Abdusamad on Malta

"The Biggest Lie" They Could Find
8 November 2010
last edits 14 Nov

It's no longer a secret that "Lockerbie bomber" Abdelbaset Ali al Megrahi was on the island nation of Malta on 20 and 21 December, 1988. But his passing through Luqa airport there on the morning of the bombing of Pan Am 103 was a secret at the time, since he was traveling under a false identity created by the Libyan government - Ahmed Khlaifa Abdusamad. (see passport below).

We can thus presume that Megrahi was on a secret mission of some sort, on behalf of Tripoli, and likely something illegal. No one can be certain just what his mission was, and there's been to this day no satisfactory explanation from the Libyan side.

It's not sure just who first learned that Abdusamad and Megrahi were the same person, nor when this happened. But if it was found out early enough, and by the CIA, it could well have been the deciding factor to drag the Libyan into the spotlight of suspicion, his hated nation training behind.

In their 2001 Opinion of the Court accompanying Megrahi's conviction, the Zeist judges explain the false identity's origin and early use:

On 15 June 1987 the first accused was issued with a passport with an expiry date of 14 June 1991 by the Libyan passport authority at the request of the ESO who supplied the details to be included. The name on the passport was Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad. Such a passport was known as a coded passport.  There was no evidence as to why this passport was issued to him. It was used by the first accused on a visit to Nigeria in August 1987, returning to Tripoli via Zurich and Malta, travelling at least between Zurich and Tripoli on the same flights as Nassr Ashur who was also travelling on a coded passport. It was also used during 1987 for visits to Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and Cyprus.  [paragraph 87]

The earlier indictments of Megrahi and Fhimah, issued November 1991, gave different uses of the identity. On 22 August, 1987, "Abdusamad" flew from Zurich to Malta, stayed at the Holiday Inn there, and returned to Tripoli the next day. This trip was made "along with the said Nassr Ashur, who was then using a passport in the false name and using the false identity of Nassr Ahmed Salem." [points (e) (m)]

And then after a long break, he went out as Abdusamad only once in 1988 - on 20 December, when he flew with Fhimah from Tripoli to Malta, and again the next morning for the return trip, this time with Mohammed Abouagela Masud. [point (p)] The Zesit judges agreed that "the only use of this passport in 1988 was for an overnight visit to Malta on 20/21 December, and it was never used again." [para 87]

A supposedly key piece of evidence for Megrahi's guilt occurred only some days after the 14 November public announcement of the indictments. In a November 1991 interview with Pierre Salinger (I can't pin down the date), Megrahi denied being Abdusamad or being on Malta the day of the bombing. This was presented, for one, in the recent STV documentary Lockerbie Bomber: Sent Home To Die [23:18]

"You accuse me falsely. ... On 20 December and 21, at that time I wasn't there. Believe me, I was here in Tripoli with my family."

The editors had FBI lead investigator Richard Marquise follow the clip by saying "I realize that being a liar doesn't make you a terrorist murderer. But I think, again, it adds credibility to all the other factors that we led up to at that point." And Marquise is quick to offer up this lie, as one of his two or three points, nearly every chance he gets. This repeat play is itself a sign that he knows "all the other factors" need all the help they can get. At least once, he's called this "the biggest lie" the Libyan had told.

Megrahi denied being a member of the Libyan Intelligence Service; he did not know Abdusamad; and he did not know MEBO. All were proven at trial to be lies. However, his biggest lie was his claim that on December 20-21 he had not been in Malta: "I was here in Tripoli with my family believe me." Why should anyone believe any of his claims today after his lies in 1991? [source]

This early repudiation has been a verbal rope used by Marquise and many others, time and again over the years, to tie Megrahi to the bombing. In retrospect, he should probably have come clean as much as possible, but bare days after the shocking announcement, and revelation of his secret presence, that didn't happen. It seems cover-up won, at least for a moment. Perhaps it was reflexive on Megrahi's part, not grasping the reality of the charges against him, or a firm order from callous superiors despite Megrahi's own pleas. Either way, it was an unfortunate move on the part of the accused to say these words to a watching world, and one of the few things he actually did that contributed to his conviction.

