Showing posts with label Megrahi appeal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Megrahi appeal. Show all posts

Yes, Millions to Malta

Who Says Tony Got $2 Million.
July 19 2010

last update 27 September (see bottom)

Who Says?
The primary witness that mattered in convicting Abdelbaset al Megrahi for the Lockerbie bombing was, of course, Maltese shopkeeper Anthony "Tony" Gauci. Gauci provided the only link between al Megrahi and the primary suitcase, "identifying" the Libyan as the purchaser of clothes ruled to be inside when the bomb went off. Gauci's evidence and its reliability has come under withering critique from different quarters, and among the more repeated charges in recent years is that Tony was paid - and more importantly offered in advance - $2 million by U.S. authorities for delivering his testimony. The earliest reference I can find is from The Guardian, October 3, 2007:
"The key prosecution witness in the Lockerbie bombing trial was allegedly offered a $2m reward in return for giving evidence, raising fresh doubts about the safety of the case." [source]
This was referring to documents held by Megrahi’s leagal team, first uncovered by the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission in its four year investigation. In the end they found six grounds of possible miscarriage of justice to refer the case back for appeal. Four of these were publicized, all dealing with aspects of Gauci's evidence, and two remain secret to this day. The SCCRC's public announcement (PDF)  of June 2007 in itself makes no mention of reward concerns, but that might have been one of its secret points. However well-supported, the story was widely repeated in credible reports as an explosive allegation.

Consider this audio discussion from September 7 2009, between Scotish politician/activist George Galloway and Frank Duggan, president of the US families group Victims of Pan Am 103 Inc. Not himself a family member of a PA103 victim, Duggan was a political appointee to liase with them from 1989 on. He wasn't able to cite the number of families he represented in 2009, but was quite clear in stating their unanimity about Megrahi's guilt among that unknown number. "There’s no difference of opinion as to the guilt of Mr. Megrahi."

On Tony Gauci, Duggan said “I don’t know anything about the man. I think he’s an honorable guy just trying to do what he thinks is right,” but admits “I’m not that familiar with what he said.” He also said “Dr. Swire doesn’t believe him and I’m sorry about that, but everyone else seems to believe him who’s looked at this case,” notably the "eight judges" that reviewed the case at trial and appeal. Indeed, they accepted what Gauci said, aside from small details like the buyer’s build and height, his age, and the date of purchase. (see first link).

Duggan correctly notes that Gauci’s "inconsistencies" are the subject of the SCCRC’s publicized grounds of appeal, while incorrectly citing “three or four” grounds total. He chalks up their quibbles to "natural" variation from one interview to the next, while admittedly not knowing what was said. And he misunderstands how many interviews were really done with Tony by the same Scots-Maltese team – at least 23, only indicating Megrahi near the end. Duggan seems to feel each nation was only allowed one interview, and 19 involved nations made 19 interviews.

When Mr. Galloway asked the simple question “why did the US government pay him several million dollars?” Duggan about snapped.
“They never did. Who said that? Dr.Swire? Let me tell you one thing. And forgive me if I raise my voice, ‘cause I really get angry. We keep hearing about witnesses being bribed, witnesses who have new evidence, all sorts of things that are just not true. Who said we paid the man two million dollars? It’s preposterous." 
Galloway: “it’s a matter of public record … it’s a commonplace.”
Duggan: “No it’s not. No - it’s - not. … Who said that? Who said that? Who said that? … That’s not so. That’s - not - so.”

Sorry, Frank. I noticed that George said "several million,"and you said "two million," so I know you've heard this before. And yet all you can do in return is call it "preposterous" to pay this witness $2 million. And you’d likely find it crazier yet to pay his brother - who wasn’t even a witness - another $1 million. It would be highly troubling, wouldn’t it? And it happened. Galloway didn't know who to cite, but the SCCRC and Scottish police and US DoJ personnel say so. The two brothers also reportedly moved to Australia in a witness protection plan. That's an aside for the moment, but it gives an idea of the scope of this.

These People Say.
It wasn't until about two weeks after this interview that further support of the two-year old charge became available. After Megrahi’s mysterious release and abandonment of his appeal, he controversially published this information on a website in mid-September. The Grounds of Appeal cite the SCCRC’s findings, based on documents they looked at. The appeal had stuck to the Gauci issue by and large as referred, and it seems the pay-out was one of their areas of great interest: 
There is significant evidence regarding the credibility of the witness Tony Gauci in respect of his having a financial interest in, and his having received substantial monetary payment for giving evidence. This interest and payment was not disclosed at trial and the various documents which indicate same were not disclosed at trial.

The SCCRC has recovered undisclosed material which indicates that:
(a) The witness Tony Gauci had, at an early stage, expressed an interest in receiving payment or compensation for his co-operation in giving evidence, and that this interest persisted until after the trial
(b) that the witness Paul Gauci had " a clear desire to gain financial benefit" from his and his brothers co-operation and that Paul Gauci exercised considerable influence over his brother
(c) that the U.S. authorities offered to make substantial payments to the witness Tony Gauci from an early stage
(d) that an application for reward monies was made on behalf of the SIO of the investigation team of the Scottish police to the U.S. Department of Justice, after the trial, and that substantial payments were received by both Tony (in excess of $2m) and Paul Gauci (in excess of $1m) after the appeal.
Following are some of the source materials they called on to make these startling (to some) conclusions. This list is more than most people will need.
Extract from DCI Bell Diary (HOLMES version) (28/9/1989) [SCCRC Appendix: chapter 23/3] which indicates that on 28th September 1989 the FBI discussed with the Scottish Police an offer of unlimited money to Tony Gauci, with $10,000 being available immediately. Thereafter there is a comment about challenging Murray as to what he thought Gauci could give in return that he was not already giving.
They had only been speaking with him since September 1, and before the month was out they were discussing money for different/better information. The next is from February 21 1991, six days after Tony had first pointed to a photo of Megrahi and said he was similar to the buyer, but younger.
Memo from DCI Bell to DSIO Gilchrist (21/2/91) [SCCRC Appendix: chapter
23/1] which states that Tony Gauci had expressed an interest in receiving money in recent meetings and that "if a monetary offer was made to Gauci this may well change his view and allow him to consider a witness protection programme as a serious avenue"
It was clearly a service they were grateful for, and the endless visits likely petered off once they had an "ID" that fit with the other new clues. By the end of 1991, a US Grand Jury had looked at the screened evidence of Gauci, Libyan defector Abdul Majid Giaka, and various other circumstantial clues. The result was the indictment of Megrahi and his "accomplice" Fhimah on 14 November, a major goal of U.S foreign policy that would be leveraged into a massive embargo of Libya. The Gaucis thought they deserved something for their important part in that. From DCI Harry Bell's diary, January 8 1992:
“The manuscript version states "Bhiel states DOJ(Department of Justice) will give Magid [Abdul Majid Giaka] $2 million dollars. Advised of our concern." The dictated version has the same first sentence but continues "He was immediately advised of our concern regarding this. I also clarified with him about the Gauci reward and the response was only if he gave evidence." (This last comment is also unredacted in more recently disclosed manuscript version)
So as far back as January 1992 the standard $2 million amount was given to liar for hire Giaka, and also for Tony, but only in the future, after some possible, far-off trial. They already had all they needed at the moment, having secured the indictments.

The trial wasn't supposed to happen, but somehow the US was presuaded to agree to a third-couuntry compromise in 1998, and the two accused were flown to the Netherlands and turned themselves in as prisoners awaiting trial. In the run-up to his testimony at Camp Zeist, Tony had concerns, capture in a Strathclyde Police Witness Protection Report of June 10, 1999, which had addressed:
(a) the frustration of Tony Gauci that he will not be compensated
(b) that in respect of Paul Gauci "It is apparent from speaking to him for any length of time that he has a clear desire to gain financial benefit from the position he and his brother are in relative to the case. As a consequence he exaggerates his own importance as a witness and
clearly inflates the fears he and his brother have. He is anxious to establish what advantage he can gain from the Scottish police. Although demanding, Paul Gauci remains an asset to the case but will continue to explore any means he can to identify where financial advantage cane be gained."
(c) that the Gauci family had financial problems

Yet his Crown Precognitions of March 18 and August 25 1999 were clear "that Tony Gauci has never at any stage sought to benefit but that Paul Gauci whilst not "openly" seeking a reward has been "more alive to the possibility of receiving substantive assistance" SIO Henderson wrote to Maltese police security branch in August 1999 to say that Paul & Tony had been accepted onto the witness protection program, and have “expressed some dissatisfaction at the Scottish response to their particular circumstances”.

