Tom Thurman

The Political Scientists of Lockerbie, part 3/3
posted 13 November 2010
last edits 16 Nov

From Kentucky to Lockerbie and Back: A Quick Bio
Special Agent James T. “Tom” Thurman hails from Richmond, Kentucky, born on an unpublicized date to Margaret and James "Spider" Thurman [1] Tom spent most fof the 1970s serving in the U.S. Army, according to the 1998 book Tainting Evidence, starting to gravitate to explosives work "as an officer commanding an ammunitions company in Korea." His calling led him to join the FBI in 1977, and by 1981 he'd worked up to the small and elite Explosives Unit. [2]

His work on the Lockerbie SCOTBOM case was the first big thing in his career, starting immedaiately on 21 December 1988, examining the aircraft's debris. Later, he also sat in on the FBI interview of suspected bomb-maker Marwan Khreesat in Amman, Jordan, November 1989. (Thurman and Lockerbie: Overview, forthcoming)

By the end of the year Thurman was also juggling this work with the VANPAC case - the mail-bomb killing of a federal judge, a lawyer, and other attempts. In that case, Thurman was pivotal to the identification of LeRoy Moody, by a "unique" bomb style, or "signature." This case, prosecuted by future FBI director Louis Freeh, gave Thurman some minor celebrity status. (Thurman and Moody: forthcoming).

In June 1990 Thurman made the lightning timer identification for the SCOTBOM case, cementing the turn to Libya. The telltale MST-13 was identified, thanks to Thurman's knowing people - like a mysterious CIA analyst who made the match possible. After the resulting 1991 indictments, he gained much wider media fame, most notably as ABC News'  "Person of the Week." He told the show "I love putting the bad guys away." [2]

Somewhere in there, he also helped French investigators identify another "signature," a piece of circuit board from the bombing of UTA 772 in Sept. 1989 – leading again to Libya. (Thurman and UTA 772: forthcoming) (UTA 772 at all: forthcoming)

In 1993 Louis Freeh took over the FBI, and shortly after promoted Thurman to director of the explosives unit. [2] From that perch he had a major role in the investigation of the truly epic 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. (Thurman and OKBOM: forthcoming) But for collected allegations of misbehavior in this and earlier cases, Mr. Thurman was drummed out of the crime lab only two years later, in 1997. This was triggered almost solely by the efforts of one tenacious analyst, Dr. Frederic Whitehurst, and the Inspector General’s investigation that finally followed. (Thurman and 1997: forthcoming)

Not surprisingly, Thurman was not called as a star witness, or a witness of any kind, at the Camp Zeist trial of the two accused. As of 2000, according to an EKU bio, James T. Thurman has been teaching courses at East Kentucky University, where the elder James "Spider" Thurman was once an alumni director (knows people ... spider ... web?). His son is an associate professor of Loss Prevention and Safety, teaching in the Fire, Arson, and Explosion Investigations Program. [3] He wrote a book, published in 2006 "Practical Bomb Scene Investigation." (500 pp, $89.95), and told a EKU newsletter that, besides the two year writing, “technically, I’ve been working on this book for 30 years, with the experience I gained over that time." [3]

Note: BBC Dispatches program, first aired December 1998, interviewed Thurman at EKU, where "he now teaches explosives investigation." (18:36) Do note: the the criticism of the board differences they put to him is pure hogwash. Thurman comes out looking smart by comparison to Maj. Owen Lewis (16:40).

On Thurman's Qualifications
On the face of it, all these things suggest a seriously qualified and professional expert, but sources vary widely. Some of those who've worked with Thurman pan his credentials. Dr. Ludwig de Braeckeleer interviewed two of these, including the aforementioned Whitehurst, for an excellent 2008 article. "Thurman holds an undergraduate degree in political science and I hold a PhD in chemistry," Whitehurst told de Braeckeleer. "Thurman was not recognized by the FBI or anyone else as having expertise in complex chemical analysis and I was." [4]

The other cited critic is William Tobin, a former FBI forensic analyst who played a key role in determining the cause of the crash of TWA 800 and, after retirement, discredited a decades old forensic technique used to put away many people. To de Braeckeleer he said in part:

“I put no credence into any scientific or technical conclusions rendered by anyone without a suitable scientific background for that matter, until I can make an independent evaluation. Thurman was a history or political science major to my recollection […] His habit, as with most Explosives Unit examiners with whom I interacted […] was to seek someone else’s expertise and then present it as his own in a courtroom without attribution.” [4]

Tobin specifically mentioned attempts at "bail-outs," where Thurman asked for his advice to bolster something he wasn't able to support on his own. And he does seem a bit dense when left on his own for the numerous news cameras he’s so unafraid of. He looks like a former football player who was able to score Cs in class, but really just loves to blow things up, A beefy fellow with a slightly shy manner, cop-like mustache, and a mild, good-natured Tennessee twang. He's got a clumsy trying-to-sound-smart way of speaking: a lot of unnecessary big words, “ummms”, hyperbole, and emphasis on the “literal” “physical” reality of his war stories, which change freely on different occasions.

But those at a distance get a different perspective. Steve Emerson and Brian Duffy wrote well of Thurman in their 1990 book The Fall of Pan Am 103.

“One of the bureau’s best explosives technicians … Regarded by his colleagues as a pro. Described by friends and coworkers as serious-minded and intense … according to those knowledgeable about the dangerous arcane of explosives, he was among the very best investigators in the field.” [5] 

The book relates his qualifications so:

“Thurman had acquired a master’s degree in forensic science from George Washington University and was a graduate of the United States Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal School. Even after all his highly specialized training, the FBI still did not consider Thurman quite ready to work in its Washington crime laboratory, one of the most advanced forensic labs in the world. At the bureau’s request, Thurman undertook more than a year of intense lab study on explosives and explosive devices. That was in 1977. Thurman had been a special agent with the bureau ever since…” [5]

From the other sources I've seen, his high-level colleagues, Whitehurst and Tobin and perhaps silent others aside, seem to lean as that book does. Tom is a fully-qualified and rigorous investigator of great brilliance. The unanimity is almost eerie. (see below)

E. Unit Culture: The Explosive Arts
Tainting Evidence explains that Explosives Unit, which Thurman marinated in and came to lead, were sometimes called “the bombers.” This was apparently from their penchant for figuring out explosions by recreating them in a “trial and error … hopefully not too much error” method. [2] They apparently start with a guess, try to rebuild an IED and blow it up, identify the differences and try again. They went on gut instincts and adrenaline, sounds like. Thurman himself told the Miami Herald in 1991 that "we're the blacksmiths of the FBI. The nuts and bolts. We get extremely dirty, actually, filthy dirty." [1] It doesn’t sound fully scientific, and in fact, Tainting Evidence continues:

“[T]he physical explosives examinations, crime scene investigations and bomb data identification that the "bombers" did were not scientific. […] The FBI's Explosives Unit handed all scientific analysis over to chemists, metallurgists, or technicians [...] However, it was the principal examiners among the "bombers" who made the decision as to what explosives evidence should go where and what the results meant in the context of the overall investigation. As such they would often interpret the results of others. It was a recipe for a culture clash — and more." [2]

"The nature of the job," the book continues, aside from the obvious fun of it, "meant that pseudomilitary, nonscientific attitudes were entrenched in the Explosives Unit. Many were suffering from what one forensic scientist termed "testosterone poisoning."" [2] This differences alone could explain some of the conflict with those like Whitehurst and Tobin (not that either seems lacking in the testo department - ed) . But more important than some science-vs-explosive arts dispute is the culture of politics over science and collective ass-covering that seems to be at work under the surface. 


E. Unit Culture: Politics
Dr. DeBraeckeleer wrote that "William Tobin told me that, in his opinion, Thurman and other Explosives Unit examiners were prone to confirmation bias, an observer bias whereby an examiner is inclined to see what he is expected to see." Thurman in particular is singled out for seeing and saying what the prosecution wants to hear, as opposed to what the science, or presumably his own explosions, really say. [4] That's a bad start point, methodologically.

Unlike the quieter Tobin, who only spoke up after retiring, Frederic Whitehurst had spent year lodging complaints with superiors about Thurman’s frequent alterations of his scientific reports. When in these disputes Whitehurst reminded him of their qualification difference, he tells de Braeckeleer, "Thurman did not deny it but argued that my reports could and/or would hurt prosecutors’ cases. I was very concerned about the fact that wrong information in the final reports could hurt individuals and deny citizens of this country right to a fair trial." [4] For years, Tom won these disputes.

Further, Whitehurst suggests a pattern of collective reinforcement and ass-covering, which would only naturally follow from the adoption of "political science." (It does not thrive, like real science does, on open challenges to the orthodoxy.) What he describes is a system that enables and rewards the actions of those like Thurman, and uses those rewards to justify further enabling.

"When I raised my concerns with my managers at the FBI laboratory, all except for one of them reminded me that Thurman was the “hero” behind determining the perpetrators of the Pan Am 103 disaster. I understood from that that the FBI would not expose these issues for fear that the investigation into the Pan Am 103 bombing would be seen as possibly flawed and this would open the FBI up to criticism and outside review.

[...]

I cannot imagine that he was acting alone. [...] The problem with having a scientific laboratory within an intelligence gathering organization is that scientists traditionally are seeking truth and at times their data is in direct contradiction to the wishes of a government that is not seeking truth but victory on battle fields.” [4]

Tobin agrees, saying “I’ve seen so often where an individual who was at one time an independent thinker and had good powers of reasoning acquires the ‘us vs. them,’ circle-the-wagons, public-relations at all costs mentality at the FBI. [...] Whatever you do, ‘don’t embarrass the Bureau’ and ‘the Bureau can do no wrong.’" [4] All this makes sense and explains the different views, cited above, one will get from talking to most Thurman colleagues or the bureau's press reports on the one hand, or from seeking out one of the others who don't get offered up for interviews with the big terrorism experts writing their bestsellers.

Sources:
[1] Roser, Ann. “Nuts and Bolts Work Pays Off in Lockerbie Probe.” The Miami Herald. Published November 30, 1991. http://plane-truth.com/Aoude/geocities/miami7.html
[2] Tainting Evidence: Inside the scandals at the FBI crime lab. John F. Kelly and Phillip K. Wearne. Free Press, New York, 1998. Partial online excerpt.
http://www.powells.com/biblio?show=HARDCOVER:USED:0684846462:17.50&page=excerpt
[3] East Kentucky University. EKUpdate, vol 7 no 17, May 1, 2006.
http://www.prm.eku.edu/Update/?issue=70&department=10
[4] Dr. Ludwig de Braeckeleer. "FBI Special Agent Thomas Thurman." Canada Free Press. 30 October 2008. http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/6529
[5] Emerson, Steve, and Brian Duffy. The Fall of Pan Am 103. pp 27-28.

Rewards for Injustice

A Shocking Trail of Witnesses Paid Millions for Misinformation
July 25 2010
last edits July 30

The early release from Scottish prison of “Lockerbie bomber” Abdelbaset al Megrahi has been getting much airplay and page space the last three weeks. A myth that he might live for decades more, and the “news” that Gulf-despoilers BP (British!) had also lobbied for the “bomber’s” release back in 2007, stuck together for indignorant Americans. This spurred a flurry of commentary and Congressional calls for investigations, summoning foreign CEOs and ministers to explain themselves, as the Brtis say with annoyance, like naughty schoolchildren before the headmaster.

This will surely settle down before long, and amid the furor, one crucial issue will still lie in the dust, unseen by most. And that is the assassination of Megrahi’s hard-won second appeal of conviction. Many informed commentators have been bringing up the appeal in a more recent backlash, but so far It’s hardly even a side note in the US - just a trifle the “bomber” was “allowed to drop” right before going home to live way more than three months.

Three Important Witnesses
And so the appeal’s secrets were buried, for the moment The central point of the surrendered challenge, soon submitted to the court of public opinion, was the reliability and credibility of eyewitness Anthony “Tony” Gauci. The scope of this article will be wider and consider two other witnesses who share three key features with Gauci.

Upon finding Megrahi guilty for the bombing on January 31, 2001, the three judge panel ruling at Camp Zeist issued an 87-page Opinion of the Court (PDF link) to explain their thinking. Among the points in setting up the evidence against Megrahi was this short list:

“In relation to the first accused, there are three important witnesses, Abdul Majid, Edwin Bollier and Tony Gauci.” [paragraph 41]

To those who know enough about the case, that line is itself hilarious, the punch-line to a sick joke. To those who don’t know enough (and that’s who this article is for), it take a little explaining. Besides being the only three with anything truly incriminating to say against Megrahi, each of these has in common two further points:
1) The evidence they provided is questionable in many cases, and unquestionably fraudulent in others.
2) They were all offered (or have said they were offered) millions of dollars, and at least two apparently collected.