The Zeist judges, considering in 2000 and 2001, referred to the 1991 interview in lieu of live testimony, which both accused declined to offer (they felt it was wiser to let the lawyers do the talking henceforth). Referring to the crucial visit, the judges mused:

It is possible to infer that this visit under a false name ... was a visit connected with the planting of the [explosive] device. Had there been any innocent explanation for this visit, obviously this inference could not be drawn. The only explanation that appeared in the evidence was contained in his interview with Mr Salinger, when he denied visiting Malta at that time and denied using the name Abdusamad or having had a passport in that name. Again, we do not accept his denial. [paragraph 88]

He was of course no longer denying his presence at the time, his representatives having surrendered to the Crown the passport with his photo and stamped 20 December, Malta. But Megrahi's, his counsel's, and his government's continued silence over this mission, presumably not bombing-related, allowed this inference that it was bombing-related to be possible (or does simple imagination do that? See comments below).

Besides pretending to genius status for rejecting a moot denial made to someone else a decade ago, the judges managed to bolster it with the other weak points to collectively sort-of-justify saying "guilty." An act of imagination, and otherwise it was down to the evidence that he actually was planning a bombing at the time.

And it's this class of clues, as Mr. Marquise likely knows, that needs some help. He called on the same imaginative reading of "Abdusamad" as support for the evidentiary case. But in reality there's much to suggest the oppposite - the hard evidence may have been planted and bribed into being in order to support the fabricated case against that suspicious-looking Megrahi and his false passport.

The "Elimination" of the Bedford Suitcase(s)

(almost complete article in progress)

Note: Having a look now at David Leppard's book, I've decided to split the old post into two new ones, joined here. The first comments below reflect the previous version. This post will discuss both tracks, an official report and a dramatic blowing-up of things by political scientists, in general terms, how they relate in altering the course of the investigation. The switch was from an obvious and useful lead that neither the Americans nor Brits wanted to follow. And it was to a confusing muck in which a new plot could eventually be "discovered" and followed.

Also, here I'll address the decidedly non-scietific aspect in how this valid forensics work was twisted to insist something it simply couldn't do - "the bomb bag had to have come from Frankfurt and before that... we'll think of something. Just give us some time, okay?"

Shuffling Aside Bedford's Baggage
Not a whisker of the Libyan guilt storyline could have emerged if not for a key decision made early on about where the bomb came in from before being loaded onto PA 103. The official presumption was that the bomb had arrived in London on Pan Am 103A, a feeder flight / flirst-leg originating in Frankfurt, West Germany. Acceptance of this premise allowed a bag from Malta, and all that was attached to that, and eventually a guilty verdict for al Megrahi,

It was clear which luggage container had held the bomb; that was named AVE4041PA, and had been loaded first with various luggage at Heathrow, then filled with bags from PA 103A. As it was finally loaded, most luggage in 4041 was from Frankfurt, so by sheer numbers the bomb would more likely be in the majority batch. Perhaps riding on that wave of thought, on March 28 1989 Senior Investigating Officer (top Scot) John Orr told investigators gathered at the Lockerbie Incident Control Center (LICC):

“Evidence from witnesses is to the effect that the first seven pieces of luggage in the container belonged to Interline passengers and the remainder was Frankfurt luggage. […] To date 14 pieces of explosive-damaged baggage have been recovered and enquiries to date suggest that on the balance of probabilities the explosive device is likely to be amongst the Frankfurt baggage items. Of all the currently identified explosion-damaged luggage all but one item originated from Frankfurt.” [1, bold was LICC italics in original]

In this Frankfurt/London distinction for those damaged, one must wonder how he categorized the “primary suitcase,” the only brown, hardshell Samsonite among them. It matched the description and approximate location (see below) of the two maroony-brown hardshell Samsonites John Bedford reported as being in the container. These were loaded well before the German feeder arrived, and as blogger "Baz" points out, the "effect" that this was all interline baggage was not from "evidence from witnesses" but from the name of the shed (interline) where the suspect bags were inserted. They therefore constituted unwanted baggage that would have to be factually shuffled aside before the eventual story could unfold as it did.