Then the trial, Tony's disastrous testimony, the judges' mysterious acceptance of the Crown reading of it, and the surprise conviction of Megrahi at the end of January 2001. Another piece can be seen in a letter of 1 February from SIO McCulloch to PF Brisbane. On the day after the guilty verdict, he was double-checking with the Crown before applying for the Gaucis' reward money. An enclosed report from McCulloch gave the reasons it should go ahead:
(a) " the issue of financial remuneration has not been discussed in detail with the witnesses and no promises exist"
(b) " It is considered that the witnesses may harbour some expectation of their situation being recognised, however
whilst proceedings are still 'live' they displayed a clear understanding that such matters could not be explored"
(c) " The conduct of the Gauci brothers reflects both their own integrity and their response to the manner with which the police have dealt with them. It is therefore vital that they continue to perceive that
their position is recognised and they continue to receive the respect that their conduct has earned."
The final justification accompanying payment (date redacted, unknown) the reasons for approving were about the same. Here Paul's role and reward were again affirmed.
“In relation to Paul Gauci, it was a decision of the Crown not to call him to
give evidence and agree a joint minute for elements of his evidence. His evidence was important as it related to the identification of the clothing. However, it should never be overlooked that his major contribution has been
maintaining the resolve of his brother. Although younger, Paul has taken on the role of his father (died 7 years ago) with regard to family affairs. His influence over Anthony has been considerable (It is considered critical that the contribution of Paul is recognised in order to preserve their relationship and prevent any difficulties arising in the future).”

How much resolve does it take to simply recall what happened and describe it to the police? How many meeting and how many years should it take? It took a team effort deemed to be worth at least three million. In fact, the authorities were never averse to paying the Gaucis whatever they wanted - they only afraid of being seen doing it. And Paul clearly did more than help his brother's mood, judging by how Tony works on his own (trial testimony):

Yes, [the police] came a lot of times. They used to come quite often, didn't they. […] I don't know exactly when they used to come, but I did not take notes when they used to come. But they used to come quite often to see me. They used to come and ask questions, and they used to take me to the depot and things like that.

Yes, yes, and the ice cream. I'm sure he loved that. But he knows money too, and he still wasn't getting it after the conviction. There was an appeal to be heard first. After this was dismissed for its own complex reasons, on April 19 2002 a letter "records a meeting held with the US Department of Justice where the reward was discussed and supported by the FBI and refers to a suggestion made at the meeting that the sums applied for - $2m for Tony Gauci and $1m for Paul Gauci could be increased."

The SCCRC states that at some time after the appeal the two witnesses were each paid sums of money under the "Rewards for Justice" programme adminstered by the U.S. Department of Justice [SCCRC Reference at 23.19]

Concerns surfaced among investigators in 2007 about how this would look if the SCCRC publicized the heretofore secret facts:
Briefing Note D12915 DI Dalgleish to ACC Graham (16/5/07) Refers to the
“expectation that the SCCRC’s statement of reasons, which will be furnished to Mr Megrahi and his defence team, is likely to question the integrity of Anthony Gauci’s evidence and also reveal that he and his brother have received substantial payments from the American authorities. [...] there is scope for distorted or malicious reporting of the facts and a real danger that if SCCRC’s statement of reasons is leaked to the media, Anthony Gauci could be portrayed as having given flawed evidence for financial reward [...] Providing these witnesses with the financial ability to leave the island whenever they wished to avoid media or other unwanted attention was a significant factor in the nomination being made to the Rewards for Justice programme in the first place...
The concern about "distorted reporting" is ironic, given the distortion caused by years of keeping these payments secret. And the last bolded suggests it was partly hush-up and get out of town money. Go somewhere where you're not recognized and take new names under witness protection. As fragile a thing as Gauci's evidence cannot handle sneaky press inquiries, which are inevitable when something is this fragile. Clearly the best move is effectively disappear the men, as they did Giaka.

Now Mr. Duggan can take back his claim this is a ludicrous event, and craft an argument as to why it's all perfectly natural, normal, and expected, not to mention open and well-known from day one.
---
Postscript - further notable denials:
The August 2010 STV video Lockerbie bomber: Sent home to die features fresh affirmations, from investigators themselves, that money had not a lick to do with the case. Around 29:30 in, the $2 million payment - and Gauci's pre-trial pursuit of such - is mentioned. FBI SCOTBOM chief Richard Marquise issued the usual 'no money was promised or asked for,' meaning no money was relevant to what anyone said, but allowed for payment afterwards ("not allowed to comment" means yes, and so he's not a total liar). Scottish Senior Investigating Officer Stuart Henderson immediately followed with this (at 30:02):
"When we extracted the evidence and information from Gauci, he was well aware that there was no such thing as a reward being handed to him and he certainly didn't get any remote thoughts from us that he would get anything. Didn't enter his head. He had such a good relationship with our officers he really tried hard to help us."
It could be said he and Paul were left hanging, and unsure if they'd get a reward, or how large it would be. But to say it was made clear there would be nothing is absolutely not illustrated by the evidence shown above, and would have been a lie. Henderson's claim to know what did and didn't enter Tony's head is classic appeal to authority. And finally, note how the witness' compliance is attributed to the "good relationship" he held with the police. As shown above, good feelings are always put forth when money delayed enters the frame. For example as the application for reward was put in by Henderson's successor as SIO:
"[T]he issue of financial remuneration has not been discussed in detail with the witnesses and no promises exist ... It is therefore vital that they continue to perceive that their position is recognised and they continue to receive the respect that their conduct has earned."

Video: Gauci on al-Megrahi

"A Little Bit Like Exactly" Like a Non-Identification
December 13 2010

last update 15 December

I'm just wrapping up a video on Tony Gauci's evidence in toto. Including credits, it's about 12 minutes, split in two halves on Youtube, embedded below.

Part One:

Introduces the relevance of Mr. Gauci, the physical discrepancies between his buyer and Megrahi, and the date of purchase issue. Some pretty damning stuff.


Part two:

The actual identification session, Gauci's other IDs, his amazing fudging of all discrepant points at trial, the $3 million plus paid out to the Gauci brothers following the verdict, the SCCRC's findings, second appeal, conclusion, and credits.

Comments:
This production is a little rushed. I didn't re-do the narration enough times, adjust all the levels, make the best slides or animations. I thought I could rush this through in time for the Dec 7 anniversary of the alleged sale to Megrahi, but the assembly and rendering process didn't agree. Then I just wanted it done by Monday (today), and only managed to meet that deadline with part one.

Anyone who'd like to see more of the information this is based on, all my blog posts about Tony Gauci's evidence are at one or both of the links Tony Gauci's "Identification" of Megrahi and all posts tagged Gauci T.

Owning the Comments

On American Media Coverage of Swire's Libya Visit
22 September 2010
last edits 6 Feb. 2011


About a week ago, British family leader of PA103 victims Dr. Jim Swire made an unusual visit to Libya, to meet the convicted "Lockerbie bomber" he and so many believe is innocent. Within the UK, discussion about this and related developments is animated, as can be glimpsed at Professor Black's blog. The Scotsman coversthe visit, and The Firm talks about Swire'splan to revive Megrahi's appeal in his name.

In step with following American media reports on the issue of Megrahi, I've done that here. Relatively few US outlets that have picked this up. Most have focused on Swire's rare news that Megrahi is still alive and, while sick, able to stand and walk. And not dead. This was bound to piss people off over here, but the first article was New York Daily News. Being about Swire, New Yorkers I guess get it to keep the criticism muted - a touch of either silent awe or awkward silence. I added a sixth comment and it stopped there. The usual NYDN reader brand of ugly stayed mostly at bay, aside from the one guy calling Swire a "useful idiot." The other comments were actually sympathetic. Strange.

On the article itself, I was surprised. Just mentioning the visit and Swire's unusual belief is itself rare, but the article actually cited a support for it:
Swire, however, met with al-Megrahi in a Scottish prison in 2008 and told the Daily Record he believed the testimony of one of the witnesses, Maltese shop-owner Tony Gauci, was paid for by prosecutors. He visited Libya last week at al-Megrahi's invitation and called for investigators to overturn the verdict.
There was no mention of the SCCRC deciding the same thing and making it one of six reasons to order a second appeal. But on the other hand, they included a poll about megrahi'sguilt - the one allowing doubts actually got about 20% ("who cares"got 25%).

CNN's report was actually worse than NYDN's, mentioning no support, but did discuss the notion of Swire reviving the killed appeal of conviction. Its target audience perhaps can be gauged by the slew of flippant comments, well over 200 when I set in. Most of these basically said "not dead yet? He should die ...no wait, live and suffer ... I hope someone kills him ... I hope he's tortured," and so on, amid lectures about Islam, softness, Obama and the Brits and oil and lots of uninformed opinion in general. One called Swire a "limey suck-up," and another said "Gee, Jim, with a Daddy like you, Flora hardly needed a plane crash!" I called that one out solidly.