“Abdul Majid”
Abdul Majid Giaka (an alias, true name unknown, called ”Abdul Majid” by the Zeist judges) was a Libyan intelligence agent with the JSO, Libya’s CIA. He was very low level and knew almost nothing, but from August 1988 he had been able to draw money from the CIA ($1,000 a month, increased to $1,500) selling them small tidbits. The CIA called Giaka code-name “Puzzle Piece.”

The defector was stationed at Luqa airport on Malta, where the JSO and Libyan Arab Airlines mingled. At some point after Pan Am 103 fell to Earth in December, two of the people he’d named as high JSO agents working on Malta – Megrahi and his “accomplice” Fhimah – came to the center of suspicion. Strange clues emerged suggesting Libyan authorship, and a Malta link that pointed right to Megrahi. By early 1991, the other puzzle pieces (including Gauci and Bollier) were all in place, and they needed a witness closer to the perps.

It seems the Libyans were by then tired of Abdul Majid’s strange behavior on Malta and ready to call him back to Tripoli. The CIA threatened to cut him off and let him go unless he said something good, and if it was good enough, he might say it to the FBI. So in the summer, he met with agent Hal Hendershot and laid down a whole new version of the previous years in which Megrahi and Fhimah had plotted the bombing in the open and he saw half of it himself.

Hendershot liked what he heard, and Giaka went straight to Washington, with his pregnant wife fetched from Malta soon after. He testified to a grand jury in October 1991, telling of the brown Samsonite case he’d seen the Libyans with on December 20, of the report he (Giaka) was asked to write about bombing a “British plane,” the TNT they kept in a desk at the airport…

As the indictments were sealed and put in place on November 14, the defector Giaka was re-settled somewhere under a new name and witness protection, and paid handsomely. Megrahi’s appeal documents reveal, from DCI Harry Bell's diary, January 8 1992: “Bhiel states DOJ (Department of Justice) will give Magid [Giaka] $2 million dollars. Advised of our concern." This seems to have been dispensed under a US DoJ “Rewards for Justice Program."

When the millionaire was presented as the star witness at Camp Zeist in 2000, it was an unprecedented event – the first time a CIA asset had testified in open court (his voice was disguised and he was hidden behind a screen). The judges were not told about the $2 million, but they did know of his CIA paychecks, other arrangements and efforts to secure money, and his relocation to America, which was clearly of immense value to the witness. They noted how Abdul Majid’s best stories about late 1988 only appeared in mid-1991, and learned along the way that the CIA themselves didn’t believe his information, and had tried to conceal that fact. Therefore, they explained, rather timidly:

“Information provided by a paid informer is always open to the criticism that it may be invented in order to justify payment, and in our view this is a case where such criticism is more than usually justified […] we are unable to accept Abdul Majid as a credible and reliable witness on any matter except his description of the organisation of the JSO and the personnel involved there.” [para 42, 43]

This is an embarrassing rebuke - the most crucial witness to the whole Libyan plot was found to be almost entirely a fraud. It was this loss that led to a total lack of Fhimah clues and the judges having to find the “accomplice” not guilty. And then there was the $2 million they didn’t even know about, as the Crown either didn’t know or didn’t pass it on. And Giaka wasn’t the only witness considered at Zeist who was given this princely sum and had the fact successfully concealed.

Tony (and Paul) Gauci
This now-famous refugee shopkeeper from Malta, clearly a man of simple intellect, was able to recall the exact sale (in different exact versions) of some odd clothes that were later “found at Lockerbie.” Anthony Gauci's original performance recalling the sale was convincing enough, and it seems likely, barring a very elaborate set-up, that he really did sell these clothes to some particular man, on November 23 1988, and they wound up in the bomb bag.

But Megrahi was not on the island that day, so the second-best fit of December 7 (a distant second) was chosen by investigators as what the man meant to describe. By “six feet or more in height,” he meant 5’8” like Megrahi. By around 50, he meant 36. By raining enough to warrant an umbrella, he meant no rain. Etc. But Gauci is touted as identifying a photo of Megrahi, on February 1991, as “similar” to the buyer but ”ten years” too young. Even Tony himself noted the obvious slant of the lineup in question. “The first impression I had was that all the photographs were of men younger than the man who bought the clothing.” With the police’s help, he picked the oldest one shown – Megrahi.

Payments to Mr. Gauci, and to his brother Paul, who assisted somehow behind the scenes, are covered in detail elsewhere, but Megrahi’s appeal documents note the earliest American mention of money is from September 28, 1989, just weeks after the brothers were first approached. “The FBI discussed with the Scottish Police an offer of unlimited money to Tony Gauci, with $10,000 being available immediately." It's not clear if any of this ever came through, but as Giaka was being put up for a reward in 1992, the Scottish police lobbied for Tony to get the same. "I also clarified with him about the Gauci reward and the response was only if he gave evidence."

Tony had his chance to give evidence in mid-2000 and he performed well, considering, fudging everything possible. Under 6 feet, under 60, I don't know, raining a little, not really, no, maybe. Mysteriously, the Judges bought it and Megrahi’s fate was sealed.

The day after the verdict, February 1 2001, the Scottish police started the application for the brothers’ rewards – they had realized specific arrangements couldn’t be discussed until after the judgment, had no explicit promises, had delivered well, and deserved their money now. Paul’s assistance upholding his brother’s “resolve” was noted - but so was his evident desire for money. For some reason they had to wait until the appeal was over as well, and only in April 2002 was “a meeting held with the US Department of Justice where the reward was discussed and supported by the FBI,” say the appeal papers. Further, a suggestion was made there “that the sums applied for - $2m for Tony Gauci and $1m for Paul Gauci - could be increased."

The Scottish review board found all this, and that at some time after the appeal (date redacted) the two were paid some amount under the US DoJ "Rewards for Justice" program. And that is why the appeal they authorized had to be killed.

Edwin Bollier
The third witness is a Swiss electronics merchant, supposed supplier to Libyan JSO of the only 20 MST-13 timers ever made. When an implausibly large chunk of one was “found at Lockerbie” and identified in mid-1990, Bollier’s 18-month-old campaign to sell evidence to the CIA paid off. Much of what he said before and during the trial was dismissed as an obvious bunch of rubbish, but the 1991 indictments did feature his info for points (a), (b), and (j).

