Toshiba RT-SF 16 Radios and Libyan Guilt

Undated
last edit March 1 2011

It was forensically determined that the model of radio carrying the bomb that brought down PA103 was a Toshiba RT-SF16 BomBeat radio cassette player, a small black-cased unit with twin-speakers. The radio was identified, in an often bizarre process as it's recorded, by fragments of circuit board and melted case plastics found blasted into surrounding clothes and luggage. And it was confirmed by fragments from the paper user's manual, one a full sheet pronouncing the model plain as day, torn up badly by the thousands-degree Semtex supernova a few inches away (below, left).

That last find, called PK/689, is just too much. Decky Horton thought it had been completely intact when she turned it in, and said so under oath at Camp Zeist. It's been explained the damage to the sheet might have been from forensics testing, and the bomb, apparently, did just about nothing to it.

The science was said to find the manual was not folded at the time of blast, meaning it was outside its narrow box, perhaps way out amongst the clothes. That becomes a bit more plausible. But then why were other bits of the same manual blasted into the blue babygro thought to be wrapped directly around the bomb radio box? Of all the fishy clues that suggest planting, this fishy plant would surely grow the most fish if planted.

These clues appeared to me before the context. I was asking why it had to be the RT-SF16 that wound up in the rubble, to necessitate something so obviously foul? The answer I found is put forth by, for example, the esteemed Richard Marquise, onetime overseer of the FBI's investigation. In a "letter to" Lucy Adams, Marquise pointed out how the model of radio itself indicates Libyan guilt:

"It was a senior Libyan official who had ordered the majority of all the Toshiba radios similar to that which carried the bomb. This official also talked in 1986 about putting a bag on a British or American flight from Malta. Ask why?"

As for the talk of bombing planes, Mr. Marquise will be aware that was a dubious claim of desperate defector A.M. Giaka. The official referred to is Said Rashid, head of JSO operations section, who "asked" Giaka himself - a driver for the JSO - to write a report about bombing planes. It's clearly a rubbish claim, among those first offered on the FBI's boat in mid-1991 in order to win witness protection for him and his wife and impending baby. It was dismissed by the Zeist judges, along with Giaka in general, and virtually everything else he said.

As for Rashid's company's purchase of the radios in question, another unbiased expert, Lord Advocate (prosecution) for the Scottish Crown at trial, Lord Colin Boyd, said in remarks on 28 August 2001:

"As if in confirmation of Libya's involvement during the preparation for the trial evidence was obtained from Toshiba which showed that during October 1988 20,000 black Toshiba RT-SF 16 radio cassettes, the type used in the Pan Am bomb, were shipped to Libya. Of the total world-wide sales of that model 76% were sold to General Electric Company of Libya whose chairman was Said Rashid.

Accordingly, its clear that the move of interest by investigators away from the PFLPGC and towards Libya was as a result of the evidence which was discovered and not as a result of any political interference in the investigation."

October 1988, just two month before the bombing, they made sure to conspicuously corner the market on the exact radio they'd turn into a bomb. Not wise, unless you're framing yourself. Some confirmation of the Libyan BomBeat connection did come from the trial:

"Two employees of Toshiba confirmed in their evidence that their company had supplied 20,000 Toshiba RT SF 16 Bombeat radio cassette recorders to Libya in October 1988. It is alleged that the bomb was contained within such a cassette recorder." LTBU daily report, 26 July 2000

Well that certainly depends on how pure the evidence itself was to begin with. But if we accept this claim, there would seem to be a rough correlation - all things being equal - that if you find a SF-16, it's about 76% likely to be JSO-owned, at least until it was stolen from them. That still leaves a 24% rate of non-JSO probability, and of course all things are not equal.

So the allegation per Lord Boyd is that the Libyans first branded this one radio model - and its amazingly durable manuals - as JSO material. And then they made one of those, of all the models on Earth they could have chosen, into a bomb for such a major operation. And they'd do this using a highly-identifiable and exclusive timer set so it would blow up over land and leave the clues to find. Including the conspicuously purchased Maltese clothing tied right to Megrahi. Packed in the case the Giaka "saw" Megrahi holding the day before the bombing. Sent through three airports unaccompanied but without a single trace at the one airport of them that had excellent security and delivered all their evidence.

It's an insane plot, and standard fare for this investigation. Another stupid move by the villains or, depending on your point of view, another sign of frame-up, with no opportunity to lost to emphasize the direction. Libyan-exclusive everything. I don't think that's normally how terrorists work when they're writing their own script.

Rewards and Bribery

1 October 2010

This is the title over an excellent new post by "Rolfe" at the JREf forum. It covers some of the issues in my own post Rewards for Injustice, but goes beyond that with new information and thoughts in quite a sharp package.

The post, with slight edits, is as follows:
---
There's been more stuff today about the matter of the bribery of witnesses by the US Department of Justice in the Lockerbie case. [...] How comfortable are those who believe in Megrahi's guilt with the amount of bribery that was going on?

Rewards for information are a recognised part of crimefighting. They're often aimed at people in the underworld themselves, or on the fringes of it. If people with that sort of inside knowledge see more benefit to themselves from turning "grass" than from their criminal activities, they may squeal.

That sort of information has to be taken with a huge health warning of course. Petty jealousies and feuds may easily lead criminals to invent false allegations against their colleagues. So it has to check out. Give us the information, yes, but be prepared for it to be scrutinised and verified and corroborated before you'll see a penny.

Ordinary members of the public might get such a reward too, but what for? Not for simply telling the truth about what they know after the police have approached them about a matter. In that case, you'll be lucky to get your bus fare to court and a limp sandwich for lunch. These rewards are for crucial information the police hadn't found out for themselves, and which leads on to the Big Breakthrough.

And again it has to be corroborated and verified. Nobody gets millions of dollars or pounds for simply making stuff up to suit what the police want them to say.

Or do they? What really happened in the Lockerbie case?

Regarding the Gauci brothers, it's a matter of public record that they eventually received (probably more than) $3 million. This is not in respect of approaching the police with any new or valuable information, but simply for giving an account of a clothes purchase Tony recalled, after the police had identified them as the vendors of the clothes by independent means.

It has been hotly denied that this was ever promised in advance, and indeed there was probably no actual promise. However the documents now available show a lot of evidence that Paul in particular was very much interested in receiving money for giving evidence, and that heavy hints were dropped. Start at page 90 of the pdf, page no. 149 of the document. A couple of extracts.

on 28th September 1989 the FBI discussed with the Scottish Police an offer of unlimited money to Tony Gauci, with $10,000 being available immediately.

And later, in relation to a luxury holiday in Scotland that was given to Tony and his father in 1991.

He wondered how he would explain the cost of such a trip. He was told [by Godfrey Scicluna] to suggest the National Lotto as having won a prize!

How is this possibly be justifiable, if the only interest is in ensuring the witness gives as accurate an account of what he saw as possible?

And Tony wasn't the only one having hints about large sums of money dangled in front of him. At Zeist, Fhimah's business partner Vincent Vassallo gave evidence. He knew Fhimah very well, but only met Megrahi on 20th December 1988. He was pressed on a number of matters, including whether either of them had a bronze Samsonite suitcase with them that day. If he had chosen, he could have "remembered" stuff that would have been highly incriminating. Here's part of the transcript.

Q Mr. Vassallo, do you recollect that in April 1991 you were approached by a number of police officers at Luqa Airport in Malta?
A Yes.
Q And in particular, a number of Scottish police officers, including a Mr. Bell?
A Yes.
Q And do you recollect being interviewed by those police officers at Luqa Airport on 18th April 1991? [7642]
A I do not remember the exact date, but that they had met me the first time at Luqa Airport, I do remember.
Q And do you recollect them discussing Lamen Fhimah when they interviewed you?
A Yes.
Q And do you recollect them referring to Mr. Baset [Megrahi] when they interviewed you?
A I don't remember.
Q Do you recollect if the subject of a reward or money was raised with you?
A What I remember is that when they came to my office, Harry Bell asked me -- he said "Try and remember well. You know there is a large reward, and if you wish to have more money, perhaps go abroad somewhere, you can do so."
I am not saying, to be clear, that Harry Bell was offering me something. He was simply telling me what the conditions were; that for information that I might be able to give, there is a large reward. And I also read it, and I also heard it on the news.
To be clear, he didn't say "Here, this is the money," to give the wrong interpretation. He only said "There is a reward, and if you for any reason wish to be more relaxed with money, we would not find any [7643] difficulty, even if you do not wish to give us information here"; that is, in Malta.