Before long I was correcting a lot of people and being a real pest, leaving over 30 comments among over 300 now. Few responses. There are a few smart people there who acknowledge doubts, but these were piled on with attacks. One member suggests they were family of a victim, and berated another member for expressing such doubts, and for being a "worthless piece of crap."

Epoch Times' report was bland. It didn't anger me, and it didn't have any deep insight, nor anything suggesting Megrahi's innocence aside from mentioning Swire's strange views. Seattle Times covered it as well, blandly, and I left the sole comment. Oh, I see Faux News is covering it. I might not even bother with that one...

Update, later: Interestingly, I tried to comment at Faux News. I registered, then had it tell me I had to log-in to comment. I logged out and back in, same thing. Logged out to check to 50 or 60 comments there earlier, all gone. 0 comments listed, no new ones allowed. Very strange...
Update again: I was allowed to submit a comment - in case it doesn't take or doesn't stay, it said this:
Hey weren't there about 60 comments here recently, ranting about death and pain and especially Hell, plus Islam and liberals and Obama? Why is this the first comment now? Well I'll take the slot - what do we have for actual evidence this man is even guilty? Let's look at witnesses - Abdul Majid Giaka and Tony Gauci. Giaka was a Libyan defector, telling the CIA what he knew (little)about JSO on Malta. He had a whole pile of overly-juicy details of the plot that appeared just in time to form the indictments and then sanctions. But these were all dismissed at trial in 2000 - the star witness was shot down by the all-wise judges. “Information provided by a paid informer is always open to the criticism that it may be invented in order to justify payment, and in our view this is a case where such criticism is more than usually justified […] we are unable to accept Abdul Majid as a credible and reliable witness on any matter except his description of the organisation of the JSO and the personnel involved there.” They knew about his CIA payout, various other help, his relocaion to America to escape Libya, his salary for testifying, and witness protection. They did not know about an additional $2 million reportedly given by the DoJ. (search "rewards for injustice"). He's hardly mentioned after 2000, but was the smoking gun before that.  
The scorched clothes that were found were traced right to the shop where investigators found Tony Gauci. He clearly described Nov 23 as the date of purchase (weather records, TV schedules, and Silema Christmas decoration schedules establish this). But Megrahi wasn't there that day, so investigators changed it to Dec 7 (there's a case to be made for that date, but a very slim one with too many presumptions - search "date of clothing purchase" + Gauci) Besides the date discrepancy, which is dynamite, Gauci never even identified Megrahi. The buyer he described was at least 4 inches taller and 14 years older than our villain,observations Tony has fudged in the years since ("under six feet, under sixty" was his mantra at Zeist). Once in 1991 he pointed at a photo of Megrahi and said "similar to the man ... He would perhaps have to look about ten years older ... this photograph resembles the man who bought the clothing, but it is younger.” Note he's comparing two separate men. All the men shown that day were too young, and Megrahi was the oldest among them. Later in 1999 at Camp Zeist in the Netherlands, he pointed to the guy in person (famous by then) and said "“not exactly the man I saw in the shop. Ten years ago I saw him, but the man who look a little bit like exactly is the number 5 [Megrahi]” And he was paid $2 million,I guess just to not protest at the abuse of his evidence, while his brother scammed another $1 million. (search: "yes, millions to Malta") That's as good as the evidence against Megrahi gets. But he was (wrongly) convicted and so he killed all those people and deserves to die in pain and suffer in Hell, right? Because of a legal technicality?
Update: Of course they didn'tpublish it. It's a zero-comment article. CNN's new comments halted with the appearance of TerpMole, aka Kaddafi Delenda Est, come to criticize me. I've left I think 49 comments there now.

Rewards for Injustice

A Shocking Trail of Witnesses Paid Millions for Misinformation
July 25 2010
last edits July 30


The early release from Scottish prison of “Lockerbie bomber” Abdelbaset al Megrahi has been getting much airplay and page space the last three weeks. A myth that he might live for decades more, and the “news” that Gulf-despoilers BP (British!) had also lobbied for the “bomber’s” release back in 2007, stuck together for indignorant Americans. This spurred a flurry of commentary and Congressional calls for investigations, summoning foreign CEOs and ministers to explain themselves, as the Brtis say with annoyance, like naughty schoolchildren before the headmaster.

This will surely settle down before long, and amid the furor, one crucial issue will still lie in the dust, unseen by most. And that is the assassination of Megrahi’s hard-won second appeal of conviction. Many informed commentators have been bringing up the appeal in a more recent backlash, but so far It’s hardly even a side note in the US - just a trifle the “bomber” was “allowed to drop” right before going home to live way more than three months.

Three Important Witnesses
And so the appeal’s secrets were buried, for the moment The central point of the surrendered challenge, soon submitted to the court of public opinion, was the reliability and credibility of eyewitness Anthony “Tony” Gauci. The scope of this article will be wider and consider two other witnesses who share three key features with Gauci.

Upon finding Megrahi guilty for the bombing on January 31, 2001, the three judge panel ruling at Camp Zeist issued an 87-page Opinion of the Court (PDF link) to explain their thinking. Among the points in setting up the evidence against Megrahi was this short list:
“In relation to the first accused, there are three important witnesses, Abdul Majid, Edwin Bollier and Tony Gauci.” [paragraph 41]
To those who know enough about the case, that line is itself hilarious, the punch-line to a sick joke. To those who don’t know enough (and that’s who this article is for), it take a little explaining. Besides being the only three with anything truly incriminating to say against Megrahi, each of these has in common two further points:
1) The evidence they provided is questionable in many cases, and unquestionably fraudulent in others.
2) They were all offered (or have said they were offered) millions of dollars, and at least two apparently collected.

“Abdul Majid”
Abdul Majid Giaka (an alias, true name unknown, called ”Abdul Majid” by the Zeist judges) was a Libyan intelligence agent with the JSO, Libya’s CIA. He was very low level and knew almost nothing, but from August 1988 he had been able to draw money from the CIA ($1,000 a month, increased to $1,500) selling them small tidbits. The CIA called Giaka code-name “Puzzle Piece.”

The defector was stationed at Luqa airport on Malta, where the JSO and Libyan Arab Airlines mingled. At some point after Pan Am 103 fell to Earth in December, two of the people he’d named as high JSO agents working on Malta – Megrahi and his “accomplice” Fhimah – came to the center of suspicion. Strange clues emerged suggesting Libyan authorship, and a Malta link that pointed right to Megrahi. By early 1991, the other puzzle pieces (including Gauci and Bollier) were all in place, and they needed a witness closer to the perps.

It seems the Libyans were by then tired of Abdul Majid’s strange behavior on Malta and ready to call him back to Tripoli. The CIA threatened to cut him off and let him go unless he said something good, and if it was good enough, he might say it to the FBI. So in the summer, he met with agent Hal Hendershot and laid down a whole new version of the previous years in which Megrahi and Fhimah had plotted the bombing in the open and he saw half of it himself.

Hendershot liked what he heard, and Giaka went straight to Washington, with his pregnant wife fetched from Malta soon after. He testified to a grand jury in October 1991, telling of the brown Samsonite case he’d seen the Libyans with on December 20, of the report he (Giaka) was asked to write about bombing a “British plane,” the TNT they kept in a desk at the airport…

As the indictments were sealed and put in place on November 14, the defector Giaka was re-settled somewhere under a new name and witness protection, and paid handsomely. Megrahi’s appeal documents reveal, from DCI Harry Bell's diary, January 8 1992: “Bhiel states DOJ (Department of Justice) will give Magid [Giaka] $2 million dollars. Advised of our concern." This seems to have been dispensed under a US DoJ “Rewards for Justice Program."

When the millionaire was presented as the star witness at Camp Zeist in 2000, it was an unprecedented event – the first time a CIA asset had testified in open court (his voice was disguised and he was hidden behind a screen). The judges were not told about the $2 million, but they did know of his CIA paychecks, other arrangements and efforts to secure money, and his relocation to America, which was clearly of immense value to the witness. They noted how Abdul Majid’s best stories about late 1988 only appeared in mid-1991, and learned along the way that the CIA themselves didn’t believe his information, and had tried to conceal that fact. Therefore, they explained, rather timidly:

“Information provided by a paid informer is always open to the criticism that it may be invented in order to justify payment, and in our view this is a case where such criticism is more than usually justified […] we are unable to accept Abdul Majid as a credible and reliable witness on any matter except his description of the organisation of the JSO and the personnel involved there.” [para 42, 43]

This is an embarrassing rebuke - the most crucial witness to the whole Libyan plot was found to be almost entirely a fraud. It was this loss that led to a total lack of Fhimah clues and the judges having to find the “accomplice” not guilty. And then there was the $2 million they didn’t even know about, as the Crown either didn’t know or didn’t pass it on. And Giaka wasn’t the only witness considered at Zeist who was given this princely sum and had the fact successfully concealed.