Bollier is quite different from the other two “important witnesses.” First, he has not disappeared as a protected witness and made silent. Quite the contrary; He has continued to claim a leading role in the fight to clear Megrahi (comments as "ebol"), and claimed in a 2008 interview that this is to secure a $200 million prize from Libya. [Video, 41:10]. Mr. Bollier reminds me (see comments below) the BBC cut out Q: "Will Libya pay you for your work in the Lockerbie case?" A: "No, if we win the case and the compensation for the victims (US$ 2.7 billion) is refunded I will get a success honorary of US$ 200 million." If the victims pay Libya back, Bollier says he gets almost 8%. To this end, he uses illogical or unsupported claims and exclamation marks, and hasn’t even bothered learning to write in English for a campaign this ambitious.

And unlike Giaka and Gauci, there is no evidence I’m aware of that Bollier was ever paid by investigators for his own evidentiary offerings. He does claim a measly 1% of Libya’s later offering, $2 million - was offered to him in January 1991 by a FBI legal attaché in Switzerland named Fanning. This sounds entirely plausible, actually. But in the same interview linked above [33:35], he says FBI chief Richard Marquise personally doubled the offer just a couple weeks later, “up to $4 million and a new identity” merely to say that this fragment was from a Libyan timer. But they already knew this, and he says he refused anyway (Marquise firmly denies this offer).

Bollier’s oddball account isn’t to be trusted, and he hasn’t been. But he’s served a useful role since the conviction, as a lightning rod to safely channel revisionist thought down blind alleys. Someone really should pay him if they haven't yet.

A Tentative Tally
So far it appears the Scots-CIA-FBI Lockerbie witness pipeline brought in all three “important" but unreliable witnesses against Megrahi. The DoJ payout was at least $5 million to Giaka and the Gaucis plus possible money to Bollier that we just don’t know of. There would be administration, manpower, paid dinners, car rentals and air travel, and assorted overhead for arranging all this, some under FBI, others under CIA or Scottish police. All told, we’re dealing with at least $8 million for just this aspect of what seems like an intelligence operation masquerading as a criminal investigation. The whole case was bigger than this but no squarer, and the other, wider costs of the resulting miscarriage of justice will defy all efforts at calculation.

Richard Marquise Disputes the Findings of the Zeist Court

18 October 2010
edits 20 October

Special Agent Richard Marqise was the FBI's chief investigator on the Pan Am 103 (SCOTBOM) case during its formative turn (following the evidence, of course) to focus on Libya. He's also the author of SCOTBOM: Evidence and the Lockerbie investigation (2006), frequent giver of video interviews, and infrequent internet commentator.

He emerged recently for a short post at Professor Black's blog (The Lockerbie Case) refering to an article about "star witness" Abdul Majid Giaka. Giaka is of course the Libyan defector who fed a whole lot of specific information against Megrahi and his "accomplice" Fhimah. His stories were central to the 1991 indictments, but were famously dismissed, and rightly so, by the judges at Camp Zeist for being unrealiable in a number of ways.

I wouldn't have been so surprised to see Mr. Marquise comment on the article, if I'd realized his book from six years after Zeist dedicates at least five chapters to the subject ("Lockerbie and Giaka," "TNT and a Brown Suitcase" "Mrs. Giaka," "the CIA cables," ""Star" witness"). Much of this in unreadable in the limited Google books preview, and for a couple reasons would rather not buy a copy. So do note I didn't know that yesterday while commenting (as Caustic Logic) in response to Mr. Marquise, who appears in comments 2 and 19. The many responses were brilliant and informative and all 30 so far, spanning a couple days with me only catching it at the end, are reproduced below (slightest edits only).

I take his point that constantly saying "star witness" and saying it in quotes is not the best practice. I will take that to heart, but otherwise, his performance is depressing. There really is no spark of sanity left in the bankrupt and unseaworthy position he's chained himself and so many others to.
---
1 - Rolfe said...
This article raises an interesting question. Giaka was the star witness, on which the entire case was founded. Without his evidence, they would never even have got the indictment. The rest of the evidence was way too circumstantial to support anything - Tony Gauci's "identification" of Megrahi as the purchaser was fraught with uncertainty, and the evidence that the bomb travelled on KM180 thin to the point of insubstantiality. So, once Giaka's evidence was dismissed, why did the judges convict?

I liken this to model-building. The investigtors laid out the pieces of actual evidence (Gauci's evidence, the Erac printout, Megrahi's presence at Luqa as "Abdusamad", plus more circumstantial matters such as the timer fragment and the radio model) in a particular pattern that implicated Megrahi in the bombing. However, these pieces of evidence wouldn't hold together to form a substantial construct.

So they brought in Giaka, as we all know, and threatened/bribed him to "remember" stuff that would provide a solid framework for that construct of the evidence. If Megrahi and Fhimah were seen on Malta that morning (or the previous day, whatever) with the bomb suitcase, then everything held together. That strengthened Gauci's tentative "looks a bit like but too young" identification into "probably him, really", and turned B8849 into yes, that will be the bomb on its way from KM180. If Giaka's evidence had been true, these inferences would have been legitimate.

The problem was that everybody had got so used to loking at the evdence laid out in that pattern, that when the framework that supported it was taken away, they allowed the pattern to remain - even though by all logic it should have collapsed in a heap. The defence's alternative pattern, that of Megrahi and Fhimah getting on with whatever they were doing at Malta that day quite independently, the clothes buyer being someone else unidentified, and B8849 being a simple coding anomaly - while 1,000 miles away at Heathrow airport a completely different terrorist was sneaking an extra suitcase or two into AVE4041, was too unfamiliar to gain acceptance.

It's a bit like the cricket story of the batsman being clean-bowled with the ball taking out the centre stump - but the bails don't fall because the hot sun has melted the varnish and stuck them together.

2 - Richard Marquise said...
Once again, The Firm has played loose with the facts using Mr. MacKechnie as the source. I would like to know who--that is normally a person--"not intelligence agencies" informed the Crown that Giaka was a "star witness." That term was unfortunately coined by some less that brilliant UK reporter during the course of the trial. No intelligence agencies were involved in the "debrief/interview" of Giaka and no one of those who did ever said he was a witness to the loading of the bomb suitcase. The facts were the facts--not speculation--- and Mr. Mackechnie knew this because I was with him when he was able to interview Mr. Giaka in America--long before the trial. This would not be the first time Mr. Mackechnie distorted the facts. His description of his ride to see and then interview Giaka which was reported in the UK media before trial was at odds in a big way with the facts of what really happened.

Those who believe that somehow American intelligence agencies were somehow involved with the outcome of the trial have no clue either.

