Showing posts with label BBC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BBC. Show all posts

IED Fragment Survivability Tests

(incomplete)
last update Jan 31 2011

The Basics and Prosecution’s Case
The heart of this Improvised Explosive Device (IED) that tore down Flight 103 was Semtex-H, in an amount that can only be estimated. Official guesses at the weight are not widely reported, but Professor Christopher Peel of the Royal Aeronautical Society, at the Zeist Trial in June 2000, testified to his calculations; around 450 grams was used, and wound up a bare 25 inches from the plane's fragile skin. These findings were challenged by the Defense, according to the Scotland Herald, but Peel doesn't stand alone. [Source]

There were also forensics tests, reported by David Leppard in his 1991 book On the Trail of Terror, that are said to confirm "RARDE's initial assessment that the bomb had contained about 400 grammes of Semtex high explosive - less than a 2lb. bag of sugar." These were the Indian Head tests carried out April 89 in the USA by RARDE's Ferraday and FBI's J. "Tom" Thurman. Interestingly, Leppard cites this confirmation as "the explosive charge used to bring down the plane was 'in all probability' about 454 to 680 grammes or 1 to 1 1/2 pounds of Semtex." [p 139-141]

I'm no expert on how much energy is unleashed by 454-680 grams of this legendarily powerful compound. But consider the "trial loading" below used at trial (image found here and improved the labels a bit, added width notation). This is the alleged bomb - a Toshiba RT-SF16 "BomBeat" radio with explosive, a detonator rod, battery and MST-13 timer without waterproof casing, all fitting in a remarkably small case, about 16 inches across. It has the cassette assembly, about 4 inches wide, removed to allow the pat of semtex. This makes the timer, it seems, no more than two inches from that origin of the blast - inches of mostly air, not lead.

According to the officially accepted evidence of what actually survived these circumstances, refer to the following crucial evidence attested to.
- Fragment of bomb timer circuit board
Obviously, the half-inch square fragment of circuit board named PT/35(b) was a crucial clue to Libyan guilt, as seen on TV with its identifier "Tom" Thurman. This is the part people have been questioning in recent years. This led to Swiss makers Mebo, who only made a few of these ever, for Libyan intelligence JSO.

- Fragments of radio housing, circuit board, etc.
These were fairly small, fragmented, melted, lumped together in far-flung luggage. The radio remains are not implausible, but didn't prove the radio type. Consistent with but not exclusive to the RT-SF16.


- Fragments of radio instruction manual

This nearly-intact cover page saying Toshiba RT-SF16, was supposedly found in a field and brought in by citizens. This and other page fragments clumped together were consistent with a RT-SF16 manual, and convinced the Zeist judges of the model. This was presumably in a plastic sleeve, packed snugly in the radio box, perhaps three inches from the explosive center. Result - crumpled and torn a bit, slight singeing.

If it's bizarre, it's proportionally useful; the radio model itself is said to indicate Libyan guilt. It's not very conclusive, but 3/4 of the small run of RT-SF16s were sold to a company said to be connected to Libyan intelligence.

A Challenge: Dr. Wyatt's tests
Over the years, critics have contended the amount of explosive really used, their type, their placement, and whaether or not i would be strong enough to rupture an aircraft, or too strong to have left the clues that were found. The last question was brought to the fore, and left there it seems, by recently announced experimental evidence. Repeated tests simulating the alleged conditions indicated that larger items like, in particular, the famous bomb-timer fragment that nailed Libya, would have never been found if they were in the explosion. This was aired by, of all parties, the BBC program Newsnight, on 8 January, 2010. The program is currently viewable at this BBC page and definitely worth a watch. The tests were carried out by Dr. John Wyatt, an explosives expert retired from the British Army, now running a security consulting company called SDS, and is a blast consultant for the United Nations (Europe and North Africa region). The details behind how he came to test the official scenario – twenty times over - is unclear at the moment, and so far there’s been no detailed report of his methodology and precise findings, but just what the program shares is compelling enough.