Oh sure, this isn't a policeman offering a bribe to a witness to invent incriminating evidence against a suspect. Of course it is. If Vassallo had been greedy enough, and clever enough to take the hints he was offered about what sort of things the police would like him to "remember", he could have joined the Gaucis in Australia and never worked again.

And then there was Giaka. There's tons about that in the records. I'll post Paul Foot's version of it, which I think is accurate.

It was obviously important for Giaka to impress his CIA contacts. He depended on them for money – he got a thousand dollars a month rising to $1500. The CIA showered him with gifts of clothing and radio sets, and even arranged for sham surgery to his arm. [To avoid conscription into the Libyan army.] But in spite of this largesse the CIA handlers in Malta got increasingly fed up with Giaka’s prevarications, and started to conclude he was not worth the money. By December 1990, their cables decribed Giaka as “desperate”. Somehow he managed to keep the CIA’s confidence all through the Gulf War but by July 1991 his situation seemed to be even worse.

The CIA contacted him in Libya, and he returned to Malta to meet them. He was told that a meeting had been set up with officials from the US Department of Justice, and that his future depended on what he disclosed at that meeting. Almost at once he started to barter with his handlers, only to be met with a threat that unless he could come up with something about his former colleagues in the JSO [Megrahi and Fhimah] that might incriminate them in the Lockerbie bombing, he would be abandoned in Malta and cut off without a penny.

Not a single statement about having any information about Lockerbie until 1991, despite much questioning. Then when he's threatened with loss of his income (not even getting his fare back to Tripoli) if he doesn't come up with something, he "remembers" a bunch of fairy-tales.

Transcripts, via Paul Foot:

[William Taylor, QC for Megrahi] “You see the documents speak for themselves. They build up to a crescendo as I’ve described. It’s not me that is doing it. It’s the documents that are doing it. And lo and behold the deafening silence (about Lockerbie) ends the very next day, when you come up with a brown Samsonite suitcase and this rubbish about Customs. The very next day is the first mention by you, Giaka, of these matters. What do you have to say about that?”

Giaka could only stammer: “When I met with the representatives of the Department of Justice, they are very good investigators, and they can distinguish truth from lies. One way or another, they can obtain what they want.”

Giaka was immmediately, that very day, spirited out of Malta and en route for the USA where he was given a luxurious new life in the witness protection programme.

Giaka's evidence was actually the main basis of the indictments issued later that year. Tony's tentative "well he looks a bit like the purchaser" would never have been enough. It was entirely down to Giaka that Megrahi and Fhimah were charged at all. And we must remember what happened after that. Libya tried to adhere to the terms of the international convention whereby their own nationals were entitled to be tried in their own courts. The USA refused to hand over the evidence Libya would have needed to try them, and insisted on the accused being handed over instead. Stalemate, the result of which was a 10-year international blockade of Libya, keeping out essential goods and medical supplies, and resulting in thousands of preventable deaths.

All because of Giaka, and the evidence given under the circumstances outlined above.

And then, in court, the prosecution fought tooth and nail to conceal from the defence the evidence showing that Giaka had just made it all up for money - up to the point where the Lord Advocate blatantly lied to the court.

Is any of this something people are comfortable with? Note, it's not "I have a new lead that will lead you to the Lockerbie bombers". It's bare-faced solicitation to witnesses to invent details such as the possession of a brown Samsonite suitcase, that will implicate the suspects the police have already decided they want to charge.
[...]
I ask again, is anyone comfortable with this?

Rolfe.
---

Rewards for Injustice

A Shocking Trail of Witnesses Paid Millions for Misinformation
July 25 2010
last edits July 30

The early release from Scottish prison of “Lockerbie bomber” Abdelbaset al Megrahi has been getting much airplay and page space the last three weeks. A myth that he might live for decades more, and the “news” that Gulf-despoilers BP (British!) had also lobbied for the “bomber’s” release back in 2007, stuck together for indignorant Americans. This spurred a flurry of commentary and Congressional calls for investigations, summoning foreign CEOs and ministers to explain themselves, as the Brtis say with annoyance, like naughty schoolchildren before the headmaster.

This will surely settle down before long, and amid the furor, one crucial issue will still lie in the dust, unseen by most. And that is the assassination of Megrahi’s hard-won second appeal of conviction. Many informed commentators have been bringing up the appeal in a more recent backlash, but so far It’s hardly even a side note in the US - just a trifle the “bomber” was “allowed to drop” right before going home to live way more than three months.

Three Important Witnesses
And so the appeal’s secrets were buried, for the moment The central point of the surrendered challenge, soon submitted to the court of public opinion, was the reliability and credibility of eyewitness Anthony “Tony” Gauci. The scope of this article will be wider and consider two other witnesses who share three key features with Gauci.

Upon finding Megrahi guilty for the bombing on January 31, 2001, the three judge panel ruling at Camp Zeist issued an 87-page Opinion of the Court (PDF link) to explain their thinking. Among the points in setting up the evidence against Megrahi was this short list:

“In relation to the first accused, there are three important witnesses, Abdul Majid, Edwin Bollier and Tony Gauci.” [paragraph 41]

To those who know enough about the case, that line is itself hilarious, the punch-line to a sick joke. To those who don’t know enough (and that’s who this article is for), it take a little explaining. Besides being the only three with anything truly incriminating to say against Megrahi, each of these has in common two further points:
1) The evidence they provided is questionable in many cases, and unquestionably fraudulent in others.
2) They were all offered (or have said they were offered) millions of dollars, and at least two apparently collected.

“Abdul Majid”
Abdul Majid Giaka (an alias, true name unknown, called ”Abdul Majid” by the Zeist judges) was a Libyan intelligence agent with the JSO, Libya’s CIA. He was very low level and knew almost nothing, but from August 1988 he had been able to draw money from the CIA ($1,000 a month, increased to $1,500) selling them small tidbits. The CIA called Giaka code-name “Puzzle Piece.”

The defector was stationed at Luqa airport on Malta, where the JSO and Libyan Arab Airlines mingled. At some point after Pan Am 103 fell to Earth in December, two of the people he’d named as high JSO agents working on Malta – Megrahi and his “accomplice” Fhimah – came to the center of suspicion. Strange clues emerged suggesting Libyan authorship, and a Malta link that pointed right to Megrahi. By early 1991, the other puzzle pieces (including Gauci and Bollier) were all in place, and they needed a witness closer to the perps.

It seems the Libyans were by then tired of Abdul Majid’s strange behavior on Malta and ready to call him back to Tripoli. The CIA threatened to cut him off and let him go unless he said something good, and if it was good enough, he might say it to the FBI. So in the summer, he met with agent Hal Hendershot and laid down a whole new version of the previous years in which Megrahi and Fhimah had plotted the bombing in the open and he saw half of it himself.

Hendershot liked what he heard, and Giaka went straight to Washington, with his pregnant wife fetched from Malta soon after. He testified to a grand jury in October 1991, telling of the brown Samsonite case he’d seen the Libyans with on December 20, of the report he (Giaka) was asked to write about bombing a “British plane,” the TNT they kept in a desk at the airport…

As the indictments were sealed and put in place on November 14, the defector Giaka was re-settled somewhere under a new name and witness protection, and paid handsomely. Megrahi’s appeal documents reveal, from DCI Harry Bell's diary, January 8 1992: “Bhiel states DOJ (Department of Justice) will give Magid [Giaka] $2 million dollars. Advised of our concern." This seems to have been dispensed under a US DoJ “Rewards for Justice Program."