Tony (and Paul) Gauci
This now-famous refugee shopkeeper from Malta, clearly a man of simple intellect, was able to recall the exact sale (in different exact versions) of some odd clothes that were later “found at Lockerbie.” Anthony Gauci's original performance recalling the sale was convincing enough, and it seems likely, barring a very elaborate set-up, that he really did sell these clothes to some particular man, on November 23 1988, and they wound up in the bomb bag.

But Megrahi was not on the island that day, so the second-best fit of December 7 (a distant second) was chosen by investigators as what the man meant to describe. By “six feet or more in height,” he meant 5’8” like Megrahi. By around 50, he meant 36. By raining enough to warrant an umbrella, he meant no rain. Etc. But Gauci is touted as identifying a photo of Megrahi, on February 1991, as “similar” to the buyer but ”ten years” too young. Even Tony himself noted the obvious slant of the lineup in question. “The first impression I had was that all the photographs were of men younger than the man who bought the clothing.” With the police’s help, he picked the oldest one shown – Megrahi.

Payments to Mr. Gauci, and to his brother Paul, who assisted somehow behind the scenes, are covered in detail elsewhere, but Megrahi’s appeal documents note the earliest American mention of money is from September 28, 1989, just weeks after the brothers were first approached. “The FBI discussed with the Scottish Police an offer of unlimited money to Tony Gauci, with $10,000 being available immediately." It's not clear if any of this ever came through, but as Giaka was being put up for a reward in 1992, the Scottish police lobbied for Tony to get the same. "I also clarified with him about the Gauci reward and the response was only if he gave evidence."

Tony had his chance to give evidence in mid-2000 and he performed well, considering, fudging everything possible. Under 6 feet, under 60, I don't know, raining a little, not really, no, maybe. Mysteriously, the Judges bought it and Megrahi’s fate was sealed.

The day after the verdict, February 1 2001, the Scottish police started the application for the brothers’ rewards – they had realized specific arrangements couldn’t be discussed until after the judgment, had no explicit promises, had delivered well, and deserved their money now. Paul’s assistance upholding his brother’s “resolve” was noted - but so was his evident desire for money. For some reason they had to wait until the appeal was over as well, and only in April 2002 was “a meeting held with the US Department of Justice where the reward was discussed and supported by the FBI,” say the appeal papers. Further, a suggestion was made there “that the sums applied for - $2m for Tony Gauci and $1m for Paul Gauci - could be increased."

The Scottish review board found all this, and that at some time after the appeal (date redacted) the two were paid some amount under the US DoJ "Rewards for Justice" program. And that is why the appeal they authorized had to be killed.

Edwin Bollier
The third witness is a Swiss electronics merchant, supposed supplier to Libyan JSO of the only 20 MST-13 timers ever made. When an implausibly large chunk of one was “found at Lockerbie” and identified in mid-1990, Bollier’s 18-month-old campaign to sell evidence to the CIA paid off. Much of what he said before and during the trial was dismissed as an obvious bunch of rubbish, but the 1991 indictments did feature his info for points (a), (b), and (j).

Bollier is quite different from the other two “important witnesses.” First, he has not disappeared as a protected witness and made silent. Quite the contrary; He has continued to claim a leading role in the fight to clear Megrahi (comments as "ebol"), and claimed in a 2008 interview that this is to secure a $200 million prize from Libya. [Video, 41:10]. Mr. Bollier reminds me (see comments below) the BBC cut out Q: "Will Libya pay you for your work in the Lockerbie case?" A: "No, if we win the case and the compensation for the victims (US$ 2.7 billion) is refunded I will get a success honorary of US$ 200 million." If the victims pay Libya back, Bollier says he gets almost 8%. To this end, he uses illogical or unsupported claims and exclamation marks, and hasn’t even bothered learning to write in English for a campaign this ambitious.

And unlike Giaka and Gauci, there is no evidence I’m aware of that Bollier was ever paid by investigators for his own evidentiary offerings. He does claim a measly 1% of Libya’s later offering, $2 million - was offered to him in January 1991 by a FBI legal attaché in Switzerland named Fanning. This sounds entirely plausible, actually. But in the same interview linked above [33:35], he says FBI chief Richard Marquise personally doubled the offer just a couple weeks later, “up to $4 million and a new identity” merely to say that this fragment was from a Libyan timer. But they already knew this, and he says he refused anyway (Marquise firmly denies this offer).

Bollier’s oddball account isn’t to be trusted, and he hasn’t been. But he’s served a useful role since the conviction, as a lightning rod to safely channel revisionist thought down blind alleys. Someone really should pay him if they haven't yet.

A Tentative Tally
So far it appears the Scots-CIA-FBI Lockerbie witness pipeline brought in all three “important" but unreliable witnesses against Megrahi. The DoJ payout was at least $5 million to Giaka and the Gaucis plus possible money to Bollier that we just don’t know of. There would be administration, manpower, paid dinners, car rentals and air travel, and assorted overhead for arranging all this, some under FBI, others under CIA or Scottish police. All told, we’re dealing with at least $8 million for just this aspect of what seems like an intelligence operation masquerading as a criminal investigation. The whole case was bigger than this but no squarer, and the other, wider costs of the resulting miscarriage of justice will defy all efforts at calculation.

Appeal Court Dismissal of the Heathrow Theory

February 10, 2010
last update Jan 14 2011

The judges considering Abdelbaset al Megrahi's appeal of conviction in February 2002 [PDF] had to give the London introduction theory a listen - they had the Bedford bags, the 38-minute clue, and the recently revealed, long-suppressed break-in evidence to consider. They did some thinking about this it seems. I invite comments to criticize this ridiculous word salad.

[244] In assessing whether the additional evidence supported the hypothesis that the break-in at T3-2A provided the route by which one of the Bedford suitcases was infiltrated, the Advocate depute made a number of points. First, he submitted that an individual carrying a suitcase and, presumably, lock-breaking equipment would be rather conspicuous in Terminal 3 between 2200 and 0030 hours, since normally no members of the public would be around at that time. Secondly, setting aside speculation, for a suitcase brought airside through the forced door at T3-2A to be one of the Bedford suitcases, it required to be infiltrated into the baggage handling system at the interline shed. For that purpose it would require an interline tag. That was particularly so if it was accepted, as the Advocate depute [prosecution] submitted it should be, that the Bedford suitcases were probably placed in the container by Mr Kamboj. He would not have placed them in the container if they had not been bearing appropriate interline tags.

Okay, someone would have to have put Pan Am tags on them. That's not much of a de-bunk. They got some tags, however people do that.

... despite the fact that the trial court’s preference of Mr Bedford over Mr Kamboj (on the question of whether Mr Kamboj told Mr Bedford that he had placed the suitcases in the container) did not constitute evidence that Mr Kamboj had in fact so placed them, the natural inference was that the cases were put into the container by Mr Kamboj, whose job it was to x-ray PanAm interline baggage, rather than by some interloper. Why would an intruder through T3-2A choose to introduce a case containing an explosive device at the interline shed? He had, on the hypothesis under examination, broken in to airside at a point adjacent to the very area (the baggage build-up area) where most bags were handled. Yet he had spurned the opportunity of introducing the case into the baggage handling system there, andhad opted for the interline route which introduced the additional risk of detection when the interline baggage was x-rayed.

What if they had an inside helper, like one of the guys who ran the x-ray machines, and would vouch for it being okay? Or, as I've wondered, Bedford's story isn't directly true, but only reflects someone else's witnessing of these bags at, of all places, the wide-open and unsecured baggage build-up area?