From what Marshall explains in voice-over, Dr. Wyatt carried out his twenty tests over time, starting with the radio bomb detonated by itself. One sample he showed the cameras is at right, a suitcase filled with random clothes, and a radio (different model than alleged, a bit larger), rigged as a bomb and set in a homemade cardboard box. Another he showed contained yet another type of radio, bright red, and a suicase he says is the same model used for PA103 (Samsonite hardside). Both were soon after blown up with the pat of plastic explosives tucked inside. Of the consistent results, Wyatt told Newsnight:
“I must admit, since the quantity of explosives we were using was only three or four hundred grams, I thought there were going to be some remnants of the radio left. But it – it – (chuckling) it just totally disintegrated. I mean really just went into tiny, tiny bits."
Please note that he was using amounts, if this accurate, of 300-400 grams, when the Indian Head Tests considered 454-680 grams the likely force behind the half-inch readable chunk "found" in the Scottish countryside. Wyatt elaborated a bit on method to The Times of Malta, specifying a separate timer was included and considered, as well as the general radio unit, and that the tests were done in varying conditions.
"We tried exploding the device on its own; in a radio similar to the one it was supposed to have been planted in; in a suitcase with and without clothes; surrounded by other suitcases and, eventually, in a container. In all tests, the timer and the circuit board were completely destroyed."

He later “built the tests up” to a finale – a dozen or so pieces of luggage piled in an airliner luggage container, arranged among other containers, and detonated in a field, videotaped from several viewpoints. This last was the only outdoors test; he told the Times he had done the other 19 indoors, “to make sure we could collect all the evidence.” Collecting the remains is what it was all about, of course, and so they used sparse concrete rooms (rather than a hundreds of square km countryside) and “we even painted the circuit board bright yellow to make it easier to identify any fragments among the debris. In no circumstance did we find any fragment," Dr Wyatt explained. Presumably he means no fragments of the scale of PT/35(b), since elsewhere he does mention “tiny tiny bits.” Perhaps the yellow was simply cooked off in all cases?

Above is a dramatic image from one of the tests, in a darkened room and greatly slowed down. The curly stuff is presumably the "hard-side" suitcase material, the little bars parts of its frame. The white-hot cluster at center is that 3-400 grams of explosive, semtex it should be, consuming the whole radio and vaporizing/weaponizing everything around it. Do consider that the bomb penetrated the plane's hull, after losing force bursting from the luggage container, after tearing through the suitcase lining, surrounding clothes, cardboard box, and the radio's plastic casing. The timer would be got to right away, before any energy was lost in an of those battles. Is Wyatt's testing just an elaborate (and expensive) way of proving the patently obvious?

Presented by Newsnight host Peter Marshall with the official story again - that a 1cm square chunk of circuit board so near the blast survived inside a small piece of cloth, and was found on the ground, during manual searches, 35 km from Lockerbie? Dr. Wyatt stopped precisely this far short of calling it all a grand farce:
"Obviously these things are not impossible, we only carried out 20 tests, we didn't carry out 100 or 1,000 tests, but in every of those 20 tests we found absolutely no sign at all. So I find it highly improbable that you would find anything like that, particularly at 10,000 feet when bits are dropping into long wet grass over hundreds of miles. […] I do find it quite extraordinary and I think highly improbable, and most unlikely that you would find a fragment like that – I mean, it is unbelievable.” [emphasis as spoken]