I realize it is a losing battle to try and convince those of you who blog on this site of the truth, but at least be sure you report information which is correct and factual.

3 - Matt Berkley said...
Is this correct and factual?

"The charges are based on evidence that directly and conclusively links Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi...and Lamin Fhimah...and other unidentified co-conspirators to the suitcase containing the bomb and to its insertion into the baggage system leading to Pan Am flight 103."
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher
1:05 PM, Washington, DC
Nov 14, 1991

Secondly, was the description "filing details" given by the CIA to censored passages relating to Mr Giaka, purely for the eyes of the defence and the judges, accurate?

Thirdly, was that not contempt of court?

4 - Jo G said...
Mr Marquise, for you to dare utter the sentence "played loose with the facts" would be hilarious if this case was anything remotely close to a laughing matter. The facts already in the public domain establish, BEYOND ALL REASONABLE DOUBT, that the conviction of Megrahi was deeply unsafe. Furthermore the part the US government played in bribing witnesses all over this case screams how unsafe it was and what a complete set up it was. I recently saw you on a UK TV programme trying to avoid admitting that yes indeed Gauci was paid! Incidentally it was TWO MILLION DOLLARS the US paid him.

And finally, if you are so sure of your case you surely can have no objection whatsoever when the time comes and that appeal can be resurrected and heard - as it should have been three years ago long before your country threw a massive wobbler because a Scottish Government dared to release the man the US framed.

5 - Jo G said...
Oh and Mr Marquise, I doubt you would recognise the truth if it walked up to you and introduced itself.

6 - Matt Berkley said...
If Mr Marquise thinks the judges said things which were beyond reason, why did he trust their verdict?

http://archive.maltatoday.com.mt/2009/08/26/t9.html
Marquise: "a senior Libyan official asked a Libyan Arab Airline (LAA) employee about the feasibility of getting a “bag” onto an American or British flight leaving Malta."
Judges: "we are quite unable to accept this story"....

Marquise: "Evidence was elicited that the Station manager of LAA in Malta kept explosives in his desk..."
Judges: "we are unable to place any reliance on this account"

Marquise: "This board was traced to timers, only 20 of which were ever made. All had been given to Libyan officials."
Judges: "the two prototypes were delivered by Mr Bollier to the Stasi..."...

Marquise: "He was described as carrying a “brown suitcase” similar to that which blew up Pan Am Flight 103..."
Judges: "We are ... quite unable to accept the veracity of this belated account"

7 - Jo G said...
Sorry. That line posted itself before the rest followed.

My point about the truth is that a person can read the trial transcripts and see, repeatedly, decisions being made by judges which fly in the face of the evidence presented.

Gauci did not ever positively identify Megrahi.

Gaika's evidence was rejected utterly by the judges. (Gaika who had implicated Megrahi and his co-accused)

Air Malta proved an unaccompanied suitcase did NOT travel from Luqa.

Even those working for the Lord Advocate seemed desperate to get a conviction when they went so far to keep from the defence - and from the judges - the contents of those cables exchanged between the prosecution and the US authorities where Gaika's contribution was basically trashed.

And since the verdict....

We had a report issued by the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission raising SIX grounds to suspect a miscarriage of justice could have taken place.

We had the UK government falling over itself to ensure certain info was withheld from Megrahi's appeal. One lot of evidence involved the break-in at Heathrow. We had other evidence, to do with the timer, withheld using Data Protection law. And of course we had the bribing of Gauci with two million US dollars, something that would not have been permitted in any Scottish court of law ever! We had the date Megrahi is alleged to have visited the shop and the fact that the weather doesn't fit in with the story.

In short we have a complete shambles of a case Mr Marquise. And can I remind you that on the basis of that evidence the US would have executed Megrahi had it been given half a chance! And you talk about truth?

8 - bensix said...
Mr Marquise chides readers of this blog for using information which is less than factual. Might we return the favour? As Matt Berkley points out he's used "evidence" which had long been dismissed by the Court. In another piece, for the Times, he relied on the statements of Tony Gauci, long after the SSCRC dispatched them. He also asserted that Libya "accept[s] "responsibility"", despite appearing months before on a programme where Saif Gaddafi claimed that it had been "just wordplay". Ex-FBI Special Agent, investigate thyself?

9 - Rolfe said...
I made a post last night that has vanished this morning, but by the greatest of good luck it was still on my clipboard from my "insurance" copy. I'll re-post it in two parts, because length seems to be what's causing the disappearing acts.
_________________________

I realise this is just another of Mr. Marquise's hit-and-run posts filled with inaccuracies and sidestepping the real issues, which will lie there undefended. But still.

Once again, The Firm has played loose with the facts using Mr. MacKechnie as the source. I would like to know who--that is normally a person--"not intelligence agencies" informed the Crown that Giaka was a "star witness." That term was unfortunately coined by some less that brilliant UK reporter during the course of the trial.

"Star witness" seems an appropriate enough term for Giaka, irrespective of who coined it. I've heard "supergrass" as well. Objecting to perfectly reasonable terminology on spurious grounds is always a useful smokescreen though.

No intelligence agencies were involved in the "debrief/interview" of Giaka

Do you take us for complete idiots?

and no one of those who did ever said he was a witness to the loading of the bomb suitcase.

And The Firm didn't say he was. Nor did I, in my first post on this thread. He placed Megrahi and Fhimah at the centre of events by placing them on Malta with a suitcase of the correct description, at the appropriate time. That is the point being made. Evasion and lies about claims that "he was a witness to the loading of the bomb suitcase" noted.

10 - Rolfe said...

The facts were the facts--not speculation--- and Mr. Mackechnie knew this because I was with him when he was able to interview Mr. Giaka in America--long before the trial. This would not be the first time Mr. Mackechnie distorted the facts. His description of his ride to see and then interview Giaka which was reported in the UK media before trial was at odds in a big way with the facts of what really happened.

When it comes to distorting the facts, I have to go with what I see in front of my eyes. And what I see is Richard Marquise both in person on TV and in blog comments like this, distorting in a manner that would put the Hall of Magic Mirrors to shame.

The FACTS about Giaka's evidence and how it was obtained and why it was dismissed by the judges are available to anyone who can read the Zeist transcripts. It's a shameful catalogue of bribery and threats to elicit evidence implicating Megrahi and Fhimah, to order.

Those who believe that somehow American intelligence agencies were somehow involved with the outcome of the trial have no clue either.

You're probably right, at that. No clue as to just how deep these claws of deception and control really dig. Come on, we can read Hans Kochler's report too. Was he hallucinating the US DoJ officials constantly directing the prosecution team?