Moreover, although readily discoverable evidence of the break-in had been left behind in the form of the damaged padlock, the hypothesis involved that the case was not introduced into the interline shed until some fifteen hours later. Unless the risk of opening the case airside to set the timer was to be undertaken, the timer would have had to be set before the break-in. No method of arranging for the bag to pass through the system to the interline shed had been identified. 
If I had  hidden two brown Samsonites, say, behind an air vent cover at midnight, I'd come back at the end of the day in Pan Am costume, retrieve the bags, and either
1) pay an Indian guy at Interline some money to let me place them on the floor and make him agree to vouch for them but not to move them, or
2) set them in myself at build-up, where the container sat completely unattended for almost 45 minutes.
I'd also have tags, since that would help thm not stand out otherwise.
The intruder would have required either to wait for fifteen hours himself, or to have the assistance of an accomplice. No place of concealment for the intruder or the suitcase had been identified. There was nothing in the evidence to explain why a suitcase, brought through T3-2A between 2205 and 0030 hours, would not be placed in the interline shed in time for either of the two earlier PanAm flights. On the hypothesis under examination, the suitcase had been tagged for flight PA103, although there were two earlier flights that would have involved a shorter period of concealment of a suitcase containing an armed explosive device. Yet there was no evidence that there was anything about flight PA103 or its passengers that singled it out as the target. Moreover, if an accomplice with airport identification, genuine or false, was involved, there was no need to break in to airside. All that was required was to smuggle the components of the explosive device through an access point, such as T3-2A, where persons with appropriate identification were not searched. The effect of all these points, the Advocate depute submitted, was to show that the hypothesis that the break-in at T3-2A was the means of infiltrating one of the Bedford suitcases was so weak and flawed that the additional evidence could not pass the Cameron test.
[245] The third stage at which the Advocate depute suggested the significance of the additional evidence might be tested was in the context of all the other evidence led at the trial, not merely the other evidence bearing on events at Heathrow airport. The critical issue at the trial was not a simple competition between infiltration at Heathrow and infiltration at Luqa. It was in any event wrong to say, as Mr Taylor did, that the evidence of Heathrow infiltration was no worse than the evidence of Luqa infiltration.
To better Mr. Taylor, it's physically demonstrated to a high degree (see next paragraph), while even the Luqa theorists' best hypotheses are barely verbalized. They just don't bother. They musta snuck it, since a piece of paper shows a thing kinda like maybe the thing Giaka saw, or whatever... As they explain in this ridiculous paragraph: :
There was evidence, which the trial court had accepted, that an unaccompanied and unaccounted for bag had travelled from Malta on flight KM180, had transferred at Frankfurt to flight PA103A, and had thence been loaded on flight PA103. There was evidence associating the bag containing the explosive device with Malta. On the other hand, in respect of Heathrow there was evidence that a door from landside to airside was forced, and evidence that a suitcase matching the description of the primary suitcase was placed in container AVE 4041. There was no evidence that the explosive device was in that suitcase.
Uh... How can one piece of paper, that went missing for a month and says only B8849, station 206, 1307, show all the stuff these judges say it shows? Because that AWOL printout is the only evidence for such a bag at three airports. As for London, we have a credible visual ID of a bag of the right type (two actually) placed in that precise corner of AVE4041 soon after blown up by a bomb (or bombs) in just that kind of case. As for evidence that case(s) had a bomb(s) inside, see the previous sentence, dummy.
[246] There were nine components in the evidence before the trial court, the Advocate depute submitted, which were unaffected by the additional evidence. They were:
(1) The clothing in the primary suitcase was purchased by a Libyan, and the timer was supplied to the Libyan secret service. The trial court concluded that the plot was promoted by the Libyan secret service.
(2) The clothes were purchased in Malta, showing that a Libyan had gone to Malta in furtherance of the plot.
(3) The records of Frankfurt airport were shown to be capable of allowing the origin of baggage transferred there to be tracked.
(4) Those records demonstrated the carriage of an unaccompanied bag from Malta on flight KM180. The evidence of Mr Borg did not rule out the possibility of that happening. It was to be remembered that the Crown case was that the security measures at Luqa had been deliberately circumvented by a criminal act.
And no proof save that lonely printout?

(5) The clothing in the primary suitcase suggested that it had been sent from Malta.
(6) The promoters of the plot, the Libyan secret service, had a presence at Luqa airport.
(7) The appellant, a member of the JSO and the purchaser of the clothing, flew into Malta the evening before the carriage of the unaccompanied bag on flight KM180. He did so using a false identity obtained for him by that organisation.
(8) The appellant was again present at Luqa airport the following morning, during some of the time when flight KM180 was loading. He then left on the first available flight for the safety of Tripoli, and never again used the false identity.
(9) Malta, because of its proximity, provided an airport to and from which Libyans could easily travel.
None of those nine features of the evidence was affected by the additional evidence. They all supported the Crown case. No feature of the additional evidence was consistent with the promotion of the plot by the Libyan secret service.

And that last about sums it up. "The new evidence challenges our preconceptions. It casts doubt on the accused's guilt. That's crazy. Whaddyou think this is, an appeal? Come back with something rational that blames Gadhafi or if possible Megrahi, and then we'll talk..."

Time Magazine - seriously - addresses five serious questions

23 August 2010

An amazing and heartening article on the Time website, marking the one year anniversary of Megrahi's controversial release, has taken an insanely intelligent stance for such a prominent mainstream American publication. Penned by Vivienne Walt, this article I missed all weekend (props to Professor Black for noting it first) poses "five questions about the Lockerbie bomber's release." These are listed below, and may be quite surprising, so be sure to sit down.

1) Where's the document proving a BP-Libya deal?
"Still missing, however, is written proof of a freedom-for-business deal..."
The lack of direct proof is not much of a counter-argument, so Walt Seems open to the circumstantial clues, in a way I'm inclined to consider a bigger factor than I had before.

2) Did Scotland distort Al-Megrahi's medical report?
"...how that prognosis whittled down to three months remains a mystery."
While it's possible the lone three month "reasonable" low-end estimate is entirely in good faith, its elevation to the forefront is suspect. The more interesting part is the why behind such a possible distortion - aside from trade nterests as mentioned above, there's another factor I;m more interested in.

3) Did Scottish officials persuade Al-Megrahi to drop his legal appeal before going home?
With no explanation, Al-Megrahi dropped his appeal against his conviction shortly before he was freed. Some relatives of Lockerbie victims suspect Scottish officials might have persuaded Al-Megrahi to end his appeal — possibly in exchange for a smoother release [...]
Two British family members of PA103 victims were interviewed: John Mosey and Jim Swire.
"Most of us here feel that there is something extremely murky, which the U.S. and British governments don't want to come out," John Mosey, a British pastor whose 19-year-old daughter died aboard the Pan Am plane, tells TIME. Jim Swire, whose 24-year-old daughter was killed in the Lockerbie attack, says Scotland's Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill did something "very unwise. He went to see Al-Megrahi in prison ... then Al-Megrahi dropped his appeal, and then MacAskill decided to send him home." Swire, who has fought a long campaign to reveal the truth behind the Lockerbie attack, says that suggests possible persuasion. But, so far, there's no proof of any.
Again, no proof is a pretty weak counter-point to the neat appearance and logic of appeal-for-release - perhaps in addition to release-for-oil.

4) Could Al-Megrahi have been innocent?
This follows logically off question three, and both are routinely ignored by the American media.
U.S. Senators are not aiming for a retrial, but they might focus on the controversies surrounding Al-Megrahi's imprisonment. Swire, Mosey, and former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's envoy to the Lockerbie trial, Austrian law professor Hans Köchler, are among those who have long argued that the trial leading to Al-Megrahi's conviction was deeply flawed. In 2007, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, a publicly funded body that investigates possible wrongful convictions, issued an 800-page report listing several grounds for an appeal by Al-Megrahi, including inconsistencies in the testimony of the key prosecution witness and the existence of CIA documents about the Swiss-made timer for the bomb, which defense lawyers had not seen. So far, the full report has not been released publicly.

5) How is Al-Megrahi still alive?
This sort of points back to the issues raised in question 2 - was he just misdiagnosed a year ago? It allows the piece to close on a different note, with Dr. Swire ignoring this obvious possibility to speak glowingly of "some new technology" that might be behind the "hopeless" Libyan's continued survival.

Yes, the all-American news magazine founded by Henry Luce, has seen fit to allow the view that's swelling towards unanimity in thee UK and it still ruthlessly denied here in the states. Megrahi could be innocent, and that may help explain the mystery of his release. Walt is spot-on in just about every point, and unfortunately that usually dooms an article in many American minds as some conspiracy theorist nonsense, probably paid for by Libya. But with its accession (in the first points) to existing American suspicions, and closing on a gentle jab at Dr. Swire, it becomes palatable - part of a continuum of cynicism and (apparent) naiveté. Cleverly formulated as they are, and still grasping the humming livewire of hidden truth, and these five questions should give serious pause to anyone not excessively gripped by cognitive dissonance.

18 August 2009

MacAskill’s Two-Track Railroad: Part 8/10
18 August 2010 


Note: The posts in this series are not conclusive, but rather what I was able to learn before the anniversary arrived, sporadically updated later. Any suggestions from knowledgeable readers to improve the content will be gladly appreciated.

<< Previous: 13/14 August
Next: 19 August >>

One year ago today, Kenny MacAskill still hadn't decided whether or how how to send Megrahi home - as a dying but essentially free man, or as a prisoner under terms of the Libya-UK PTA. These two options vied for his attention, and he had amassed reams of information and opinions for and against different versions of each.