The Sciencey Stuff - Two Tracks
Two tracks we can assess in some detail are covered that way in separate posts. First I recommend
part 1 the investigation, images, and explanations of Mr. Thomas Claiden. He assembled appendix F for the UK Air Accident Investigation Branch report on the Lockerbie non-accident. Based on decent forensics reasoning, he concluded the suitcase with the bomb was almost certainly not directly on the main floor panel, but otherwise at almost floor level, outboard aft quarter, or just above the left-hand Bedford suitcase, and slid a little left into the sloped-floor overhang area. This was only published in 1990, but it's more visual, which helps one form their own opinion from the damage. I don't disagree with anything of the essence here, it just doesn't say anything.

Track two is the Indian Head Forensics Tests of 1989. The tests showed that the reading inherent in the AAIB report was correct - the bomb was one layer up and not on the main floor. So the results were the same, if more dramatic and less public in their documentation.

Ultimately, the conclusion that Frankfurt was indicated relies on a stated assumption that the Bedford cases could not possibly have been stacked one on the other. If someone had stacked them, perhaps to make room for their feet as they prepared to load from 103A, the top one would be in the exact spot of the detonation. I suspect that's what happened.

Zeist Judges' Speculation
The judges at the 2000 trial explained the significance, by universal custom taking Bedford's cases as singular, in their final opinion.

It was argued on behalf of the accused that the suitcase described by Mr Bedford could well have been the primary suitcase, particularly as the evidence did not disclose that any fragments of a hard-shell Samsonite-type suitcase had been recovered, apart from those of the primary suitcase itself. [para 25]

Bedford then took container 4041 with 6-7 cases, to the "build-up area" and went home. It was taken to meet Pan Am 103A, and the case against Megrhahi was based on the "primary suitcase" being loaded from that luggage, and that based on the fact that it wasn't on the floor. For such an important aspect of the case, the exact details of where such a bag would end up later are hard to predict well, and impossible to predict with certainty. The judges are clearly aware of this:

"It was submitted that there was evidence that an American Tourister suitcase, which had travelled from Frankfurt, fragments of which had been recovered, had been very intimately involved in the explosion and could have been placed under the suitcase spoken to by Mr Bedford."

That might seem like a good clue why this bag wasn’t on the floor, but with a usual spherical propagation, the blast could cause the same damage if this suitcase was above it, below it, or beside it, depending on how they were arranged. That non sequitur leads to mental gymnastics to the effect that if a Frankfurt bag got under the ones Bedford saw, then anything is possible and two Samsonites are thus smeared out of relevance to make way for their brown Samsonite (I'm fairly sure it's the one reported by Giaka).

"That would have required rearrangement of the items in the container, but such rearrangement could easily have occurred when the baggage from Frankfurt was being put into the container on the tarmac at Heathrow. It is true that such a rearrangement could have occurred, but if there was such a rearrangement, the suitcase described by Mr Bedford might have been placed at some more remote corner of the container."

They might have been pushed over there, and never seen since, who knows. But we're quite certain they were not simply stacked up and pushed a few inches to the nearest 'corner.' The only thing solid they seemed to have was “the effect of forensic evidence was that the suitcase could not have been directly in contact with the floor of the container.” Emphasis mine, wishful reasoning theirs. See the above section for what that was all about.

Nowhere along the line were intact suitcases matching Mr. Bedford's story ever been produced intact and explained away. It's as if they both just disappeared. Or blew into tiny bits.