When the millionaire was presented as the star witness at Camp Zeist in 2000, it was an unprecedented event – the first time a CIA asset had testified in open court (his voice was disguised and he was hidden behind a screen). The judges were not told about the $2 million, but they did know of his CIA paychecks, other arrangements and efforts to secure money, and his relocation to America, which was clearly of immense value to the witness. They noted how Abdul Majid’s best stories about late 1988 only appeared in mid-1991, and learned along the way that the CIA themselves didn’t believe his information, and had tried to conceal that fact. Therefore, they explained, rather timidly:

“Information provided by a paid informer is always open to the criticism that it may be invented in order to justify payment, and in our view this is a case where such criticism is more than usually justified […] we are unable to accept Abdul Majid as a credible and reliable witness on any matter except his description of the organisation of the JSO and the personnel involved there.” [para 42, 43]

This is an embarrassing rebuke - the most crucial witness to the whole Libyan plot was found to be almost entirely a fraud. It was this loss that led to a total lack of Fhimah clues and the judges having to find the “accomplice” not guilty. And then there was the $2 million they didn’t even know about, as the Crown either didn’t know or didn’t pass it on. And Giaka wasn’t the only witness considered at Zeist who was given this princely sum and had the fact successfully concealed.

Tony (and Paul) Gauci
This now-famous refugee shopkeeper from Malta, clearly a man of simple intellect, was able to recall the exact sale (in different exact versions) of some odd clothes that were later “found at Lockerbie.” Anthony Gauci's original performance recalling the sale was convincing enough, and it seems likely, barring a very elaborate set-up, that he really did sell these clothes to some particular man, on November 23 1988, and they wound up in the bomb bag.

But Megrahi was not on the island that day, so the second-best fit of December 7 (a distant second) was chosen by investigators as what the man meant to describe. By “six feet or more in height,” he meant 5’8” like Megrahi. By around 50, he meant 36. By raining enough to warrant an umbrella, he meant no rain. Etc. But Gauci is touted as identifying a photo of Megrahi, on February 1991, as “similar” to the buyer but ”ten years” too young. Even Tony himself noted the obvious slant of the lineup in question. “The first impression I had was that all the photographs were of men younger than the man who bought the clothing.” With the police’s help, he picked the oldest one shown – Megrahi.

Payments to Mr. Gauci, and to his brother Paul, who assisted somehow behind the scenes, are covered in detail elsewhere, but Megrahi’s appeal documents note the earliest American mention of money is from September 28, 1989, just weeks after the brothers were first approached. “The FBI discussed with the Scottish Police an offer of unlimited money to Tony Gauci, with $10,000 being available immediately." It's not clear if any of this ever came through, but as Giaka was being put up for a reward in 1992, the Scottish police lobbied for Tony to get the same. "I also clarified with him about the Gauci reward and the response was only if he gave evidence."

Tony had his chance to give evidence in mid-2000 and he performed well, considering, fudging everything possible. Under 6 feet, under 60, I don't know, raining a little, not really, no, maybe. Mysteriously, the Judges bought it and Megrahi’s fate was sealed.

The day after the verdict, February 1 2001, the Scottish police started the application for the brothers’ rewards – they had realized specific arrangements couldn’t be discussed until after the judgment, had no explicit promises, had delivered well, and deserved their money now. Paul’s assistance upholding his brother’s “resolve” was noted - but so was his evident desire for money. For some reason they had to wait until the appeal was over as well, and only in April 2002 was “a meeting held with the US Department of Justice where the reward was discussed and supported by the FBI,” say the appeal papers. Further, a suggestion was made there “that the sums applied for - $2m for Tony Gauci and $1m for Paul Gauci - could be increased."

The Scottish review board found all this, and that at some time after the appeal (date redacted) the two were paid some amount under the US DoJ "Rewards for Justice" program. And that is why the appeal they authorized had to be killed.

Edwin Bollier
The third witness is a Swiss electronics merchant, supposed supplier to Libyan JSO of the only 20 MST-13 timers ever made. When an implausibly large chunk of one was “found at Lockerbie” and identified in mid-1990, Bollier’s 18-month-old campaign to sell evidence to the CIA paid off. Much of what he said before and during the trial was dismissed as an obvious bunch of rubbish, but the 1991 indictments did feature his info for points (a), (b), and (j).

Bollier is quite different from the other two “important witnesses.” First, he has not disappeared as a protected witness and made silent. Quite the contrary; He has continued to claim a leading role in the fight to clear Megrahi (comments as "ebol"), and claimed in a 2008 interview that this is to secure a $200 million prize from Libya. [Video, 41:10]. Mr. Bollier reminds me (see comments below) the BBC cut out Q: "Will Libya pay you for your work in the Lockerbie case?" A: "No, if we win the case and the compensation for the victims (US$ 2.7 billion) is refunded I will get a success honorary of US$ 200 million." If the victims pay Libya back, Bollier says he gets almost 8%. To this end, he uses illogical or unsupported claims and exclamation marks, and hasn’t even bothered learning to write in English for a campaign this ambitious.

And unlike Giaka and Gauci, there is no evidence I’m aware of that Bollier was ever paid by investigators for his own evidentiary offerings. He does claim a measly 1% of Libya’s later offering, $2 million - was offered to him in January 1991 by a FBI legal attaché in Switzerland named Fanning. This sounds entirely plausible, actually. But in the same interview linked above [33:35], he says FBI chief Richard Marquise personally doubled the offer just a couple weeks later, “up to $4 million and a new identity” merely to say that this fragment was from a Libyan timer. But they already knew this, and he says he refused anyway (Marquise firmly denies this offer).

Bollier’s oddball account isn’t to be trusted, and he hasn’t been. But he’s served a useful role since the conviction, as a lightning rod to safely channel revisionist thought down blind alleys. Someone really should pay him if they haven't yet.

A Tentative Tally
So far it appears the Scots-CIA-FBI Lockerbie witness pipeline brought in all three “important" but unreliable witnesses against Megrahi. The DoJ payout was at least $5 million to Giaka and the Gaucis plus possible money to Bollier that we just don’t know of. There would be administration, manpower, paid dinners, car rentals and air travel, and assorted overhead for arranging all this, some under FBI, others under CIA or Scottish police. All told, we’re dealing with at least $8 million for just this aspect of what seems like an intelligence operation masquerading as a criminal investigation. The whole case was bigger than this but no squarer, and the other, wider costs of the resulting miscarriage of justice will defy all efforts at calculation.

Richard Marquise to Speak at Syracuse University

10 November 2010

Attention, students of Syracuse University! You won't want to miss the lecture tomorrow to be given by Richard Marquise, who headed the FBI's investigation into the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103. (thanks to Ben Six for the tip). Marquise even wrote a book about his work on the case: SCOTBOM: blahblahblah [2006 - Google books, partial preview]. As you've surely been reminded lately, 35 of your historical classmates, eternal alumni, were among the 270 killed in a bombing that an increasing number worldwide consider to be unsolved. But don't let that bother you - Mr. Marquise will assure you he helped get the right man. It's easy when the whole world seems to agree. Just don't worry about it.

Nonetheless, as the years have grown, so have the doubts about his and others' work in this case. All the points of evidence led at trial and before fall apart upon scrutiny, at the latest. I'll spare the full explanation here (but feel free to look around). To put it simply, besides the much-touted verdict against this "Lockerbie bomber," there is a second legal ruling, by the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission, that the first one "may have been a miscarriage of justice," and should be heard again. But it wasn't. Roadblocks, as always. This has been happening consistently for nearly a decade, something protecting the verdict, and the largely FBI case behind it. And it's not the verifiable truth, this much is clear.

I don't want anyone to be too mean to Mr. Marquise, but he is, as one friend has put it, "crooked as a corkscrew." Or as I've put it, like a broken Speak-and-Spell, programmed in 1991 with no updates since, full of pre-programmed statements, and no good at answering real questions. He should be asked questions. Here's some good material to consider.