The families of UK victims had weighed in, largely concerned with Megrahi's appeal, opposing the PTA which would cost the world that chance at truth. American families were interviewed, and opposed any release, transfer, or any relenting in the extraction of justice. The US government sided with the families but were pragmmatic enough to entertain compassionate release. However, under no conditions would they support his return to Libya (see 9 August). The UK position was that the prisoner swap should go ahead and there was no reason not to send Megrahi back to Libya.

Medical experts weighed in with a picture of advancing cancer, set to kill him within months. The estimates ran as short as three months, but tended more like eight under cirumstances as they stood - the return home they proposed was sure to lengthen that (10 August). MacAskill also received legal opinions from W. George Burgess (14 August). These saw no barrier to compassionate release straight out to Libya. Shockingly, Burgess also said the Crown's outstanding appeal for longer sentence was enough to bolock the PTA despite Megrahi's own surrendered appeal. Precisely the sharpest danger that faced him in the surrender process was recognized and suggested in this strategy paper.

The most recent known pieces to fill in MacAskill's puzzle had been Burgess' twin documents on the PTA and compassion angles. By 18 August, the Justice secretary had four days to consider this in light of everything else on file.

And still he hadn't quite made up his mind as one final piece fell into place one year ago today; a panel of three judges ruled that Megrahi's appeal should be closed. He had applied for this six days earlier, for somewhat mysterious reasons related to getting home quicker. A Canadian news story, among many others, seemed to think about the same thing: "A British court will allow convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi to drop an appeal, taking him a step closer to being released." CBC, 18 August

Structurally and by normal rules, this could only assist in the Prisoner transfer, not compassionate release. MacAskill had been advised by Burgess that this was still a closed option, due now to the Crown's outstanding appeal for longer sentence. But whatever the prisoner's reasoning and the effects on his repatriation, the formal loss of the appeal had peculiar side effects, vis-a-vis the truth. As British families leader Pamela Dix told the Guardian the following day:
"This is the worst possible decision for the relatives. ... There now seems little chance of this evidence [in the appeal] being heard and scrutinised in public." 
[Source: Guardian, 19 August]
Could it be that was exactly the point of the exercise?

12/13 August 2009

Megrahi Files to Drop his Appeal
12 August 2010
last edits 13 August

<< previous: 10 August
Next: 13/14 August >>

On this day one year ago, al-Megrahi and his legal team filed to drop the hard-won second appeal of conviction. The convicted terrorist had been pursuing this as swiftly as the court would allow (which was slowly) since mid-2007. Its scope had been expanded beyond the initial six grounds of possible miscarriage of justice, and was thus ripe with potential.

But Megrahi had just learned, on 3 August, that he was likely to die well before the appeal's end - in fact maybe before the second of three phases even began in November. But whatever his own life span, surrendering this fight was anathema to al-Megrahi's known wishes. Compassionate release, which was now all-but ensured (or so it seems in retrospect), would allow the appeal to live on under a successor to clear his family's name. And here he was surrendering it for no clear reason, unless...

Scottish law magazine / website The Firm stepped in during this process on 12 August with an editorial publicly asking Kenny MacAskill's Justice Department the following:
“Before this decision is made, reassurance must be provided to the Scottish people and the world that Megrahi’s return home is not being made conditional upon his dropping his appeal. Justice must be done, though the heavens may fall. That time, surely, is now.”
The following day, a governmant spokesman responded “In answer to the simple question posed by The Firm, the answer is “No."" [source]

But a meeting of 12 August between Libyan delegates and "the Minister" offered a clue, according to “sources within the Scottish Government Justice Department” that spoke with The Firm. The Libyan attendees were told “if Megrahi is to be granted compassionate release he must first drop his appeal […] This was the rammed home to the Libyans at their meeting with the Minister yesterday,” the source said in a follow-up article of 13 August (see above link).

For that they also spoke with Dr. Hans Köchler, one of the UN's international observers at the Zeist trial. He said “certain quarters confronted [Megrahi] with the alternative of either giving up his appeal in order to be sent back to Libya" under the PTA's terms, "or die in a Scottish jail.” Köchler further urged MacAskill to “act without further delay” to simply grant compassionate release and so “allow the appeal to continue and avoid the circumstances of emotional blackmail" inherent in the existing, and confusing, arrangement.

The overall tone of the 13 August article suggests the PTA's provisions would have to be met before the compassion appeal would be considered on its own merits; the final decision would be medically based, but only after a clearly non-medical decision was made. This would probably be illegal, and was of course denied by the Justice Department. But something clearly happened here, and one year ago today Megrahi applied to surrender his appeal. That is just a mysterious move that still cries out for an explanation.

The appeal was not yet dead, and neither was it alone in blocking the exit via PTA. He had only applied, or requested, to have appeal nullified. Officials would have to review and grant this request for permanent legal guilt before it would be effective. It's not certain whether Megrahi any longer had the power to cancel the application once filed, but the fact is he never did. And even after  this decision, an additional legal proceeding - the Scottish Crown's appeal of sentence, seeking to lengthen Megrahi's stay - remained in force. 12 August and after was, therefore, a period of great vulnerability for for the dying Libyan.

And finally, the same day, 12 August, U.S. ambassador LeBaron handed over the letter relating his government's position on the release issue (see 9 August). They urged no release if possible, but if he left jail, it should be no more than three months and nowhere but Scotland. This missive arrived on the same day as Megrahi's filing, but offered no guidance about Washington's view on either appeal. If pressed, they'd probably have advised the following:
- accept the application to surrender the appeal of conviction
- deny the request for compassionate release
- deny the prisoner transfer arrangement
- hear out the appeal of sentence, and let the guilty bastard die wherever in that process he does.

We Americans, after all, are always about the justice. And it comes down hard.

5 August 2009

MacAskill’s Two-Track Railroad: part 2/10
MacAskill-Megrahi Meeting
5 August 2010


Note: The posts in this series are not conclusive, but rather what I was able to learn before the anniversary arrived, sporadically updated later. Any suggestions from knowledgeable readers to improve the content will be gladly appreciated.

<< Previous: 3 August
Next: 6 August >>

One year ago today, Wednesday 5 August 2009, a much-speculated meeting occurred between "bomber" al-Megrahi and Scotland's Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill. Held in Megrahi's cell at Greenock prison, it's been often described as a "secret meeting" - unprecedented, off-the-record and highly suspect. It was preceded, by mere days, with the prisoner's application for release on compassion grounds and the nearly-instant 3-month prognosis that made it more doable. And the meeting was followed a week later by the Megrahi filing to surrender his appeal, and another week on by his return home to Libya, on compassionate grounds.

It's been wondered if MacAskill used the unusual visit to set out the deal to the prisoner - drop the appeal or die in jail. It is a bit heavy and crude, but I more than half-believed just about that until shortly after hearing Magnus Linklater, publishing magnate, speak about it. He said on a radio show recently that he'd read the transcript of this meeting it said something like "there is no question of you being released while there is still an appeal outstanding. The decsion as to whether you pursue that appeal is for you and your legal team." [1]

I soon learned why Mr. Linklater was wrong, and that the transcript is not secret but freely available. The meeting was to solicit Megrahi's "representation," as part of the ongoing PTA process Mr. MacAskill had been unable to stop. The minutes are on pages 14 and 15 of a PDF of collected representations from all interested parties. [2] So the meeting dealt with transfer, not release, and that distinction changes the meaning of Linklater's recollection.

To start with, the date on the minutes is wrong – Wednesday Aug 6 2009 does not exist. It was either Wednesday the 5th, as scheduled [3], or else changed to Thursday the 6th and written wrong. Besides Megrahi and MacAskill, present at the meeting were two players from the Scottish Justice side and Mr. Megrahi's lawyer, Tony Kelly.

Regarding the PTA application, “Mr.MacAskill stressed that he could not give any indication as to his likely decision.” Mr. MacAskill explained that he was looking at compassionate release as well, and "was considering this application in parallel and he would aim to make both decisions at the same time." And the secretary stressed that “he can only grant a transfer if there are no court proceedings ongoing. Mr. MacAskill stressed that this was a decision for Mr. Al-Megrahi and his legal team alone.” [3]

Megrahi knew what this last meant, despite the indirect reference. Procedings means his appeal of conviction, granted by the SCCRC over two years prior. He complained about the "unduly" stalled process, which was slated to resume about as he was just slated to die - early November. But he followed this by affirming that he qualified for the PTA, suggesting he was open to dropping the fight.

There was also another appeal that was definitely not "a decision for Mr. Al-Megrahi and his legal team alone.” The Crown's standing appeal of sentence, demanding a longer term than the 27 years established, would also have to be withdrawn for the transfer to happen. If Megrahi dropped his own appeal, he faced a risk the Crown's would remain and bar his release anyway - guilty with no appeal and locked up for even longer, all while dying innocent and far from home.