I realize it is a losing battle to try and convince those of you who blog on this site of the truth, but at least be sure you report information which is correct and factual.

You mean, don't take your example? Have you any response to what Matt posted above, showing all the incorrect, non-factual pronouncements you've been making recently?

If you want to convince us of anything, you could start by telling us what evidence you rely on to support your belief that Megrahi was involved in the bombing. Giaka was lying, we know that. Tony Gauci didn't sell these clothes to Megrahi, by any reading of his evidence. Tray B8849 at Frankfurt could easily have been a coding anomaly, and the strength of the evidence from Malta (which you couldn't dent) proves it to be such.

There's no evidence at all that the bomb travelled on KM180 (bloody stupid plot if ever there was one), and no evidence that Megrahi had anything to do with it.

And that is the correct, factual information.

12 - tomcyrus said...
With what is known about how the FBI works and conducts itself, especially regarding international issues, should it be added to the UK's list of terorrist groups?.

13 - ebol said...
MISSION LOCKERBIE:

FBI Special Agent Richard A. Maquise led the U.S. Task Force which included the FBI, Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency CIA, managed all aspects of the investigation on the PanAm 103 attack.
With the untruthful claims in his "Log Book" (Lies Book) Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation, it wants to cover up the true facts and the fatal investigations errors of FBI, Scottish- and Swiss police...

Giaka, Abdul Majid Giaka, was the fundamental crucial witness, number 684, together with rouge CIA agents, in the "Lockerbie case" against Libya's Leader Moammar Gaddafi. Its criminal work started with a story claimed that there had been a complaint of sexual harassment with a Egyptian woman against Lamen Fhimah...

+++
Excerpt of court in Kamp van Zeist:

Q And that was in case you got into trouble because of the incident involving the Egyptian lady at the airport, wasn't it, Mr. Giaka?

A When I asked her to get in touch with the embassy, I didn't know what the incident was, and I didn't know why -- what was in the telegram. I hadn't seen the telegram. All I knew was that Fhimah and myself were being called back to Tripoli. We were supposed to go back on the same day. And this was scary...

Q The lady at the airport who acted as interpreter agreed to help you?

A Yes.

Q And I take it that you were grateful to her for the help that she was prepared to give you in these circumstances? A Yes.

Q And you explained to her the high-minded principles that were driving you to go to the Central Intelligence Agency, didn't you, Mr. Giaka?

A I don't remember exactly. I can't say.

Q You see, I was wondering, Mr. Giaka, why did you go to so much trouble to hide from her the fact that you were taking money from the Central Intelligence Agency? Can you explain that? 

A Try to avoid what?

Q You tried to hide from her the fact that you were taking money from the Central Intelligence Agency, didn't you, Mr. Giaka?

A I didn't hide anything from her. We didn't talk about this subject.

Q You are a liar, Mr. Giaka.

A I do not lie. I AM NOT LYING ABOUT THIS !!!

+++
continuation down >>>

14 - ebol said...
continuation MISSION LOCKERBIE >>>

Giaka went to see the CIA for the first time on 10th August 1988. The dirty business between Giaka and CIA against Libya was started...

Abdul Majid Giaka was interviewed by officers of the CIA, which is the Criminal Intelligence Agency of the United States of America over a period of months from the 10th of August of 1988 to the 31st of August of 1989. And productions numbers 104 -- 804 to 828 are a total of 25 cables which were sent by operatives of that intelligence organisation from Malta to their masters in the United States informing the U.S. Intelligence community of information handed over by the man Giaka.

A undisclosed cables to CIA which is cable number 32, is dated the 21st of December 1990, and relating to a meeting with Giaka on the 20th of December at 1990 in Malta. On paragraph 6. are the notes:

At the end of an hour-long meeting, Giaka asked if he was still receiving his salary. The case officer responded negative, but because of his willingness to recontact during this trip to Malta, he gave him 200 Maltese money, which is estimated as $700 U.S.

Giaka wondered aloud if it would be possible for him to obtain $2,000 U.S. to purchase bananas in Malta for his return to Libya where they sell at three or four times the Maltese price. The case officer again replied negative, since Washington is unsure of Giaka's sincerity in assisting against terrorism. They would not approve such money without more detailed information.

The case officer added, though, that he would raise the issue with the proper authorities, who might recompense him if he would be willing to be completely debriefed.

Giaka was becoming desperate as he searches for his role in life in his post-ESO world. And he is certainly milking all of his contacts and was construct lie-storys during this transition period with CIA.
The full Story: Why CIA have needed Giaka's lie information, publishes soon.

by Edwin and Mahnaz Bollier, MEBO Ltd. Switzerland
our webpage: www.lockerbie.ch

15 - Jo G said...
Only dropped in to see if he'd been back yet. I see he hasn't. Hmmm.

16 - Rolfe said...
He replied to me once. I considered myself privileged.

The question I asked then was the same as the question I asked this time. Please give us a short outline of the evidence on which you base your assertion that the right man was convicted.

Unfortunately all he said was that the judges brought in a guilty verdict and that was enough for him.

That was one of my major "no, they really don't have anything, do they" moments.

17 - bensix said...
Unfortunately all he said was that the judges brought in a guilty verdict and that was enough for him.

Pretty low considering he ignores them elsewhere!

18 - FullInquiry said...
Vincent Cannistraro, former CIA Head of Counter Terrorism, said the following long before the Trial:

"Oh! I think the evidence available to the Department of Justice in their case, which they’re keeping under wraps, is overwhelming, it’s conclusive. I think it is mid boggling in the amount of detail that they have. They have also….they have a live witness for one thing, who would be presented in a court of law. I think there is a tremendous amount of evidence that will allow the prosecutors to present the chronology of the operation from its very inception, and that chronology would start even before Malta and then… you know…describe and in almost excruciating detail exactly how they made the bomb, how they secreted it, how they got it on board the aircraft, and I think that’s a fairly strong case".

I can only assume, based on Richard Marquise's comments above, that Vinny had no clue either - certainly no witness at the Trial ever explained in any detail how the accused made the bomb and got it on board the Air Malta flight let alone doing so in "excruciating detail" or in a "mindboggling" manner.

The only thing that boggles the mind in this case is how anyone could conclude the accused is guilty based on such flimsy evidence.

But such statments by Vinny and others like him definitely had an affect on public opinion, and therefore on the Trial, its outcome, and public acceptance of the verdict against Megrahi.