Camp Zeist – Perils and Pitfalls of a Designer Trial

What follows is a commentary by Barry Walker submitted to the Lockerbie Divide
Posted 19 February 2010
---
I thought Robert Forrester’s article “Circumstantial Jigsaw Puzzle” of the 5th February 2010 raised interesting points. It is his belief (and that of other supporters who regard Mr Megrahi as the principal victim of Lockerbie) that he should not have been convicted on the evidence presented at Camp Zeist.

He quotes Professor Black (para.10) that in his view “it constituted the worst miscarriage of justice perpetrated by a Scottish Criminal Court since 1909.” As this was also the first time in which the experiment concept of a Scottish Court sitting on neutral territory had been attempted I wondered if there was a connection between the two.

I would therefore pose the fundamental question - why was Megrahi convicted if the evidence against him was so flimsy?

As the article notes the “evidence” of Majid Giaka was rejected and the evidence against Megrahi was almost entirely circumstantial. Why was it that at every point where the prosecution case was challenged their Lordships decided in favour of the prosecution case despite compelling evidence to the contrary (The conclusion, despite the meteorological evidence, that the clothing was purchased on the 7.12.88, the “identification” of Megrahi as the purchaser, the absence of evidence of a bag smuggled onto KM180, the conclusion a suitcase had been transferred at Frankfurt, ignoring the evidence a brown Samsonite was introduced at Heathrow ect. He also points out the crucial issue of the renumbering of RARDE’s notes concerning the discovery of the MST-13 timer although the notes were those of Dr Hayes not Alan Feraday.)

There was also in this Camp Zeist trial the quite astonishing reversal of the burden of proof and the mystery of the “missing” witnesses that a Jury may have found curious.

Mr Forrester had a lot to say about the absence of a Jury. (para.2)

“It is truly hard to believe that if a Scots jury of fifteen ordinary citizens had been employed to reach a verdict, they would have arrived at the same conclusion as their Lordships.”

He raises the incongruity of any “self respecting bomber” introducing a bomb at Luqa and transferring it twice to explode after take-off from Heathrow. It is a point to which the Judges were indifferent but a Jury employing common-sense may rightly have come to a different conclusion.

“Never again” he writes “should the Crown be in the position where it performs the role of prosecutor, Judge and Jury”. In view of the outcome of “Camp Zeist” it is unlikely that any defendant anywhere would chose such an option – that may have been the object of the conviction. He speculates that the result would have been different if there were a “Jury drawn from citizenry at Zeist”. But the key feature of “Camp Zeist” was the discarding of a Jury. With a Jury what would be the point of moving the trial to Camp Zeist – indeed what objective was served by having the trial at Camp Zeist at all save to give the illusion that this was a negotiation not a surrender?

Mr Forrester’s article implies that in some way the Jury was disposed of by some Government decree. Mr Forrester writes “it is clear that he (Professor Robert Black) agrees that one of the reasons why we have a Jury of fifteen ordinary citizens in criminal trials, and do not utilise a form of Diplock Court in Scotland is in order that a degree of common sense might prevail in arriving at a verdict.” This is quite true but whose idea was it to try this case as a “Diplock Court” without benefit of a “degree of common sense”? It was the defence “team” and the Libyan Government who thought the defendants chances were improved by abolishing the Jury. Messrs Fhimah and Magrahi (to the extent that they had any say in the process) were given some pretty lousy advice. The Libyan Government were also badly advised and fell into a trap set by the West by responding in a thoroughly predictable manner. (As with Iraq while sanctions were bad news for the people they were not necessarily bad for the regime.)

At para.10 Mr Forrester writes “There is no criticism whatsoever of Professor Black (Mr Forrester’s colleague in the Justice for Megrahi campaign) how could anyone have imagined that such a Pandora’s box be opened?

Well some people did imagine this outcome prior to the trial and wanted a proper investigation and the right defendants charged. However I for one was astonished that their Lordship’s still managed to convict Mr Megrahi after rejecting Giaka’s evidence. I thought it was the defendants who were “bonkers” to agree to be tried for mass murder in a Judicial experiment the central feature of which was the abolition of a Jury.