Besides offering no tip as to whether he would grant a transfer, MacAskill was also unclear if he would choose compassion. It could have one or the other or perhaps neither. This unnecessary confusion may have led Megrahi to drop his appeal in preparation, when MacAskill already knew the reason the PTA could not be implemented.

When announcing the release just two weeks later, the Justice Secretary explained why he felt he must reject Libya/UK transfer option. "the American families and Government either had an expectation, or were led to believe, that there would be no prisoner transfer and the sentence would be served in Scotland." [4] This had been established for him at a meeting with American relatives on 9 July (see [3] pp 10-13), a month before this meeting where he misled Megrahi into believing it was a viable option and perhaps his ticket home.

But for his part, the prisoner's 3-page handwritten note (pages 16-18 in the PDF) insisted he was wrongly convicted, was hated by the victims but didn't hate them back, was dying, felt "desolation," wanted to see his family, and was ready to go under PTA or compassion. Mr. Megrahi's thinking is important to understanding what came next. The most important decisions weren't his, but he and his team were left with one ball in their court - would they keep the appeal open and block one possible way home, or surrender the fight to overturn that unjust verdict?

Having said and heard what he needed to, Mr. MacAskill thanked the prisoner for his own thoughts, and they parted ways again to consider what move to make next.

Sources:
[1] http://lockerbiecase.blogspot.com/2010/07/macaskills-meeting-with-megrahi.html
[2] http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/925/0085963.pdf
[3] http://www.scribd.com/doc/34616433/Megrahi-Correspondence-US-DID-Know
[4] http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/This-Week/Speeches/Safer-and-stronger/lockerbiedecision

Leaked Documents Reveal Gory Details of Megrahi Release Decision

August 1 2010
update Aug 3

A small vanguard of US Senators have been pursuing/demanding an investigation into the early release nearly one year ago of "Lockerbie bomber" Abdelbaset ali al-Megrahi from a Scottish prison. At first the probe was to be into the role of vilified oil company BP in the release. But after no one agreed to show up, and the Senators realized that limited scope wouldn't take them far at all, they decided on a wider probe into the full body of little-understood circumstances surrounding the release. (Except for Megrahi's appeal - see below)

The details of any inquiry or discussion are still being discussed, but in the meantime, anyone who has an interest in this much derided decision might want to look at the classified Scottish Government documents:
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/legal/lockerbie
The highly revealing reports were leaked by the Scottish government to the Scottish government website nearly one year ago. They reveal the shadowy machinations that led to what might just be a miscarriage of justice surrounding the release of this legally guilty, schedule one terrorist.

This amazing resource has some lines of blue lettering in the middle area, which are actually links to whole subsets of the unnecessarily convoluted decision. Much of it is in PDF format - raw government reports with few redactions. Most of what's blacked out is certain names that weren't agreed, and things the U.S. government said in the run-up to Megrahi's release.

The compassionate release decision is explained, including a medical report (overview - no scientific stuff). The history, legality, and philosophy of compassionate release is explained - it wasn't invented for Megrahi. There's the PTA track (Prisoner Transfer Agreement), as lodged by Libya, lobbied by BP, green-lighted by the UK, opposed in Scotland, and finally - at the very last minute after it had apparently slain an appeal - rejected by Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill. Both of the possible release/repatriation schemes are explained in detailed documents of the advice rendered to the secretary.

"Representations" to Mr. MacAskill, connected to the PTA process, are collected in another document. Families of Pan Am 103 victims weighed in against the transfer idea, Libyans and UK for. Mr. Megrahi's misunderstood meeting with MacAskill on August 6 is recorded in abstract, and the prisoner's 3-page note is included, ptotesting his innocence and dismay at his stalled appeal process and impending (ish) death. He was told if the PTA went ahead, which it couldn't and wouldn't, but which he implied it might, Megrahi's appeal would have to be surrendered.

If a new meeting to understand all of this is to go ahead, the Senators (who have their own brains plus research staffs) could first establish which questions have already been answered, narrow down the rest, and clarify all accordingly. Instead, we've seen insistent calls to 'get over here and explain this.' Much information was already sent to the Senators and only just yesterday did they finally say:
"Mr Menendez and Mr Lautenberg have pledged to carry out a thorough review of all documents already made public by the UK and Scottish governments..." link
That is soon they'll see if any of their questions were already answered in the informative documents they were sent a while back.

If the Senators are just alittle slow and not downright impaired, once it's all clear enough they will come around to the Scottish view. Then they can hopefully finally explain this to the American public, and much of the anger and confusion will dissipate. But even in this best-case scenario, I predict any such hearing will prove a farce. Both sides in this (Scottish and American, as it will come down) agree on concealing the biggest pachyderm in the living room - Megrahi's dropped appeal, the explosive information contained within it, and the deliberate framing of Libya suggested by that information.

But whatever the outcome, I suggest to all relevant parties on Great Britain that it might be best to go to the angry Americans, let them come to you, whatever works, and talk it out. Answer all their questions, be sure to explain everything relevant at one point or another. Be thorough, take time of your own to make sure they've heard allyou have to say. In fact, be chatty - have some coffee. Show respect of course, but some gentle dersision is in order here, and holding it back would be awkward.

And then just MAYBE they won't come a-knocking again a few weeks off, eight days after some quack reports that Megrahi will be "dead within a week." Best of luck.

"Emotional Blackmail"

Deals, Appeals, and Megrahi's "Compassionate" Release
Adam Larson (Caustic Logic)
April 20 2010
last edit May 18 1 am


*Note: There are some aspects of this issue I'm not 100% clear on, like the continuity of PTA deals. Some of this is hashed out in the comments section below.

See also Professor Black's response at The Lockerbie Case and comments there.
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There was much talk last year about a suspected deal over the release by Scottish authorities of convicted but innocent “Lockerbie bomber” Abdelbaset al Megrahi. The vast majority of the discussion skips over the subject of this article and obsesses over images of Brits caving to a Libyan trade of oil access for its terrorist back. It’s rather a crude construct, and technically untrue, but oil was a factor in earlier negotiations headed by the UK government back to 2007 - a prisoner transfer agreement (PTA) scheme pursued following Libya’s rapprochement with the West. [1] As talks with London dragged on towards 2009, it became clear that neither a newly-Nationalist Scotland nor the United States would agree to a PTA, and that option eventually faded away, as Professor Robert Black put it, “to the considerable annoyance and distress of the Libyans, who had been led to believe that repatriation under the PTA was only months away.” [2]

Now, for such an arrangement to have gone ahead, any outstanding appeals had to be closed. And yet for the two years that PTA agreements were considered, both defense and the Crown (prosecution) had appeals pending: the Crown had an appeal against leniency of sentence and Megrahi had his second appeal of the conviction (the first was controversially dismissed in 2002). [3] Scottish Courts had made him “convicted Lockerbie bomber” and only they could undo it in the right way. Besides, once an appeal is dropped by the applicant, it cannot legally be revived by anyone. So while Megrahi had reportedly said he'd surrender this appeal if a transfer was ever approved, [4] until that unlikely event, he kept it open to clear his name if at all possible.

Scottish Justice Secretary Kenny MacAskill eventually made the decision for release on other grounds entirely, following Megrahi’s diagnosis in July 2008 with advanced prostate cancer. A controversial (and somewhat mysterious) July 2009 prognosis gave the prisoner perhaps three months to live, the key point at which release is mandated. There was no need for oil interests, or any other trades – the only requirement for compassionate release is that the applicant contracts a terminal, incurable disease and be expected to die quite soon.

There is an application process, where the Justice Secretary decides to approve or deny the request, but so long as the prognosis is good, such appeals had always been approved. There was American pressure to make an exception and deny the request, but to judge by MacAskill's later statements, he would have made the decision to release no matter what, as it was the right thing to do. Importantly, when a prisoner is released on compassion grounds, appeals can be left open for a successor to clear one’s name posthumously.

The Cost of Compassion?
Yet just as the prognosis and decision to release were made official and announced, Megrahi also, suddenly, dropped his appeal. Following the prognosis and Megrahi's appeal for the compassion out in late July 2009, Justice Secretary MacAskill made an unprecedented visit to the prisoner’s cell for an unknown discussion [5] (alternately reported as August 4, 5, or 6). This was followed a week later by Megrahi’s mysterious request to surrender the fight on August 12. That same day, the BBC broke the story of his imminent release [6], and indeed the High Court of Justiciary accepted Megrahi’s plea on the 18th and graciously closed the appeal, dooming him to permanent legal guilt. [7] Megrahi was released and flew away two days later, or eight months ago today, in what officially is a separate development.