As such, CIA actions did in fact have an effect on the outcome of the trial, which clearly shows Marquise is himself, clueless or simply and conveniently ignoring the facts.

When a head investigator gives the appearance of ignoring facts (which also include payoffs to witnesses) his credibility automatically goes down the tube.

As a result, Mr. Marquise has little more credibility than his Star Witness Giaka.

I wonder if and when he got to see the redacted portions of the Giaka cables? Surely Vinny had access to all the cables in their unredacted form but still held Giaka out to be a key witness.

What about Edwin Bollier's claim that Marquise offered him money for his testimony that MST-13's were sold only to Libya? Will Marquese address that? Who is one to believe? Marquise or Bollier? What a choice!

Please do enlighten us Mr. Marquise and back up your claims in a credible manner.

19 - Richard Marquise said...
Quite a few more misstatements here. Cannistraro was never head of the CIA CT Center--he was deputy and retired before the EVIDENCE led to Libya. As a result he was not involved in any aspect of Giaka or his statements. Anything he ever said was based on his opinion alone-- not on information he may have had access to from the investigation.

I have --many times addressed the issue of payments to witnesses--none--none--including Bollier--ever requested, or were offered or paid any money in exchange for them to tell investigators what we wanted to hear. It is my belief that all the witnesses told what they believed to be the truth at trial (except for one--not Giaka) and what they said was consistent with what they had always said. I realize I am a loner on this site with regard to Giaka but unlike all here--I am the only one who had the opportunity to speak with him and examine all his statements (I did not do original interview of him).

With regard to Giaka and the CIA file mess, I covered this quite explicitly in my book in Chapter 34. I had not seen them prior to the trial nor did I know they existed--I spoke about second guessing myself in this regard.

I would also imagine most on this site spent little (any) time at the trial and probably have read neither the trial transcripts nor my book so it is easy to criticize what you think rather than what you know. I know what the intelligence agencies contributed --early and late---I also know the role they played at trial--it was only to assist with accessing all the info contained in the cables--not influencing the outcome of the trial.

We know what we did-- the facts were obtained in a righteous manner and in accodance with the laws of the US and Scotland. They were presented to an impartial panel of judges and the facts were weighed by them and they reached their decison.

I remain amazed that so many seemingly intelligent people would continue to support someone who claimed to not be a member of Libyan intelligence, "believe me, I was here in Tripoli with my family (12/20-21)," and I never heard of MEBO or Abdusamad.... As we now know the facts are somewhat different. Mind boggling.

20 - Rolfe said...
Oh dear. Anyone who lies to a jourmalist must be guilty of mass murder, is that it?

Frankly, under the circumstances, I'm not at all surprised Megrahi went into "deny everything" mode when confronted by Salinger. Even if he wasn't under instructions from on high to do exactly that, which he might well have been.

And yes, I've read the trial transcripts (want a pdf of the whole thing, single-spaced? - ask me nicely), and as much of your book as Google Books will let me read for free since I'm certainly not paying out any money that might go into your pocket, that's for sure.

If you can seriously maintain that Giaka was telling the truth, I'm not quite sure what you're smoking, but can I have some?

21 - Rolfe said...
And another thing.

I have --many times addressed the issue of payments to witnesses--none--none--including Bollier--ever requested, or were offered or paid any money in exchange for them to tell investigators what we wanted to hear.

You've many times addressed the matter of payments to witnesses. You use different wording every time. It used to be that nobody was paid any money. Then nobody was paid any money before the trial. Then nobody was promised any money before the trial. Then nobody asked for any money.

The more information emerged, the more these various versions fell over like dominoes. Now, we've got a new one. Nobody was paid "to tell investigators what we wanted to hear."

That's neat. Because it's completely unverifiable. How can anyone know whether or how any witness altered their testimony with an eye to the main chance, once they realised there was money on offer?

A reward for a good lead to a perpetrator whose guilt can be proven by independent means is one thing - usually offered to criminals to grass on their mates of course. But paying out millions to witnesses who were independently identified by police investigation, simply to relate the details of a particular incident as well as they could remember it? This is some idea of due process you have in America, I must say. Round here, you might get your bus fare to the court, if you fill in the right forms in triplicate.

Did you make Bogomira Erac a rich woman? She at least came forward independently with her evidence.

22 - Jo G said...
Mr Marquise. Simple question. HOW MUCH DID THE US PAY TO GAUCI? ANSWER PLEASE.

You did not answer the question in the STV documentary about Lockerbie. Please answer now. I've helped you. Scroll back. I gave you the amount your government paid him!

23 - Jo G said...
TWO MILLION DOLLARS!

24 - Rolfe said...

Cannistraro was never head of the CIA CT Center--he was deputy and retired before the EVIDENCE led to Libya.

Yes, some of us know that. Vinnie was high up in the investigation at the start. For example, a week into it, when Reagan went off on one against Libya on absolutely no evidence at all, no? A month into it, when our mutual friend Edwin was writing strange letters on Spanish typewriters accusing Libyans?

Perhaps not. Quite irrelevant, no doubt.

But he was right in there during the summer of 1989, when the bits of "evidence" that eventually seemed to point to Libya were mysteriously appearing in the chain of custody, with some very peculiar provenance. Wasn't he?

He was just out of it by the time these things went live a year later, and the general public saw the shift to Libya. Which was based on "evidence" that had appeared in mid-1989.

Some people might find that awfully interesting, you know. I couldn't possibly comment of course.

25 - Rolfe said...

TWO MILLION DOLLARS!

Be fair, Jo. The notes said they couldn't be sure exactly how much either of the brothers had been paid. They said it might actually have been more than the $3 million between them that was the estimated (or promised?) figure.

Nice work if you can get it.

I still think it would have been awfully unfair if they didn't give Bogomira anything at all, after making the Gaucis rich like that. She even volunteered her evidence, and it was just as important (and just as completely non-incriminating, though that's another story) as Tony Gauci's.

26 - bensix said...

...what they said was consistent with what they had always said...

Richard, if that were the case the Christmas lights were both off and on; Megrahi was both too young and a lot like the customer.

Still, an intelligence agent was a bit dishonest? Well, that clinches it. A startling anomaly like that is hard to justi --- kidding.

27 - Caustic Logic said...
Richard Marquise:

... at least be sure you report information which is correct and factual.

LOL. Isn't the whole dodged point here the FBI's acceptance and promotion of an obvious fabricator of convenient evidence?