Marquise on Giaka
Richard Marquise is quite keen on the 2001 conviction of Megrahi by three Scottish judges sitting at Camp Zeist, in the Netherlands. But he's rather selective in accepting the Zeist judges' decisions. They found Megrahi's necessary accomplice, Lamin Khalifah Fhimah, flat-out not guilty (skipping a softer option of "not proven"). And the reason for that was the almost total lack of evidence against him, aside for the abundant claims of the prosecution's witness, a Libyan defector turned CIA-FBI asset, Abdul Majid Giaka.

Mr. Marquise is annoyed by the frequent description of Giaka as a "star witness," but he was presented with some fanfare at trial, was hyped heavily by Vincent Cannistraro in the 1990s when we were choking Libya over this, and contributed roughly half of the claims in the 1991 indictments. Giaka and his wife also consumed five chapters of Marquise's 2006 book.

The judges were presented with this witness, star or no, and also grudgingly allowed to see the full text of CIA cables about his debriefings in 1988-1991. What was redacted was where the CIA itself complained that he was unreliable, making things up but nothing good enough, offering little and asking for money and all sorts of help. Someone deliberately chose to conceal all these doubts from the court and, essentially, present a sham witness as a credible one.

This did not go unnoticed by the defense. William Taylor QC ripped into Giaka epically, calling him a liar many, many times, and colorfully. The prosecution didn't even bother to object. Consider these mainstream news article about the episode:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/944606.stm
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2000/sep/28/lockerbie.gerardseenan

The judges found the witness as a whole unacceptable. They did credit his basic knowledge of Megrahi's comings and goings, and of the Libyan intelligence operation at Malta's airport. But everything directly relating to the case was dismissed. Explosives in the desk, bomb studies, the suitcase, and a number of peripheral claims verging into the ridiculous. Having lost the most important witness, nearly everyone expected the charges to be dismissed. But only Fhimah was so lucky, as the judges managed to accept the flimsy case left against Megrahi.

Belated Claims
In mid-1991, after being in touch with the CIA for nearly three years, Giaka was finally taken on board by the FBI as a witness. Desperate to escape Libya's clutches, and faced with a tough choice, he enabled this by telling them amazing information he never told the CIA at the time it supposedly happened. He'd forgotten to mention seeing the two accused arrive on Malta carrying a style of suitcase just like the one that held the bomb. He only remembered in 1991 that he'd been asked by Megrahi to look into how to bomb a "British plane." And so on. The improved memory had him selected, and given a vaunted new life in America under witness protection, quite likely with a planned $2 million DoJ prize. Bare months later, the indictments came into effect and Libya started to suffer.

The judges found his sudden 1991 remembrance unacceptable, and one of the main reasons they tossed his whole celebrated roster of detailed inside clues.

But Mr. Marquise just sees it differently, and feels Giaka got a bum deal. He was telling the truth as best he could all along, he recently said, to much wicked rebuttal. Matt Berkley, who lost his brother Alistair in the bombing, took issue there with a 2009 article where Marquise put forth as fact several of Giaka's claims, contrasted with the Zeist judges' own feeling on each. (double-check these if you like here)

Marquise: "a senior Libyan official asked a Libyan Arab Airline (LAA) employee about the feasibility of getting a “bag” onto an American or British flight leaving Malta."
Judges: "we are quite unable to accept this story"....

Marquise: "Evidence was elicited that the Station manager of LAA in Malta kept explosives in his desk..."
Judges: "we are unable to place any reliance on this account"

Marquise: "He was described as carrying a “brown suitcase” similar to that which blew up Pan Am Flight 103..."
Judges: "We are ... quite unable to accept the veracity of this belated account"

The former SCOTBOM chief investigator does provide in his book some explanation for his different view. For example, on page 216 (readable on-line) he affirms that Giaka didn't make things up in 1991, he just had a better memory then and the investigators themselves had "an advantage ... a wealth of information about Lockerbie and were able to ask questions not available to the CIA handlers who spoke with him in [1988 and] 1989."

For one thing, they may have been willing to stoop lower than the CIA (???) and tell him, from their wealth, that Megrahi used a brown hard-shell Samsonite, triggering a desperate memory of seeing him with one. They might have asked him, if he'd like to come to America, did Megrahi ever show any previous interest in bombing airplanes? A memory emerges of the 1986 report.

This wishful thinking is clearly nothing but self-interest. Why on Earth should someone not be questioned about something like this?

Belated Note: See comments below for at least one other very worthy question about the evidence of Tony Gauci, Giaka's "co-star" at trial.

Richard Marquise Disputes the Findings of the Zeist Court

18 October 2010
edits 20 October

Special Agent Richard Marqise was the FBI's chief investigator on the Pan Am 103 (SCOTBOM) case during its formative turn (following the evidence, of course) to focus on Libya. He's also the author of SCOTBOM: Evidence and the Lockerbie investigation (2006), frequent giver of video interviews, and infrequent internet commentator.

He emerged recently for a short post at Professor Black's blog (The Lockerbie Case) refering to an article about "star witness" Abdul Majid Giaka. Giaka is of course the Libyan defector who fed a whole lot of specific information against Megrahi and his "accomplice" Fhimah. His stories were central to the 1991 indictments, but were famously dismissed, and rightly so, by the judges at Camp Zeist for being unrealiable in a number of ways.

I wouldn't have been so surprised to see Mr. Marquise comment on the article, if I'd realized his book from six years after Zeist dedicates at least five chapters to the subject ("Lockerbie and Giaka," "TNT and a Brown Suitcase" "Mrs. Giaka," "the CIA cables," ""Star" witness"). Much of this in unreadable in the limited Google books preview, and for a couple reasons would rather not buy a copy. So do note I didn't know that yesterday while commenting (as Caustic Logic) in response to Mr. Marquise, who appears in comments 2 and 19. The many responses were brilliant and informative and all 30 so far, spanning a couple days with me only catching it at the end, are reproduced below (slightest edits only).

I take his point that constantly saying "star witness" and saying it in quotes is not the best practice. I will take that to heart, but otherwise, his performance is depressing. There really is no spark of sanity left in the bankrupt and unseaworthy position he's chained himself and so many others to.
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1 - Rolfe said...
This article raises an interesting question. Giaka was the star witness, on which the entire case was founded. Without his evidence, they would never even have got the indictment. The rest of the evidence was way too circumstantial to support anything - Tony Gauci's "identification" of Megrahi as the purchaser was fraught with uncertainty, and the evidence that the bomb travelled on KM180 thin to the point of insubstantiality. So, once Giaka's evidence was dismissed, why did the judges convict?

I liken this to model-building. The investigtors laid out the pieces of actual evidence (Gauci's evidence, the Erac printout, Megrahi's presence at Luqa as "Abdusamad", plus more circumstantial matters such as the timer fragment and the radio model) in a particular pattern that implicated Megrahi in the bombing. However, these pieces of evidence wouldn't hold together to form a substantial construct.

So they brought in Giaka, as we all know, and threatened/bribed him to "remember" stuff that would provide a solid framework for that construct of the evidence. If Megrahi and Fhimah were seen on Malta that morning (or the previous day, whatever) with the bomb suitcase, then everything held together. That strengthened Gauci's tentative "looks a bit like but too young" identification into "probably him, really", and turned B8849 into yes, that will be the bomb on its way from KM180. If Giaka's evidence had been true, these inferences would have been legitimate.

The problem was that everybody had got so used to loking at the evdence laid out in that pattern, that when the framework that supported it was taken away, they allowed the pattern to remain - even though by all logic it should have collapsed in a heap. The defence's alternative pattern, that of Megrahi and Fhimah getting on with whatever they were doing at Malta that day quite independently, the clothes buyer being someone else unidentified, and B8849 being a simple coding anomaly - while 1,000 miles away at Heathrow airport a completely different terrorist was sneaking an extra suitcase or two into AVE4041, was too unfamiliar to gain acceptance.

It's a bit like the cricket story of the batsman being clean-bowled with the ball taking out the centre stump - but the bails don't fall because the hot sun has melted the varnish and stuck them together.