Response and counter-response

- Crown Response / Indian Head Forensic Tests
A Scottish Crown Office response quickly followed. It started with a standard appeals to 'we already won, he was convicted,' which have no bearing on the issue at hand, which cuts to the how of the conviction. They note irrelevant facts like "Dr John Wyatt has never examined the timer fragment (PT 35)." Indeed, only certain scientists who have a history of "political" science (Feraday, Thurman) were allowed touch this one and decide it was indeed from the Libyan explosion. Erroneously, the Crown Office state "conclusive forensic evidence proved that the fragment was part of the timer ... at the time of the explosion which destroyed Pan Am 103." Such tests apparently consisted of finding it in a burnt piece of shirt. They did not test it for explosives residue, or do anything to prove it was not planted for them to find. Most interesting and relevant, the press release stated:
"In fact, extensive explosives tests were carried out in the United States in 1989, some time before the fragment PT35 was extracted by the forensic experts, as part of the Lockerbie investigation. The purpose of these tests was:
o to estimate the amount and location of the explosives used on PA103;
o to establish the extent of damage to the improvised explosive device ( IED ), the adjacent suitcases and their contents; and
o to ascertain what parts of the IED and its contents it was possible to recover and identify." COPFS original posting
This fragment survivability aspect is not mentioned in Leppard's book, but hinted at with the note that the clothing within the IED case was “sprayed with a distinctive colour of paint for ease of identification.” [p 139] The Crown office release continued to explain what was found:
"After a number of test explosions a detailed search was made and circuit board fragments, radio cassette casing and parts, fragments of instruction manual, the suitcase and clothing were all recovered in a condition which was consistent with the debris recovered in relation to the Lockerbie disaster." 
The results of these tests have never been formally publicized to my knowledge, making verification impossible. David Leppard does cite a varying amount of explosive in each test - from 360 to 680 grams. [p 140] Interestingly, Alan Feraday had overseen the low end test, and probably recovered the debris from a 360-gram blast "in a condition which was consistent with the debris" that started being found and identified by Mr. Feraday himself and his scientists, right afterwards. RT-8016 radios were used in the US tests, exactly like the model later identified from 103's wreckage, except for case color - the 8016 is white, the SF16 black. The best identifier of the radio model, aside from the amazing manual, was AG/145, a lump of material including a tiny but identifiable bit of internal circuit board. This was consistent with either Toshiba model.

Conclusion: More Information Needed
If indeed there's something in the Indian Head tests that clearly contradicts Dr. Wyatt's findings, and large fragments (up to 1cm square) were indeed recovered from an equivalent blast, the details should now be brought forward. Dr. Wyatt insists 300-400 grams of semtex disntegrates the whole radio, and shown us at least some of the methodology. On the other hand, we've got a few lines in an error-filled Crown Office press release suggesting that Thurman and Feraday did it right and got big chunks similar to what they found - and that they felt was after a blast of 454-680 grams.

That is a serious discrepancy. Obviously the laws of physics are immutable and unchanging, so if two sets of tests produced different results, then some variable was set up differently (wrong) between them. So far Dr Wyatt's is more open, better illustrated, makes more sense, and reeks less of politically-driven obfuscation, but Id like to see more documentation on that as well.
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Update: A little more information has come out on the tests since the first article. See "On Planted Evidence"

Update Jan 2011: Dr. Wyatt's findings and credibility are in some question. See later comments below.

Video: BBC Dispatches / 60 Minutes

last update 30 Nov. 2010 


BBC Dispatches, 1999
External video link (not embeddable, hosted by Mebo)
"The Lockerbie Trail" Director: Greg Lanning. Reporter: David Jessel. Producers: Phillip Wearne, Steve Haywood, John Ashton. BBC 4. First aired December 1998.

CBS 60 Minutes.
details forthcoming...
External video link (not embeddable, hosted by Mebo)
transcript

These two programs are almost point-for-point on content with each other. I'm not sure if Joohn Ashton helped with the second one as with the first. They're not bad, with most issues dealt with quite well. Professor Robert Black is interviewed, expressing doubts over the case. Fhimah's diary entry "get taggs" is covered well in both. The lack of evidence for an unaccompanied bag from Malta is well-established.

One interesting point I must note is the performance in both videos of Major Owen Lewis. I learned that he was involved in successful appeals of terrorism cases based on the sham science of Allen Feraday - he was also brought into support the Megrahi defense apparently, but here is flat wrong. (Dispatches,  16:44 60 Minutes, 8:40) His opinion of the "true edge" and "different curve" is accepted by the program for some reason - this board is similar but not the same, not part of the same batch. I made the image at left myself, by making an outline of the surface of the fragment as found in 1989, and as shown again later (in color, that odd too-blue green) beneath it. It's clearly a match but with the top sliver cut off at one point between. Tom Thurman says just this (Dispatches 19:38) and strangely, comes off looking like the credible one here.  

