bag. This looks like a good connection, but the items bought are covered in a separate post. For this post it establishes that Gauci’s story, however true or relevant it really was, featured significant rainfall.
During the 2000 trial, the issue was raised by defense for the first accused (Megrahi). They called as a witness one Major Joseph Mifsud, a Maltese meteorologist who gave evidence on 5 December 2000. He discussed rainfall records kept at the airport. Every three hours (usually), there was a measurement taken, entered in the "Rainfall" on the charts, showing as some entries discussed:
6 Dec 21.00 GMT - "Nil"
7 Dec 00:00 GMT – “Nil”
7 Dec 06.00 GMT – “Nil”
7 Dec 09:00 GMT – “T/R” Mifsud explained the mark “TR” as “a trace of rainfall, less than 0.5 of a millimetre.” This reading refers apparently to a one minute light shower recorded from 8:44 to 8:45 am GMT, ten hours prior to the alleged December 7 purchase. The closest time to that, for 18.00 GMT, Mifsud clarified, showed “a nil entry” for the airport. [Transcripts, Day 76, p 9192-93] All other samples aside from 09:00 were equally dry.
Note in the chart how these are daily totals, and do not reflect changes in rainfall at points during the day, so the “TR” at Luqa could be used to argue for light rain at Silema around 7pm, even though its daily total shows as blank, or nil. In fact, Foot noted how some did argue “the blank referred to the period from noon on the previous day (6 December) to noon on the 7th. So it could still have been raining at the time the clothes were sold – at about 6.30pm on the 7th.” But this is obfuscation. The As foot noted, Mifsund was quite clear on what the hourly returns meant:
"Q. Just confirm with me, please, apart from the trace of rain that we discussed that fell or was measured at 9.00 in the morning of Wednesday December 7, did any rain fall at Luqa?
A. No, no rain was recorded. No, no rain was recorded.
Q. Up to midnight?
A. Up to midnight." [Day 76, p 9201]
The prosecution asked the witness it could rain in Silema, which is right on the coast, but not the airport, approximately four miles inland (southwest). He admitted “I do not altogether exclude the possibility that there could have been a drop of rain here and there,” and estimated “the possibility that there would be some drops of rain, about ten per cent possibility.” [Foot 21] It’s precipitously less likely to have been enough to warrant buying an umbrella, and only a major screw-up in records-keeping could explain such a rain on the 7th not being recorded.
It can’t be ruled out that Gauci was eventually made aware of this disconnect and pressured to shift his story. One can observe subtle changes in the witness' recall of rainfall over subsequent statements made to DCI Harry Bell, who was leading the Scottish police effort on Malta and was Gauci’s usual contact. Two of these later read in court include:
21 February 1990: “I have been thinking about the day the man bought the clothes, November, December 1988. He left the shop after having made the purchases and turned right down Tower Road. At that time, he had the umbrella raised and opened. When he returned to the shop, he came from the same direction, but the umbrella was down because it had almost stopped raining, and it was just drops coming down.” [p 4815]
10 September 1990: “I have been asked about the weather conditions that night the man made the purchase of the clothing. Just before the man left the shop, there was a light shower of rain just beginning. The umbrellas were hanging from the mirrors in the shop, and the man actually looked at them, and that is how I came to sell him one. He opened it up as he left the shop, and he turned right and walked downhill. There was very little rain on the ground, no running water, just damp.” [emphasis mine] [p 4817]
A decade later Gauci tried valiantly to minimize rainfall further in his pivotal trial testimony. The Court summarized his take into this finding, from paragraph 56 of their final opinion: [OoC 56] “When asked about the weather he said “When he came by the first time, it wasn’t raining but then it started dripping. Not very -- it was not raining heavily. It was simply dripping...” What the actual transcripts show is a little weirder. It was delivered in his native Maltese, and translated for the court.
”Q Do you remember what the weather was like when the man came to the shop?
A When he came by the first time, it wasn't raining, but then it started dripping. Not very -- it was not raining heavily. It was simply -- it was simply dripping, but as a matter of fact he did take an umbrella, didn't he? He bought an umbrella.” [Day 31, P 4741]
“Q … on the 1st of September of 1989 your memory was that the man purchased the umbrella, he didn't leave it for you to bundle up with the other things he had bought in the shop, but he left with the umbrella and put it up outside the door of the shop because it was raining?
A Exactly.” [p 4815]
"A It wasn't raining. It wasn't raining. It was just drizzling.
Q We'll come to --
A I can't remember the dates. I don't want to say -- I don't want to give out dates if I am not that sure, sir.