2 - Richard Marquise said...
Once again, The Firm has played loose with the facts using Mr. MacKechnie as the source. I would like to know who--that is normally a person--"not intelligence agencies" informed the Crown that Giaka was a "star witness." That term was unfortunately coined by some less that brilliant UK reporter during the course of the trial. No intelligence agencies were involved in the "debrief/interview" of Giaka and no one of those who did ever said he was a witness to the loading of the bomb suitcase. The facts were the facts--not speculation--- and Mr. Mackechnie knew this because I was with him when he was able to interview Mr. Giaka in America--long before the trial. This would not be the first time Mr. Mackechnie distorted the facts. His description of his ride to see and then interview Giaka which was reported in the UK media before trial was at odds in a big way with the facts of what really happened.

Those who believe that somehow American intelligence agencies were somehow involved with the outcome of the trial have no clue either.

I realize it is a losing battle to try and convince those of you who blog on this site of the truth, but at least be sure you report information which is correct and factual.

3 - Matt Berkley said...
Is this correct and factual?

"The charges are based on evidence that directly and conclusively links Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi...and Lamin Fhimah...and other unidentified co-conspirators to the suitcase containing the bomb and to its insertion into the baggage system leading to Pan Am flight 103."
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard Boucher
1:05 PM, Washington, DC
Nov 14, 1991

Secondly, was the description "filing details" given by the CIA to censored passages relating to Mr Giaka, purely for the eyes of the defence and the judges, accurate?

Thirdly, was that not contempt of court?

4 - Jo G said...
Mr Marquise, for you to dare utter the sentence "played loose with the facts" would be hilarious if this case was anything remotely close to a laughing matter. The facts already in the public domain establish, BEYOND ALL REASONABLE DOUBT, that the conviction of Megrahi was deeply unsafe. Furthermore the part the US government played in bribing witnesses all over this case screams how unsafe it was and what a complete set up it was. I recently saw you on a UK TV programme trying to avoid admitting that yes indeed Gauci was paid! Incidentally it was TWO MILLION DOLLARS the US paid him.

And finally, if you are so sure of your case you surely can have no objection whatsoever when the time comes and that appeal can be resurrected and heard - as it should have been three years ago long before your country threw a massive wobbler because a Scottish Government dared to release the man the US framed.

5 - Jo G said...
Oh and Mr Marquise, I doubt you would recognise the truth if it walked up to you and introduced itself.

6 - Matt Berkley said...
If Mr Marquise thinks the judges said things which were beyond reason, why did he trust their verdict?

http://archive.maltatoday.com.mt/2009/08/26/t9.html
Marquise: "a senior Libyan official asked a Libyan Arab Airline (LAA) employee about the feasibility of getting a “bag” onto an American or British flight leaving Malta."
Judges: "we are quite unable to accept this story"....

Marquise: "Evidence was elicited that the Station manager of LAA in Malta kept explosives in his desk..."
Judges: "we are unable to place any reliance on this account"

Marquise: "This board was traced to timers, only 20 of which were ever made. All had been given to Libyan officials."
Judges: "the two prototypes were delivered by Mr Bollier to the Stasi..."...

Marquise: "He was described as carrying a “brown suitcase” similar to that which blew up Pan Am Flight 103..."
Judges: "We are ... quite unable to accept the veracity of this belated account"

7 - Jo G said...
Sorry. That line posted itself before the rest followed.

My point about the truth is that a person can read the trial transcripts and see, repeatedly, decisions being made by judges which fly in the face of the evidence presented.

Gauci did not ever positively identify Megrahi.

Gaika's evidence was rejected utterly by the judges. (Gaika who had implicated Megrahi and his co-accused)

Air Malta proved an unaccompanied suitcase did NOT travel from Luqa.

Even those working for the Lord Advocate seemed desperate to get a conviction when they went so far to keep from the defence - and from the judges - the contents of those cables exchanged between the prosecution and the US authorities where Gaika's contribution was basically trashed.

And since the verdict....

We had a report issued by the Scottish Criminal Case Review Commission raising SIX grounds to suspect a miscarriage of justice could have taken place.

We had the UK government falling over itself to ensure certain info was withheld from Megrahi's appeal. One lot of evidence involved the break-in at Heathrow. We had other evidence, to do with the timer, withheld using Data Protection law. And of course we had the bribing of Gauci with two million US dollars, something that would not have been permitted in any Scottish court of law ever! We had the date Megrahi is alleged to have visited the shop and the fact that the weather doesn't fit in with the story.

In short we have a complete shambles of a case Mr Marquise. And can I remind you that on the basis of that evidence the US would have executed Megrahi had it been given half a chance! And you talk about truth?

8 - bensix said...
Mr Marquise chides readers of this blog for using information which is less than factual. Might we return the favour? As Matt Berkley points out he's used "evidence" which had long been dismissed by the Court. In another piece, for the Times, he relied on the statements of Tony Gauci, long after the SSCRC dispatched them. He also asserted that Libya "accept[s] "responsibility"", despite appearing months before on a programme where Saif Gaddafi claimed that it had been "just wordplay". Ex-FBI Special Agent, investigate thyself?

9 - Rolfe said...
I made a post last night that has vanished this morning, but by the greatest of good luck it was still on my clipboard from my "insurance" copy. I'll re-post it in two parts, because length seems to be what's causing the disappearing acts.
_________________________

I realise this is just another of Mr. Marquise's hit-and-run posts filled with inaccuracies and sidestepping the real issues, which will lie there undefended. But still.

Once again, The Firm has played loose with the facts using Mr. MacKechnie as the source. I would like to know who--that is normally a person--"not intelligence agencies" informed the Crown that Giaka was a "star witness." That term was unfortunately coined by some less that brilliant UK reporter during the course of the trial.

"Star witness" seems an appropriate enough term for Giaka, irrespective of who coined it. I've heard "supergrass" as well. Objecting to perfectly reasonable terminology on spurious grounds is always a useful smokescreen though.

No intelligence agencies were involved in the "debrief/interview" of Giaka

Do you take us for complete idiots?

and no one of those who did ever said he was a witness to the loading of the bomb suitcase.

And The Firm didn't say he was. Nor did I, in my first post on this thread. He placed Megrahi and Fhimah at the centre of events by placing them on Malta with a suitcase of the correct description, at the appropriate time. That is the point being made. Evasion and lies about claims that "he was a witness to the loading of the bomb suitcase" noted.

10 - Rolfe said...

The facts were the facts--not speculation--- and Mr. Mackechnie knew this because I was with him when he was able to interview Mr. Giaka in America--long before the trial. This would not be the first time Mr. Mackechnie distorted the facts. His description of his ride to see and then interview Giaka which was reported in the UK media before trial was at odds in a big way with the facts of what really happened.

When it comes to distorting the facts, I have to go with what I see in front of my eyes. And what I see is Richard Marquise both in person on TV and in blog comments like this, distorting in a manner that would put the Hall of Magic Mirrors to shame.

The FACTS about Giaka's evidence and how it was obtained and why it was dismissed by the judges are available to anyone who can read the Zeist transcripts. It's a shameful catalogue of bribery and threats to elicit evidence implicating Megrahi and Fhimah, to order.

Those who believe that somehow American intelligence agencies were somehow involved with the outcome of the trial have no clue either.

You're probably right, at that. No clue as to just how deep these claws of deception and control really dig. Come on, we can read Hans Kochler's report too. Was he hallucinating the US DoJ officials constantly directing the prosecution team?

I realize it is a losing battle to try and convince those of you who blog on this site of the truth, but at least be sure you report information which is correct and factual.

You mean, don't take your example? Have you any response to what Matt posted above, showing all the incorrect, non-factual pronouncements you've been making recently?

If you want to convince us of anything, you could start by telling us what evidence you rely on to support your belief that Megrahi was involved in the bombing. Giaka was lying, we know that. Tony Gauci didn't sell these clothes to Megrahi, by any reading of his evidence. Tray B8849 at Frankfurt could easily have been a coding anomaly, and the strength of the evidence from Malta (which you couldn't dent) proves it to be such.