Dispatches, 14:55, Edwin Bollier of the timer's makers, MEBO, speaks of the rough saw marks evident in a pixelated photo of the corner curve. Further proof for Edwin that the fragment "does not come from one of the timers we sold to Libya." For 60 Minutes (7:45), he says the soldering on the board is too rough, to the same effect - it wasn't Libyan. It was one of the two (brown-coated) handmade prototypes sold to the Stasi, he insists.  I'm not impressed with the free reign Edwin was given in these videos, given his deep history with this case and rejection of the much better MST-13 frame-up scenario implicitly advanced by an Owen Lewis colleague, Dr./Lt/ Col. John Wyatt.

13/14 August 2009

MacAskill’s Two-Track Railroad: Part 8/10
14 August 2010


Note: The posts in this series are not conclusive, but rather what I was able to learn before the anniversary arrived, sporadically updated later. Any suggestions from knowledgeable readers to improve the content will be gladly appreciated.

<< Previous: 12/13 August
Next: 18 August >>

The previous post left off on 13 August with responses the day after Megrahi filed to drop his appeal. The same day, a BBC article suddenly expressed as fact that the convict was going to be released. The core information, included in the sidebar, was this short dispatch from Glenn Campbell, BBC Scotland political correspondent
I understand preparations for Mr Megrahi's release are being made in time for him to be home with his family in Libya by Ramadan, which starts next Friday. The Parole Board for Scotland has been asked to give its opinion on compassionate release. The Libyan authorities - who have held high level talks with the Scottish justice secretary in recent days - have also been advised to make plans to fly Mr Megrahi back to Tripoli. The Scottish Government is right to say "no decision has been taken" - but that should change in the next few days and the likelihood is Mr Megrahi will return to Libya by next weekend.

Elsewhere in the article it was said these talks were "over Megrahi's appeal against his conviction." This could mean the meeting of the day before where the Libyans were reportedly told Megrahi would have to surrender it before being released. (see 12 August) Any direct connection between the appeal and the imminent decision remained unstated in the article. But comparing two sections, the language reflects the kind of confusion Megrahi may have been experiencing at the very moment:

The Libyan man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing is likely to be freed on compassionate grounds next week, the BBC understands. [...] A prisoner transfer cannot take place if criminal proceedings are active, meaning Megrahi would have to drop his latest appeal against his conviction in order to be sent home.

And the whole article's premise was that someone with inside info he couldn't explain was sure that Megrahi would be sent home on compassion grounds - just as the appeal was surrendered.

One year ago today, on the afternoon of 14 August 2009, Kenny MacAskill received his “final advice from my officials” on the legal options for release/transfer. This came as two documents, one on prisoner transfer advice and one on Compassionate Release (CR), both penned by W. George Burgess of the Criminal Law and Licensing Division.

Both documents set out “mechanical criteria” and a longer section on legal, structural, and public relations considerations. All discussions with U.S. government counterparts and some points from the UK foreign Office are redacted. Both say for “timing: Urgent. This advice should be considered alongside advice on the Libyan Government’s application under the PTA.” The PTA advice document added between the sentences "the 90 day guideline in the Prisoner Transfer Agreement finished on 3 August 2009." The was reportedly extended (see 3 August) and if so, proved no barrier.

The CR document explains requests are usually passed through a ”prison governor” who considers all facts and then applies for the prisoner. But in this case Megrahi was allowed to lobby straight to the top, with Prison Services only consulted after. All were in agreement, however - the Governor, Medical Officer, and Prison Social Work Unit. All in all, Burgess found no reason to deny the request or even to keep Megrahi on Great Britain. Paragrahph 17 reasons he would not be allowed to travel freely outside the country, but Libya, instead of the UK, could be the country he'd have to stay in.

All the mechanical criteria for PTA had been met "bar the criterion of 'finality of judgment.'" Both appeals were in force, but "we understand that Mr Al-Megrahi has lodged a notice of abandonment." And yet, an incomplete sentence explains "the fact that this criterion on finality of judgment, in itself, is reason to refuse the transfer." The heinousness of the crime he was accepted as guilty of - extremely heinous - was itself reasoned to be no obstacle to a transfer. But his appeal surrender not being finished yet, and/or the Crown's appeal for longer sentence (due to heinousness), were sufficient. Bizarre.