Nitpick about quoting "star witness," we never said that. Not in so many words, perhaps not. But you have even til recently cited Giaka's bogus evidence as supporting Megrahi's guilt. He was clearly the centerpiece of the grand jury hearings, was cited by Cannistraro in whatever capacity as
- scratch it, full inquiry beat me to it.

That's equivalent of star witness to me, semantics aside. And he was a major liar, telling you guys what you wanted to hear, wasn't he, sir? You needn't admit to knowing that at the time, but isn't it evident by now?

28 - Caustic Logic said...

It is my belief that all the witnesses told what they believed to be the truth at trial (except for one--not Giaka)

That's it. So you do feel, to this very day, that Abdul Majid Giaka was telling the truth, and nothing but, as he saw it? Do you realize how stupid that sounds? You're going against the Zeist judges for what reason other than a vested one?

On the rewards:

none--none--including Bollier--ever requested, or were offered or paid any money in exchange for them to tell investigators what we wanted to hear.

By the doubling of none, I'll take that as the strong and unassailable part of your statement. What seems in disppute is your understanding of the words "requested," "offered," "paid," and especially "in exchange for them to tell investigators what we wanted to hear."

All: Can we agree that everything but "not" are the potential fudge words in this semantics-based denial?

Extract from DCI Bell Diary (HOLMES version) (28/9/1989) [SCCRC Appendix: chapter 23/3] which indicates that on 28th September 1989 the FBI discussed with the Scottish Police an offer of unlimited money to Tony Gauci, with $10,000 being available immediately. Thereafter there is a comment about challenging Murray as to what he thought Gauci could give in return that he was not already giving.

Where does that fit in to such a denial?

Memo from DCI Bell to DSIO Gilchrist (21/2/91) [SCCRC Appendix: chapter 23/1] which states that Tony Gauci had expressed an interest in receiving money in recent meetings and that "if a monetary offer was made to Gauci this may well change his view and allow him to consider a witness protection programme as a serious avenue"

We can see here the attempt to backpedal and convince the brothers they won't be paid, except maybe, if Tony talks right and there's a conviction. It did seem an unlikely prospect until it happened, didn't it?

Strathclyde Police Witness Protection Report of June 10, 1999:

(a) the frustration of Tony Gauci that he will not be compensated

(b) that in respect of Paul Gauci "It is apparent from speaking to him for any length of time that he has a clear desire to gain financial benefit from the position he and his brother are in relative to the case. As a consequence he exaggerates his own importance as a witness and clearly inflates the fears he and his brother have. He is anxious to establish what advantage he can gain from the Scottish police. Although demanding, Paul Gauci remains an asset to the case but will continue to explore any means he can to identify where financial advantage can be gained.

(c) that the Gauci family had financial problems

Where is the clarity in that? Where is Stuart Henderson's "he was well aware that there was no such thing as a reward being handed to him ... Didn't enter his head."

No response needed or expected.

29 - FullInquiry said...
I appreciate Mr. Marquise commenting on my post. Perhaps he will address the following?

Michael Scharf, who is said to have been legal counsel the the US counter-terrorism bureau at the time of 0the idictment was quoted in an article by Liam McDougal published in the Sunday Herald, November 12, 2006. Some excerts of the article are:

Michael Scharf, who was the counsel to the US counter-terrorism bureau when the two Libyans were indicted for the bombing, described the case as “so full of holes it was like Swiss cheese” and said it should never have gone to trial".

He claimed the CIA and FBI had assured State Department officials there was an “iron-clad” case against Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and al-Amin Khalifa Fimah, but that in reality the intelligence agencies had no confidence in their star witness and knew well in advance of the trial that he was “a liar.”

Scharf branded the case a “whitewash” and added: “It was a trial where everybody agreed ahead of time that they were just going to focus on these two guys, and they were the fall guys.”

It was largely based on this inside guy [Libyan defector Abdul Majid Giaka]. It wasn’t until the trial that I learned this guy was a nut-job and that the CIA had absolutely no confidence in him and that they knew he was a liar.

Mr. Marquise posted above he did not know about the existence of the Giaka CIA cables until the Trial. Apparently Michael Scharf was similarly unaware.

So one can reasonably conclude that the CIA withheld the Giaka cables from virtually everyone involved in the investigation until the Trial (and hoped the redacted sections never had to be revealed).

Questions for Mr.Marquise:

1. Who exactly is the person you feel lied in their testimony at the trial?

2. Do you believe that the investigation was misled by the CIA, either diliberately or by way of them withholding the contents of the Giaka cables?

3. How important is the credibility of Giaka?

My personal opinion is that if an "intellegence" agency like the CIA is involved in a criminal investigation, any outcome of such investigation becomes highly suspect by way of the very nature of what intellegence agencies do. This is particularly true if the FBI or any of the prosecuting authorities actually felt the CIA was a trustworthy source.

In any event Michael Scharf and the Trial Judges clearly have a different take on Giaka than Mr. Marquise does. I can only conclude that Mr. Marquise was rather gullible if he believed anything Giaka had to say.

Believing Giaka is a long way from following the "EVIDENCE" in my book.

Like Rolfe, I will try to find Chapter 34 if I can do so without paying Mr. Marquise for it.

Beyond having a basic belief in the need for justice and the belief that the full and real truth has yet to emerge in this matter, I have a huge personal problem with the fact that Giaka was a key factor in the UN Sanctions being imposed on Libya. Such sanctions were imposed largely on the basis of what a known liar told a Grand Jury in private. One can only conclude the CIA wanted such sanctions imposed and was willing to withhold key facts to accomplish that end and that the Grand Jury did not have access to the Giaka cables either. The UN Security Council certainly was never informed of all the evidence.

30 - FullInquiry said...
Oh and in addition Mr. Marquise:

I did follow this matter long before the trial, followed the trial, read all the transcripts from the trial daily that I could obtain, and most importanty I READ THE TRIAL JUDGEMENT, WHICH DID NOT MAKE SENSE AND BASED ON WHICH NO REASONABLE PERSON COULD CONVICT MEGRAHI, at least in my reasonably-informed opinion.

And I lived the effects of the Sanctions and still do. I'm no armchair second-guesser. People like you that were involved in the investigation and played a part are accountable in my book. You had and still have a duty to at least acknowledge where the investigation was misled or could have made mistakes.

My concerns are that you were (and still are) more concerned with obtaining a conviction than with seeking the truth or justice and are a patriot. But I guess that is what your job was and what you were paid to do. That doesn't make the outcome the proper one even if you did follow the laws of the US, Scotland, or Timbuktu.