There's no evidence at all that the bomb travelled on KM180 (bloody stupid plot if ever there was one), and no evidence that Megrahi had anything to do with it.

And that is the correct, factual information.

12 - tomcyrus said...
With what is known about how the FBI works and conducts itself, especially regarding international issues, should it be added to the UK's list of terorrist groups?.

13 - ebol said...
MISSION LOCKERBIE:

FBI Special Agent Richard A. Maquise led the U.S. Task Force which included the FBI, Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency CIA, managed all aspects of the investigation on the PanAm 103 attack.
With the untruthful claims in his "Log Book" (Lies Book) Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation, it wants to cover up the true facts and the fatal investigations errors of FBI, Scottish- and Swiss police...

Giaka, Abdul Majid Giaka, was the fundamental crucial witness, number 684, together with rouge CIA agents, in the "Lockerbie case" against Libya's Leader Moammar Gaddafi. Its criminal work started with a story claimed that there had been a complaint of sexual harassment with a Egyptian woman against Lamen Fhimah...

+++
Excerpt of court in Kamp van Zeist:

Q And that was in case you got into trouble because of the incident involving the Egyptian lady at the airport, wasn't it, Mr. Giaka?

A When I asked her to get in touch with the embassy, I didn't know what the incident was, and I didn't know why -- what was in the telegram. I hadn't seen the telegram. All I knew was that Fhimah and myself were being called back to Tripoli. We were supposed to go back on the same day. And this was scary...

Q The lady at the airport who acted as interpreter agreed to help you?

A Yes.

Q And I take it that you were grateful to her for the help that she was prepared to give you in these circumstances? A Yes.

Q And you explained to her the high-minded principles that were driving you to go to the Central Intelligence Agency, didn't you, Mr. Giaka?

A I don't remember exactly. I can't say.

Q You see, I was wondering, Mr. Giaka, why did you go to so much trouble to hide from her the fact that you were taking money from the Central Intelligence Agency? Can you explain that? 

A Try to avoid what?

Q You tried to hide from her the fact that you were taking money from the Central Intelligence Agency, didn't you, Mr. Giaka?

A I didn't hide anything from her. We didn't talk about this subject.

Q You are a liar, Mr. Giaka.

A I do not lie. I AM NOT LYING ABOUT THIS !!!

+++
continuation down >>>

14 - ebol said...
continuation MISSION LOCKERBIE >>>

Giaka went to see the CIA for the first time on 10th August 1988. The dirty business between Giaka and CIA against Libya was started...

Abdul Majid Giaka was interviewed by officers of the CIA, which is the Criminal Intelligence Agency of the United States of America over a period of months from the 10th of August of 1988 to the 31st of August of 1989. And productions numbers 104 -- 804 to 828 are a total of 25 cables which were sent by operatives of that intelligence organisation from Malta to their masters in the United States informing the U.S. Intelligence community of information handed over by the man Giaka.

A undisclosed cables to CIA which is cable number 32, is dated the 21st of December 1990, and relating to a meeting with Giaka on the 20th of December at 1990 in Malta. On paragraph 6. are the notes:

At the end of an hour-long meeting, Giaka asked if he was still receiving his salary. The case officer responded negative, but because of his willingness to recontact during this trip to Malta, he gave him 200 Maltese money, which is estimated as $700 U.S.

Giaka wondered aloud if it would be possible for him to obtain $2,000 U.S. to purchase bananas in Malta for his return to Libya where they sell at three or four times the Maltese price. The case officer again replied negative, since Washington is unsure of Giaka's sincerity in assisting against terrorism. They would not approve such money without more detailed information.

The case officer added, though, that he would raise the issue with the proper authorities, who might recompense him if he would be willing to be completely debriefed.

Giaka was becoming desperate as he searches for his role in life in his post-ESO world. And he is certainly milking all of his contacts and was construct lie-storys during this transition period with CIA.
The full Story: Why CIA have needed Giaka's lie information, publishes soon.

by Edwin and Mahnaz Bollier, MEBO Ltd. Switzerland
our webpage: www.lockerbie.ch

15 - Jo G said...
Only dropped in to see if he'd been back yet. I see he hasn't. Hmmm.

16 - Rolfe said...
He replied to me once. I considered myself privileged.

The question I asked then was the same as the question I asked this time. Please give us a short outline of the evidence on which you base your assertion that the right man was convicted.

Unfortunately all he said was that the judges brought in a guilty verdict and that was enough for him.

That was one of my major "no, they really don't have anything, do they" moments.

17 - bensix said...
Unfortunately all he said was that the judges brought in a guilty verdict and that was enough for him.

Pretty low considering he ignores them elsewhere!

18 - FullInquiry said...
Vincent Cannistraro, former CIA Head of Counter Terrorism, said the following long before the Trial:

"Oh! I think the evidence available to the Department of Justice in their case, which they’re keeping under wraps, is overwhelming, it’s conclusive. I think it is mid boggling in the amount of detail that they have. They have also….they have a live witness for one thing, who would be presented in a court of law. I think there is a tremendous amount of evidence that will allow the prosecutors to present the chronology of the operation from its very inception, and that chronology would start even before Malta and then… you know…describe and in almost excruciating detail exactly how they made the bomb, how they secreted it, how they got it on board the aircraft, and I think that’s a fairly strong case".

I can only assume, based on Richard Marquise's comments above, that Vinny had no clue either - certainly no witness at the Trial ever explained in any detail how the accused made the bomb and got it on board the Air Malta flight let alone doing so in "excruciating detail" or in a "mindboggling" manner.

The only thing that boggles the mind in this case is how anyone could conclude the accused is guilty based on such flimsy evidence.

But such statments by Vinny and others like him definitely had an affect on public opinion, and therefore on the Trial, its outcome, and public acceptance of the verdict against Megrahi.

As such, CIA actions did in fact have an effect on the outcome of the trial, which clearly shows Marquise is himself, clueless or simply and conveniently ignoring the facts.

When a head investigator gives the appearance of ignoring facts (which also include payoffs to witnesses) his credibility automatically goes down the tube.

As a result, Mr. Marquise has little more credibility than his Star Witness Giaka.

I wonder if and when he got to see the redacted portions of the Giaka cables? Surely Vinny had access to all the cables in their unredacted form but still held Giaka out to be a key witness.

What about Edwin Bollier's claim that Marquise offered him money for his testimony that MST-13's were sold only to Libya? Will Marquese address that? Who is one to believe? Marquise or Bollier? What a choice!

Please do enlighten us Mr. Marquise and back up your claims in a credible manner.

19 - Richard Marquise said...
Quite a few more misstatements here. Cannistraro was never head of the CIA CT Center--he was deputy and retired before the EVIDENCE led to Libya. As a result he was not involved in any aspect of Giaka or his statements. Anything he ever said was based on his opinion alone-- not on information he may have had access to from the investigation.

I have --many times addressed the issue of payments to witnesses--none--none--including Bollier--ever requested, or were offered or paid any money in exchange for them to tell investigators what we wanted to hear. It is my belief that all the witnesses told what they believed to be the truth at trial (except for one--not Giaka) and what they said was consistent with what they had always said. I realize I am a loner on this site with regard to Giaka but unlike all here--I am the only one who had the opportunity to speak with him and examine all his statements (I did not do original interview of him).

With regard to Giaka and the CIA file mess, I covered this quite explicitly in my book in Chapter 34. I had not seen them prior to the trial nor did I know they existed--I spoke about second guessing myself in this regard.

I would also imagine most on this site spent little (any) time at the trial and probably have read neither the trial transcripts nor my book so it is easy to criticize what you think rather than what you know. I know what the intelligence agencies contributed --early and late---I also know the role they played at trial--it was only to assist with accessing all the info contained in the cables--not influencing the outcome of the trial.

We know what we did-- the facts were obtained in a righteous manner and in accodance with the laws of the US and Scotland. They were presented to an impartial panel of judges and the facts were weighed by them and they reached their decison.