Q Indeed. What I am endeavouring to do, Mr. Gauci, with your help, is to illustrate --
A I always thank you, sir. I am here to help you, sir." [p 4816]
"A I don't want to cause confusion. I don't know dates." [p 4820]
It was barely raining, had just started, just stopped, drizzling, ground barely wet, etc. None of it fits well with December 7, when rain on Silema would be described as “maybe a few drops, but not that I noticed.” The records for November 23, not surprisingly, are a direct fit for his freshest memories. Major Mifsud, again, from the transcripts: [Day 76, Pp 9207-09] “Light intermittent rain at noon” was recorded, a condition that “persist right down the column until 16.15,” onto the next page to at least 18.00 GMT, 19:00 local, almost the minute of any alleged 6:50 purchase that day. This slot measurement shows .6 of a millimeters of rain was taken at the airport.
Results in Silema, a bare four miles distant, were likely the same - light but notable. And the buyer noticed enough to buy and use an umbrella. What this evidence shows then, is the unknown purchaser of 23 November, if he really existed, was a bit of a pansy regarding rain.
4) Football games and Paul’s absence at 6:50 pm
Tony Gauci's first statement of 1 September 1989 offered as a clue of the date “I had been working alone in the shop. It was about 6:50 pm just before closing time at 7pm." He was alone because his football fanatic brother had skipped out to watch a game at home. A portion of his first statement, read back in court, said:
“I cannot remember the day or date that I met this man. I would think it was a weekday, as I was alone in the shop. My brother Paul did not work in the shop that afternoon, as he had gone home to watch a football match on television. He may be able to recall the game, and this could identify the day and date that I dealt with the man in the shop.” [Day 31 pp 4792/93]
Indeed. Paul was spoken to and recalled the match he took an evening off early to watch - it was Rome vs. Dresden. It can be surmised he was rooting for Rome. “Paul Gauci was duly listed by the prosecution as a witness,” wrote Foot, but “was not called to give evidence” at the trial, that had just finished as he wrote [Foot p 21]. [Note: There was a separate Paul Gauci (one presumes) called, in connection with his company Big Ben (of Malta) manufacturing the "blue babygro" of the type found at Lockerbie, and selling some to the other Gaucis at Mary's House] In fact, Paul had the contents of his police records selectively ignored, it seems. Private Eye, the publishers of Foot’s booklet, obtained copies of these reports and shared part of one from 19 October, 1989. This recorded a meeting with DCI Harry Bell that made it clear why, despite his specific and useful memory, “Paul Gauci was not called to give evidence for the prosecution.” Paul stated that day, in support of Megrahi’s 7 December shopping spree:
“I was shown a list of European football matches I know as UEFA. I checked all the games and dates. I am of the opinion that the game I watched on TV was on 23 November, 1988: SC Dynamo Dresden v AS Roma. On checking the 7th December 1988, I can say that I watched AS Roma v Dynamo Dresden in the afternoon. All the other games were played in the evening. I can say for certain I watched the Dresden v Roma game. On the basis that there were two games played during the afternoon of 23 November and only one on the afternoon of 7th December, I would say that the 23rd November 1988 was the date in question.” [Foot p 21]
Despite Paul's, and his opinion's, absence from the trial, the issue of game timing was not ignored. Television records were called on, and they tell the same story but without stating an opinion on "the day in question."
- 23 November. Dresden and Roma. The broadcast was ... 16.55.45 to 18.44.00 hours local time.
- 7 December. Roma and Dresden. The broadcast was ... 12.55.30 to 14.53 hours local time.
The purchase Paul missed out on was about 1850 local, just as the November game had ended, or four hours after, if on December 7. On its own, that's not conclusive; he could have just gotten lazy and skipped the chance to help Tony for the last hours and for closing. But all things considered, Gauci himself felt the November game was the one that made him miss the fateful purchase.
5) Why doesn’t November 23 work again, aside from Megrahi not being there?