I take the view, completely without empirical evidence, that the Scottish bench is composed of individuals who are deeply conservative (with a small “c”) who regarded “Camp Zeist” as an abomination an overt politicisation of the Judicial process in which they were expected to conduct a show trial on foreign soil and come to the pre-determined verdict of “not proven”.

I suspect they found it intolerable that a defendant or defendants would negotiate the form of tribunal before which he would deign to appear (presumably in the expectation that they would gain some advantage from it) and were determined that this Judicial experiment would not be repeated, an objective I suspect that has been achieved. In the circumstances were they ever going to give the defendants an even break?

“Camp Zeist” was a disaster for Mr Al-Megrahi as, for reasons that escape me, he gave up his right to a Jury and elected instead to be tried (and have his 1st appeal heard) before a panel of Judges determined that the defence should not benefit from “Camp Zeist”. How could “anyone imagine that such a Pandora’s box be opened?” I suggest someone of reasonable intelligence might have predicted the attitude of the Legal Establishment to a “designer” trial.

One should recognise that “Camp Zeist” was likely a factor in Mr Megrahi’s conviction.

Bedford on the Color of that Brown Samsonite

(incomplete)
last edits 2/26/10

The official findings of the Lockerbie investigation have always held that the primary suitcase (the bomb bag) was inside cargo container number AVE 4041, and was a hard-sided type of Samsonite make, "brown" in color. Quite or exactly like the model at left used as a control sample, with a reddish cast, it could be called "maroony-brown." It’s not remarkable itself and might be expected to slip through an entire system without anyone noticing it at any particular spot. But an unusual bag might wind up standing out a little.

Of the dozens of items that would be loaded into 4041 for loading onto Flight 103, the only case matching this that was both seen and remembered is the one seen by John Bedford, a Pan Am loader / driver at Heathrow International Airport. He saw it there, in AVE 4041 a thousand miles from Malta, over an hour before the arrival of the feeder flight that allegedly brought the primary suitcase. It stood out because it was placed there in his absence, along with another bag of similar type, by a co-worker, Mr. Kamboj. I'll cover these details elsewhere, here I'd like to focus on the color and the official acceptance of that aspect of his evidence.

Police reports: 1989
Bedford gave at least two statements to police Detective Constable Adrian Dixon on 3 January and 9 January 1989. One would presume earlier interviews as well, but none that I've seen yet. The first of these two isn’t directly quoted in Court, at least regarding color, but the second includes an incorrect spelling of Kamboj and I will quote it in part as:

"I went to see Peter Walker in baggage build-up leaving Camjob in interline. I returned about 4.40 p.m., Camjob told me two further suitcases had arrived for PA 103 which he had put in the tin. I looked inside the tin and saw the suitcases that I had put in the tin still in the same position. Lying on their sides in front of the other suitcases, handles pointing towards the back of the tin, were two suitcases. They were hard suitcases, the type Samsonite make. One was brown in colour, and the other one, if it wasn't the same colour, it was similar. In size, they took up the remaining base area of the tin. [day 44, p 6463-65]

Please note he cites them both as the same Samsonite hardshell style, and apparently the same color. The qualifier "if not ... similar" may just be Bedford second-guessing his presumption this was a matching set of luggage. The Bedford suitcases.

Fatal Accident Inquiry, 1990/91
The UK Government's Fatal Accident Inquiry made no mention of Mr. Bedford, or anything indicating Heathrow origin in the slightest, in their final report of 1991. They did however realize a bag of the same type was used, and however they dismissed it from their findings, they did question Bedford about his report to the effect of seeing one. Some of the questions posed there, regarding color, were read out at trial in 2000 by Mr. Davidson for the defense. He called up “a transcript of a Fatal Accident Inquiry where you gave evidence in Dumfries.” Each of the points below was generally agreed by Mr. Bedford that he said these things and did so believing them to be true. Therefore I’ll again quote the reading of the original Q and A as if I had those transcripts. [from pages 6482-85]

"Q Can you recall whether on 21st December, 1988 any of the luggage that you dealt with or saw at the interline shed destined for Pan Am 103 was a bronze Samsonite case?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you see a bronze Samsonite case?
A A maroony-brown Samsonite case, yes.
...
Q Now, I wonder if I could get in a bit more detail of the colour. What is your recollection about the colour of the case lying in that position?
A I think it was a brown or maroony colour, hard-backed suitcase.
...
Q But as far as colour is concerned, can you be any more precise than you have been in your evidence?
A No, sir, I am sorry."