I remain amazed that so many seemingly intelligent people would continue to support someone who claimed to not be a member of Libyan intelligence, "believe me, I was here in Tripoli with my family (12/20-21)," and I never heard of MEBO or Abdusamad.... As we now know the facts are somewhat different. Mind boggling.

20 - Rolfe said...
Oh dear. Anyone who lies to a jourmalist must be guilty of mass murder, is that it?

Frankly, under the circumstances, I'm not at all surprised Megrahi went into "deny everything" mode when confronted by Salinger. Even if he wasn't under instructions from on high to do exactly that, which he might well have been.

And yes, I've read the trial transcripts (want a pdf of the whole thing, single-spaced? - ask me nicely), and as much of your book as Google Books will let me read for free since I'm certainly not paying out any money that might go into your pocket, that's for sure.

If you can seriously maintain that Giaka was telling the truth, I'm not quite sure what you're smoking, but can I have some?

21 - Rolfe said...
And another thing.

I have --many times addressed the issue of payments to witnesses--none--none--including Bollier--ever requested, or were offered or paid any money in exchange for them to tell investigators what we wanted to hear.

You've many times addressed the matter of payments to witnesses. You use different wording every time. It used to be that nobody was paid any money. Then nobody was paid any money before the trial. Then nobody was promised any money before the trial. Then nobody asked for any money.

The more information emerged, the more these various versions fell over like dominoes. Now, we've got a new one. Nobody was paid "to tell investigators what we wanted to hear."

That's neat. Because it's completely unverifiable. How can anyone know whether or how any witness altered their testimony with an eye to the main chance, once they realised there was money on offer?

A reward for a good lead to a perpetrator whose guilt can be proven by independent means is one thing - usually offered to criminals to grass on their mates of course. But paying out millions to witnesses who were independently identified by police investigation, simply to relate the details of a particular incident as well as they could remember it? This is some idea of due process you have in America, I must say. Round here, you might get your bus fare to the court, if you fill in the right forms in triplicate.

Did you make Bogomira Erac a rich woman? She at least came forward independently with her evidence.

22 - Jo G said...
Mr Marquise. Simple question. HOW MUCH DID THE US PAY TO GAUCI? ANSWER PLEASE.

You did not answer the question in the STV documentary about Lockerbie. Please answer now. I've helped you. Scroll back. I gave you the amount your government paid him!

23 - Jo G said...
TWO MILLION DOLLARS!

24 - Rolfe said...

Cannistraro was never head of the CIA CT Center--he was deputy and retired before the EVIDENCE led to Libya.

Yes, some of us know that. Vinnie was high up in the investigation at the start. For example, a week into it, when Reagan went off on one against Libya on absolutely no evidence at all, no? A month into it, when our mutual friend Edwin was writing strange letters on Spanish typewriters accusing Libyans?

Perhaps not. Quite irrelevant, no doubt.

But he was right in there during the summer of 1989, when the bits of "evidence" that eventually seemed to point to Libya were mysteriously appearing in the chain of custody, with some very peculiar provenance. Wasn't he?

He was just out of it by the time these things went live a year later, and the general public saw the shift to Libya. Which was based on "evidence" that had appeared in mid-1989.

Some people might find that awfully interesting, you know. I couldn't possibly comment of course.

25 - Rolfe said...

TWO MILLION DOLLARS!

Be fair, Jo. The notes said they couldn't be sure exactly how much either of the brothers had been paid. They said it might actually have been more than the $3 million between them that was the estimated (or promised?) figure.

Nice work if you can get it.

I still think it would have been awfully unfair if they didn't give Bogomira anything at all, after making the Gaucis rich like that. She even volunteered her evidence, and it was just as important (and just as completely non-incriminating, though that's another story) as Tony Gauci's.

26 - bensix said...

...what they said was consistent with what they had always said...

Richard, if that were the case the Christmas lights were both off and on; Megrahi was both too young and a lot like the customer.

Still, an intelligence agent was a bit dishonest? Well, that clinches it. A startling anomaly like that is hard to justi --- kidding.

27 - Caustic Logic said...
Richard Marquise:

... at least be sure you report information which is correct and factual.

LOL. Isn't the whole dodged point here the FBI's acceptance and promotion of an obvious fabricator of convenient evidence?

Nitpick about quoting "star witness," we never said that. Not in so many words, perhaps not. But you have even til recently cited Giaka's bogus evidence as supporting Megrahi's guilt. He was clearly the centerpiece of the grand jury hearings, was cited by Cannistraro in whatever capacity as
- scratch it, full inquiry beat me to it.

That's equivalent of star witness to me, semantics aside. And he was a major liar, telling you guys what you wanted to hear, wasn't he, sir? You needn't admit to knowing that at the time, but isn't it evident by now?

28 - Caustic Logic said...

It is my belief that all the witnesses told what they believed to be the truth at trial (except for one--not Giaka)

That's it. So you do feel, to this very day, that Abdul Majid Giaka was telling the truth, and nothing but, as he saw it? Do you realize how stupid that sounds? You're going against the Zeist judges for what reason other than a vested one?

On the rewards:

none--none--including Bollier--ever requested, or were offered or paid any money in exchange for them to tell investigators what we wanted to hear.

By the doubling of none, I'll take that as the strong and unassailable part of your statement. What seems in disppute is your understanding of the words "requested," "offered," "paid," and especially "in exchange for them to tell investigators what we wanted to hear."

All: Can we agree that everything but "not" are the potential fudge words in this semantics-based denial?

Extract from DCI Bell Diary (HOLMES version) (28/9/1989) [SCCRC Appendix: chapter 23/3] which indicates that on 28th September 1989 the FBI discussed with the Scottish Police an offer of unlimited money to Tony Gauci, with $10,000 being available immediately. Thereafter there is a comment about challenging Murray as to what he thought Gauci could give in return that he was not already giving.

Where does that fit in to such a denial?

Memo from DCI Bell to DSIO Gilchrist (21/2/91) [SCCRC Appendix: chapter 23/1] which states that Tony Gauci had expressed an interest in receiving money in recent meetings and that "if a monetary offer was made to Gauci this may well change his view and allow him to consider a witness protection programme as a serious avenue"

We can see here the attempt to backpedal and convince the brothers they won't be paid, except maybe, if Tony talks right and there's a conviction. It did seem an unlikely prospect until it happened, didn't it?

Strathclyde Police Witness Protection Report of June 10, 1999:

(a) the frustration of Tony Gauci that he will not be compensated

(b) that in respect of Paul Gauci "It is apparent from speaking to him for any length of time that he has a clear desire to gain financial benefit from the position he and his brother are in relative to the case. As a consequence he exaggerates his own importance as a witness and clearly inflates the fears he and his brother have. He is anxious to establish what advantage he can gain from the Scottish police. Although demanding, Paul Gauci remains an asset to the case but will continue to explore any means he can to identify where financial advantage can be gained.

(c) that the Gauci family had financial problems

Where is the clarity in that? Where is Stuart Henderson's "he was well aware that there was no such thing as a reward being handed to him ... Didn't enter his head."

No response needed or expected.

29 - FullInquiry said...
I appreciate Mr. Marquise commenting on my post. Perhaps he will address the following?

Michael Scharf, who is said to have been legal counsel the the US counter-terrorism bureau at the time of 0the idictment was quoted in an article by Liam McDougal published in the Sunday Herald, November 12, 2006. Some excerts of the article are:

Michael Scharf, who was the counsel to the US counter-terrorism bureau when the two Libyans were indicted for the bombing, described the case as “so full of holes it was like Swiss cheese” and said it should never have gone to trial".

He claimed the CIA and FBI had assured State Department officials there was an “iron-clad” case against Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and al-Amin Khalifa Fimah, but that in reality the intelligence agencies had no confidence in their star witness and knew well in advance of the trial that he was “a liar.”

Scharf branded the case a “whitewash” and added: “It was a trial where everybody agreed ahead of time that they were just going to focus on these two guys, and they were the fall guys.”

It was largely based on this inside guy [Libyan defector Abdul Majid Giaka]. It wasn’t until the trial that I learned this guy was a nut-job and that the CIA had absolutely no confidence in him and that they knew he was a liar.