Shockingly, Burgess also said the Crown's outstanding appeal for longer sentence was enough to bolock the PTA despite Megrahi's own surrendered appeal. Precisely the sharpest danger that faced the prisoner in the surrender process was recognized and suggested in this strategy paper.

The PTA advice section "public confidence in the justice system" is highly interesting. Its two points (paragraphs 15 and 16) address a “perception that the appeal and the PTA application are linked,” and pursuing the PTA “could be seen as influencing Mr. Al-Megrahi’s decision on whether to continue his appeal.” Burgess was happy with macAskill’s solution so far; “to avoid this, you have been at pains throughout the process to avoid discussion or consideration of the appeal,” while proceeding on a course that seems to have silently destroyed it. “Finality of judgment” is all that was ever mentioned, a phrase meaning all proceedings - including appeals – must be closed.

MacAskill's ongoing refusal or inability to decide against the transfer - when he would have to rule against it eventually - might constitute actual influence on Megrahi's decision-making, if managing to avoid the perception of it. Even after 12-14 August, Mr. MacAskill continued to put off the inevitable decision, as if he were waiting for some final piece to fall into place.

Video: Der Anschlag von Lockerbie Mythos und Wahrheit

"Der Anschlag von Lockerbie Mythos und Wahrheit"
(app., Lockerbie Attack:Myth and Truth)
A film by: Jean-Christoph Caron and Guy Smith A co-production of BBC and ZDF.
2008, Der Deutschen Fassung.

German language, obviously. My friend Nennt Mich Einfach Adam! provided a few translations/insights:
At 7:30
- At the airport Frankfurt the BKA (BundesKriminalAmt, the German FBI) found no evidence that a (suspicious) suitcase coming from Malta was introduced (“eingeschleust”).

(This is later repeated as quotation from the final BKA report on Lockerbie.)

- There was a flight from Malta and there was only a fragmented (lückenhafte) documentation of the match of baggage and passengers.

- The Leiter der Internationalen Terror Fahndung des BKA (head of the international terror investigation of the BKA), Manfred Klink, says: “There was a possibility that – possibly – here I want to be very cautious – possibly there was a suitcase that went through to the PanAm 103.”

- There were feeder flights for PA 103 not only from Malta but from 12 more airports.

At 8:55 to 9:55

- International flight security expert Siegfried Niedeck doubts that the terrorists intended to let the plane crash over Lockerbie. He speculates that the plane either 1) should explode over the Irish Sea or 2) that the terrorists intended to blow up the plane when on the tarmac at Heathrow. But they confused it due to the different time zones. He merely speculates. To that a wrong animation is shown according to which it was a flight from Frankfurt to the USA. (One of the minor errors in the film).

At 16:30

- Wilhelm Dietl tells: I know (from the stasi archives) of the cooperation between the GDR/Stasi and arab governments, arab intelligence organizations. They were invited to the GDR for training courses, starting with Marxism-Leninism and ending with exercises with handgrenades.

At 18:45

- Wilhelm Dietl denies the possibility that the Stasi was involved in the Lockerbie case: “The GDR was not in the terror bussiness”, he says.

All in all it is a fine documentary (with tiny errors) that shows us the main absurdities of the case but does not strongly advocate any special alternative theory.

This service is free of charge for all truth-seeking human beings.


See also the sister version for Brits BBC Conspiracy Files: Lockerbie. Some interesting comparisons could be made between the two versions. For example, with Germans watching this version, where's Bogomira Erac?

Video: The Conspiracy Files: Lockerbie


"The Conspiracy Files: Lockerbie." Prod/Dir Guy Smith, Ex Prod Sam Anstiss, Narr Caroline Catz. BBC Two. First Aired 31 August 2008.

See also the German sister version of this program co-produced with ZDF. It's quite different in notable ways. No Bogomira...