He needn't be more precise - he starts here with a clear enough memory of a maroony brown case to correct a slightly different description. But of course that's the color and style of the bomb bag, and in roughly its position, and so the re-questioning continued, chiseling away at the color question and his memory. My boldings here indicating unusually directive words, that just in text (without voice inflection aids) seem to communicate displeasure with the witness' answers and a desire to see them change:

Q I think it's fair to say that you have been seen on a number of occasions by police and other investigating agencies; is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as far as the colour of that particular case is concerned, have you always expressed the same view as to what the colour was?
A To my knowledge, I have.
Q Isn't it fair to say that on different occasions you thought it was brown OR maroon, and at one point you were quite certain it was maroon?
A Yes.
Q Again this is no criticism of you, but I am anxious to know what the state of your evidence is about colour. In view of the different expressions of view over the period, are you able to be clear at all as to what the colour of that case was?
A No.
Q With regard to the suitcase that you saw lying down flat to the left side of the container, I would like you to think back as best you can. Could that suitcase have been a blue suitcase with a maroon or brown trim?
A I couldn't say.
Q You don't know whether it was or not?
A No, sir.
Q But it could have been?
A It could have been.

I know I imagine things into the evidence sometimes, but I can't help but read that as Bedford's memory being broken. No, he finally admits, he doesn't know what he's talking about at all. Blue with brown trim compared to all reddish-brown is an exaggerated distinction, when suggesting burgundy or dark tan might suffice to confuse the report away. Whatever this said the the witness, at the beginning he remembered a set color, and the end no more - it might've been "any colour you like," good sir, to paraphrase Pink Floyd.

I would presume it was on this basis the FAI finally decided these cases were somehow irrelevant, alongside the dubious reasoning that the bag was too high up and couldn't have gotten that way unless it had come in from Germany first.

Zeist Trial, 2000
Mr. Bedford was unable to recall any details of the bag or of what happened around it, or talking to police afterwards, by the time of the Zeist trial in 2000. Aged 60 at the time, it was perhaps just natural memory loss at work, or perhaps more – he seems plenty lucid on some points, but defiantly unable to recall other memories. He did affirm for the defense details of his story, as if it were relevant to the investigation, by agreeing he had probably said those things and was presumably being truthful. But he could not then testify to their truth again. The Zeist Judges did accept his story - color, style, placement by Kamboj in his absence, without badgering it as they'd only be arguing with police reports. Then they calmly dismissed its relevance based, as we've seen, on "could haves."

Re-examination by Mr. Turnbull, p 6489

Q Can I ask you about two things, please, Mr. Bedford. The first is the colour of the suitcase that was at the front of the container. You remember being asked some questions a moment ago about that?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is your recollection now as to what colour that suitcase was?
A None at all, sir.
Q All right. Did you have much of a recollection as to its colour by the time you gave evidence at the Fatal Accident Inquiry?
A Yes, sir.

Turnbull then tried to jump right to the last two questions from the FAI quesioning above, where he professed uncertainty about the color. Mr. Taylor for the defense swiftly objected that unless the preceding questions were read out, rather than just seen on-screen, it would be absent from the record and put “an unfair gloss … on the witness's recollection.” Lord Sutherland agreed and had Turnbull reread the previous passages which seem to have directed Mr. Bedford to become so indecisive.

... rest coming
but that might be about it. I'm soliciting comment - can anyone play devil's advocate and find a reasonable cause to push the color issue like that? What patterns does anyone else see in this?