While it’s been denied strenuously by the Scots, many sources at the time, seeing this rapid chain of events, simply stated things like “Libyan Lockerbie bomber Al-Megrahi drops appeal, paves the way for compassionate release.” [8] And Megrahi’s own words seem to show that he himself felt, deeply and tragically, that the two were linked. In an open letter to the people and system of Scotland of August 20, the day of his release, he again proclaimed his innocence and said in part:
"Many people, including the relatives of those who died in, and over, Lockerbie, are, I know, upset that my appeal has come to an end; that nothing more can be done about the circumstances surrounding the Lockerbie bombing.
I share their frustration. I had most to gain and nothing to lose about the whole truth coming out - until my diagnosis of cancer.
[…]
I have been faced with an appalling choice: to risk dying in prison in the hope that my name is cleared posthumously or to return home still carrying the weight of the guilty verdict, which will never now be lifted.
The choice which I made is a matter of sorrow, disappointment and anger, which I fear I will never overcome."
[9]
Clearly, he’d somehow gotten the idea that abandoning the appeal was connected to returning home. It was an “appalling choice” he was somehow “faced with,” and took the home route. Nine days later Herald Scotland confirmed that Megrahi had “dropped his appeal against the conviction because he would not live to see its outcome and was desperate to return to his family.” "It is all about my family," they quoted him saying. "People have said there was pressure from the Libyan authorities or Scottish authorities, but it wasn't anything like this." [10] Perhaps there really was no squeeze, but something went quite wrong here, and others can see it too:
"I saw Megrahi not so long ago and apart from his number one priority of seeing his family he was absolutely determined to clear his family’s name and prove his innocence […] If he had found a way to do both I know he would have chosen that route. That’s why I’m highly surprised by his decision to drop the appeal and why I believe he has been leaned on.” - Member of Scottish Parliament Christine Grahame, August 14 [11]
“I cannot know what exactly happened but I believe that the UK and Scottish government wanted the appeal to be dropped and somehow it was dropped […] I think there may have been some kind of deal. One part of the deal was to have the appeal dropped and the other part was the release on compassionate grounds.” - Former UK ambassador to Libya, Oliver Miles [12]

Confusing Compassion
For the curious decision to finally surrender the fight for his name, the reason Megrahi gives is to be at home one last time. And that simply does not compute with the normal rules of Compassionate Release. It would be a very confused man who’d do that, and one can only wonder how he got that befuddled. Scottish law magazine/website The Firm stepped in during this process on August 12 to address a scandal reported to them by “sources within the Scottish Government Justice Department.” In a meeting the day before, the Libyan attendees were told “if Megrahi is to be granted compassionate release he must first drop his appeal […] This was the rammed home to the Libyans at their meeting with the Minister yesterday,” the Firm’s source said. [13]

The site publicly asked the Scottish government for “reassurance … that Megrahi’s return home is not being made conditional upon his dropping his appeal. Justice must be done, though the heavens may fall. That time, surely, is now.” The following day, a governmant spokesman responded “In answer to the simple question posed by The Firm, the answer is “No."" [14]

Megrahi was reportedly set to drop his appeal anyway, and the UN's knoweldgeable observer at the Zeist trial, Dr. Hans Köchler, implied deliberate confusion of the prisoner. Köchler told the Firm that “certain quarters confronted [Megrahi] with the alternative of either giving up his appeal in order to be sent back to Libya on the basis of a recently ratified “prisoner exchange agreement” between the UK and Libya – or die in a Scottish jail.” He further urged MacAskill to “act without further delay” to simply grant compassionate release and so “allow the appeal to continue and avoid the circumstances of “emotional blackmail"" inherent in the existing arrangement. [15]

The answer MacAskill et al. had given was “no,” they were not placing such a deal before Megrahi, yet even with this assurance presumably communicated to the applicant, he continued to link the two in his words and his "personal decision" we're to believe arose only from the terrorist's own mysterious whims. Perhaps the dying man decided to just cash in all his chips in a desperate flailing bid to secure his release in as many ways as possible, but that contradicts the shrewdness he's shown before and after. I simply cannot buy it. (I could entertain moves that account for that shrewdness, but needn't go into them here.)

A Bad Turn and a New Beginning
Quashing the appeal wasn’t in the interests of the “convicted Lockerbie bomber,” nor in the interests of the families of the victims he’s convicted of killing. At least some of those acknowledge the loss; Pamela Dix, whose brother died in the bombing and who now heads the UK survivors’ group, said:
"My immediate feeling is of great disappointment if the appeal does not go ahead. Further useful information may or may not have appeared through Megrahi's appeal process. At the moment there is no other process or procedure ongoing to tell us how the bombing was carried out, why it was done, the motivation for it and who ordered it. As the British Government are aware, we will continue pressing for the independent inquiry that has been denied to us to date primarily because of the ongoing criminal case.” [16]
No convincing official explanation for Megrahi’s motive has ever been offered. While it has little traction with anyone knowledgeable. there is a theory that Megrahi knew he was guilty and was simply ending the charade. This was stated explicitly by the Telegraph's foreign affairs editor Con Coughlin - after calling August 20 "a black day" for Scotland and before suggesting US sanctions on the sitting government at Holyrood, Coughlin used the dropped appeal as proof of guilt:
"[Megrahi] remains the only person to have been convicted of the worst terrorist atrocity committed on British soil [...] he planted the bomb that killed 270 people [...] we have no reason to believe it was anyone other than Megrahi who placed the fatal device because he dropped his appeal against conviction shortly before Mr McAskill made his shameful decision." [17]
Likewise, no legal justification was ever given for tacking PTA requirements onto a compassionate release, but it worked out exactly as if that’s what happened. Mr. Megrahi talks as if he’d been forced into such a deal, and many others report such arrangements actually being forced.

I’d guess that while deciding to surrender, Mr. Al Megrahi also – shrewdly - plotted to release his case to the world and appeal to the court of public opinion after his return. Of course he did so, and controversially, and the retrial is by default in session. Legal courts have more direct power, of course, but get forced into blind alleys by being unable to question planted evidence and the like. In the court now running, scattered and confused as it is, all avenues are open, and the truth is finally coming out in force.
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Sources:
[1] United Press International. "Straw: Oil a factor in Libya prisoner pact." September 6 2009. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/09/06/Straw-Oil-a-factor-in-Libya-prisoner-pact/UPI-19581252216109/
[2] Black, Robert. Commentary attached to post "Straw Denies Megrahi Release was Connected to Trade Deals" The Lockerbie Case (blog). 30 August 2009. http://lockerbiecase.blogspot.com/2009/08/straw-denies-megrahi-release-was.html
[3] Scottish Parliament. Justice Committee Report SP Paper 383 J/S3/10/R3 3rd Report, 2010 (Session 3) "The decision on Abdelbaset al-Megrahi." 5 February 2010. para 36. http://scotparliament.com/s3/committees/justice/reports-10/jur10-03.htm
[4] See [3]. paragraph 42.
[5] Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi (Decision). Scottish Parliament debates, 2 September 2009, 9:34 am http://www.theyworkforyou.com/sp/?id=2009-09-02.19021.0
[6, 12] MacLeaod, Angus. "I suspect deal over al-Megrahi appeal, says former ambassador" The Times. August 31 2009. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/scotland/article6816334.ece
[7] "Lockerbie bomber allowed to drop appeal." Canadian Broadcasting corporation. August 18 2009. http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/08/18/lockerbie-megrahi-bomber-appeal-scotland712.html
[8] "Libyan Lockerbie bomber Al-Megrahi drops appeal, paves the way for compassionate release." Associated Press. August 18 2009. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/08/18/2009-08-18_libyan_.html#ixzz0lWbmXuJM
[9] BBC News "In Full: Statement From Megrahi." August 20 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/8212910.stm
[10] "Lockerbie : Al Megrahi says public inquiry must take place into bombing of Pan Am Flight 103." Scottish Law Reporter (blog). August 29 2009. http://scottishlaw.blogspot.com/2009_08_01_archive.html
[11] Taylor, Jerome. "Al-Megrahi 'pressured into abandoning appeal'" Independent. August 14 2009. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/almegrahi-pressured-into-abandoning-appeal-1772156.html
[13, 14, 15] "Path cleared for Megrahi’s compassionate release as government confirms “No” to pressure claims." The Firm. August 13 2009. http://www.firmmagazine.com/news/1636/Path_cleared_for_Megrahi’s_compassionate_release_as_government_confirms_“No”_to_pressure_claims.html
[16] "New cover-up claims as Lockerbie bomber drops his appeal." Daily Mail. August 15 2009.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1206716/New-cover-claims-Lockerbie-bomber-drops-appeal.html#ixzz0lRBi8Uc3
[17] Coughlin, Con. "The release of the Lockerbie bomber is a black day for the Scottish government." 20 August 2009. http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100007064/the-release-of-the-lockerbie-bomber-is-a-black-day-for-the-scottish-government/