I almost left this section blank, to emphasize that I’ve seen no reasonable excuse yet offered as to how these clues add up to 7 December. Paul Foot’s 2000 booklet brilliantly outlined the evidence for 23 November, which I've drawn heavily from, and summarized:
But this evidence was no use at all to the prosecution of Abdelbasset Megrahi, who was certainly not in Malta on 23 November. Was there any other day he was in Malta and could have bought the clothes? Yes, he was staying in the Holiday Inn in Sliema on 7 December, 1988. So the thrust of the prosecution inquiries about the sale of clothes shifted from 23 November to 7 December. [p 21]This may sound cynical, but in point of fact, DCI Bell, head of the Scottish police investigation in Malta, tacitly admitted as much in a 2006 interview. Speaking with the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission, these excerpts were found in the Megrahi defense team’s grounds of appeal [pdf link - p 229]
DI Bell SCCRC interview (25-26/7/06)“Applicant” here refers to Megrahi, applying for his second try at appeal, which the SCCRC wound up granting. Note two aspects of his citation of Paul's 12/89 statement: it's mentioned immediately after the admission that it was Megrahi that decided it, as a supporting afterthought. Also this being an oral interview, he had the date of that meeting memorized, ready to call up. This is interesting, but inconclusive, evidence of a memorized and rehearsed spin. Paul’s “specifying” the 7th on that particular day conflicts with his own words, from two months earlier, that "the 23rd November 1988 was the date in question.” Do note that Mr. Bell deceptively places the days as equals, creating some unwarranted “confusion,” when the 23rd is clearly the better fit in all the regards addressed above. But whatever “fog of war” effect he may have suffered on the investigative front lines, Bell admitted he saw no good reason, aside from Megrahi’s absence and one mention by Paul, to dismiss the earlier purchase. And he and the investigation and ultimately the Zeist Court all dismissed the earlier purchase.
"...The evidence of the football matches was confusing and in the end we did not manage to bottom it out..."
"...I am asked whether at the time I felt that the evidence of the football matches was strongly indicative of 7th December 1988 as the purchase date. No, I did not. Both dates 23rd Nov & 7th Dec 1988 looked likely.
"...It really has to be acknowledged how confusing this all was. No date was signficant for me at the time. Ultimately it was the applicant's [Megrahi’s] presence on the island on 7th December 1988 that persuaded me that the purchase took place on that date. Paul specified 7th December when I met with him on 14th December 1989 and I recorded this..."
Further, Paul's apparent story change between mid-October and mid-December hints at - but far from proves - an intention somewhere to shift the scope onto Megrahi (and thus the date to 7 December), an intention that had somehow influenced Paul to report the other day despite everything.
Additions, Jan 5 2011
6) The Last Pajamas
This is a point I at first glossed over, mentioned by Edwin Bollier ("ebol" in comments, NOT "Ebol"). But it was also argued at trial, and to that I turn. The Opinion of the Court summarized it thus:
[66] Counsel for the first accused drew our attention to evidence which Mr Gauci gave that according to an invoice which he received, dated 25 November 1988, he purchased eight pairs of pyjamas about that time. Pyjamas sold well in winter and he used to buy stock “when it finished”. According to a previous invoice dated 31 October 1988 he had at that time bought sixteen pairs. Since the purchaser of the clothing had bought two pairs of pyjamas and Mr Gauci had renewed his stock around 25 November 1988, counsel asked us to infer that the purchase of the two pairs must have been made on 23 November 1988...Being the last pairs, by coincidence, helps set an approximate date. Just before November 25 is consistent with one date and not the other. The inference is clear. There was most likely a sale of these pajamas shortly before the order, and the buyer of November 23 was recalled as buying some. Not a break one would expect, but again, it's there.
The judges were faced with further corroboration, in quadruplicate now, of the day they refused to see. So they found a reason to dismiss this one too, and continued their paragraph 66:
...We are unable to draw this inference. In the first place it was not put to Mr Gauci in evidence that this may have been the sequence of events. Secondly, Mr Gauci was not asked what the state of his stock of pyjamas was on or about 7 December 1988.
If it had been put to him, he would most likely have fudged it to support 7 December. On the second, he would have said that, but awkwardly, again contradicting his own better statements from a decade earlier. Thirdly, unmentioned, there was no documentary evidence for or against a December re-order that might, by luck, illustrate another sale of the last pairs on December 7. I don't see a reason to suspect there would be - Tony doesn't seem to specify the pajamas were the last in stock. But it would have been on the prosecution to show that. As Megrahi's counsel William Taylor put it:
Perhaps it's useful to look at it this way: It was open to the Crown to prove the next invoice;
they did not do so. They were alive to the point. And I can address you as judges rather
than as the tribunal of fact, just as the Advocate Depute did: If the Crown had led evidence,
it would not have created an inference as to the 7th of December.
The prosecution's (Crown's) failure to locate any mid-December re-order indicates there wasn't one, leaving one wondering why the judges left themselves wondering about one.
7) Harry Bell's First Reason
Considering the quote above by DCI Harry Bell, the date 7 December was clearly chosen to fit Megrahi. One must presume this decision was made prior to his citing it, in his police diary, as reason #1 to identify Megrahi. On the day of Tony's "ID," February 15 1991, Bell wrote in support that "He arrived in Malta on 7th December '88. This was the date of the purchase of the clothing." Nabbed. Bell that is, using criminally circular logic he thought would never be exposed. (This is explained in a separate post.)
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