Mr. Marquise posted above he did not know about the existence of the Giaka CIA cables until the Trial. Apparently Michael Scharf was similarly unaware.

So one can reasonably conclude that the CIA withheld the Giaka cables from virtually everyone involved in the investigation until the Trial (and hoped the redacted sections never had to be revealed).

Questions for Mr.Marquise:

1. Who exactly is the person you feel lied in their testimony at the trial?

2. Do you believe that the investigation was misled by the CIA, either diliberately or by way of them withholding the contents of the Giaka cables?

3. How important is the credibility of Giaka?

My personal opinion is that if an "intellegence" agency like the CIA is involved in a criminal investigation, any outcome of such investigation becomes highly suspect by way of the very nature of what intellegence agencies do. This is particularly true if the FBI or any of the prosecuting authorities actually felt the CIA was a trustworthy source.

In any event Michael Scharf and the Trial Judges clearly have a different take on Giaka than Mr. Marquise does. I can only conclude that Mr. Marquise was rather gullible if he believed anything Giaka had to say.

Believing Giaka is a long way from following the "EVIDENCE" in my book.

Like Rolfe, I will try to find Chapter 34 if I can do so without paying Mr. Marquise for it.

Beyond having a basic belief in the need for justice and the belief that the full and real truth has yet to emerge in this matter, I have a huge personal problem with the fact that Giaka was a key factor in the UN Sanctions being imposed on Libya. Such sanctions were imposed largely on the basis of what a known liar told a Grand Jury in private. One can only conclude the CIA wanted such sanctions imposed and was willing to withhold key facts to accomplish that end and that the Grand Jury did not have access to the Giaka cables either. The UN Security Council certainly was never informed of all the evidence.

30 - FullInquiry said...
Oh and in addition Mr. Marquise:

I did follow this matter long before the trial, followed the trial, read all the transcripts from the trial daily that I could obtain, and most importanty I READ THE TRIAL JUDGEMENT, WHICH DID NOT MAKE SENSE AND BASED ON WHICH NO REASONABLE PERSON COULD CONVICT MEGRAHI, at least in my reasonably-informed opinion.

And I lived the effects of the Sanctions and still do. I'm no armchair second-guesser. People like you that were involved in the investigation and played a part are accountable in my book. You had and still have a duty to at least acknowledge where the investigation was misled or could have made mistakes.

My concerns are that you were (and still are) more concerned with obtaining a conviction than with seeking the truth or justice and are a patriot. But I guess that is what your job was and what you were paid to do. That doesn't make the outcome the proper one even if you did follow the laws of the US, Scotland, or Timbuktu.

"As the layers are peeled away..."

AFIO and Poteat on Megrahi's Release
31 August 2010
last edit 1 September

Leading up to, upon, and following the 20 August anniversary of Abdelbaset al Megrahi's release from Scottish prison, and with the man still stubbornly surviving, calls went up on both sides of the Lockerbie divide. Last week, former FBI SCOTBOM chief investigator Richard Marquise spoke with a writer for the Christian Science Monitor (critique link). The self-serving result, to the effect that they got the right man, joined a chorus of media reports obediently repeating the Libyan guilt storyline without regard to the other side.

From that other side comes Dr Swire's story on stage in Scotland, JFM's petition to Scotland putting Salmond "on the spot," Michael Mansfield QC repeating his conviction that the conviction was "entirely unsustainable," plus a steady show of support from the UK public for the "bomber's" release, and generally for his innocence. Even in the states, Time's article on "five big questions" conveys with some conviction the "british"position. Americans, previously assured their reality was the real one, were in danger of growing confused amid these mixed messages.

"During the 1970s the Intelligence Community was buffeted by a number of leaks and revelations, culminating in the Church and Pike Congressional investigations. CIA officer David Atlee Phillips took early retirement in 1975 to respond to the growing sentiment that the CIA was a “rogue elephant.” As part of this effort, Phillips founded this organization, known then as the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (ARIO). Although much attacked at the time when many people called for the dismantlement of the CIA, Phillips toured the world to speak out in favor of the need for a strong intelligence community. He was subsequently personally accused of being a participant in the Kennedy and Letelier assassinations... " Source: AFIO - About AFIO

Quickly on the heels of the Monitor-hosted FBI re-affirmation came a similar show of solidarity from the intelligence community, via their trusted affiliate, the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO - see box at right for more). With a membership drawn about one fourth from former CIA agents, the group's president Gene Poteat spoke with Jeff Stein of the Washington Post's "blog" Spy Talk (27 August). The column also mentions an AFIO statement (which I cannot find elsewhere) supporting recent moves by members of the Senate to investigate Mr. al-Megrahi's release. Poteat explained "the families of the murdered intelligence officers – and indeed all of the families – deserve no less than a full airing of the facts..."

Unfortunately, the sentence ended "...around Mr. al-Megrahi’s release." Silently, he affirms in the negative, a full airing of the circumstances behind Megrahi's framing for the bombing is not worthy of the same scrutiny.

This is suspected by most observers who are informed, but not implicated in an operation that was apparently headed by the CIA more than any other party. Their investigation into the bombing fell to counter-terrorism director Vincent Cannistraro, one of Reagan's experts on blaming and smearing Libya for political reasons. It's only to be expected from Cannistraro and his colleagues to defend the case that sanctioned Libya and put Megrahi away, and even to go on the offensive as a show of confidence against  any undue leniency.

In its statement, AFIO expressed strong support for the Senate committee’s investigation and called on “the UK and Scottish Governments to launch independent inquiries into the release of Mr. al-Megrahi to ensure that commercial and/or political interests did not lead to Mr. al-Megrahi’s freedom. ... CIA Director Leon Panetta, NSA Director Keith Alexander, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Attorney General Eric Holder [should] direct their staffs to fully cooperate with the Senators’ investigation.”

Obviously the foreign governments are requested to explain what they already have in letters and statements, so far refusing to come in person. As I've said before, I can see their annoyance at American ignorance and presumptuousness, and the principle behind not "crawling" to Washington. But however justified, this stance is counterproductive and really is strengthening stand-offishness over here, as Mr. Poteat and the AFIO have just shown.

At least as noteworthy is the association's suggested "narrow focus" for this desirable investigation:

AFIO "also called for U.S. government agencies “to assist in providing minimally redacted operational cables and intelligence reports to cleared Senate staff in a secure environment. All documents should be narrowly focused on al-Megrahi’s release in order to protect sources and methods of collection.”

Whatever light the US government could shed on the decision by Scotland's justice secretary is minimal, and that lack of relevant sources is quite protective of anything relevant. And in case anyone was confused, the Association of "Former" Intelligence Officers recommends you be careful to avoid accidentally requesting information on the "sources and methods of collection” behind the bullsh*t story that put Megrahi away in the first place. They're all surely just as unanimous on the justness of the conviction as they are on the unjustness of his release, as Poteat put it:

“There have been few clear-cut issues where so many of us agree as we do on this one ... The decision triggering al-Megrahi’s release was a shock, and had a strong whiff of manipulation and back-room deals.”

The only back room - or rather prison cell - deal that I've sensed lurking in the release decision was the indirect way by which Megrahi's appeal of conviction and his return to Libya were linked, and that's almost surely not the same scent they're onto. Rather, its more likely something like the deals some former intelligence officers arranged in 1989-91, that made the latter batch necessary (kill the appeal to obscure the frame-up). The most informed among the AFIO's members would know there are secrets just beneath the surface that are better left there, and one would almost expect more discretion that calling for an investigation of Lockerbie anything.

The apparent CIA personnel scouring the Scottish countryside from day one could be explained by normal, uptight, agency protocol - secure all secrets.  But the 2 February 1989 news report citing an "American" source, suggesting Libyan operatives at Frankfurt carried out the bombing - is harder to explain. Quite likely from Cannistraro or a like-minded colleague, this would be based on no evidence that ever was mentioned again (ie, made up), but did help prepare the field for the replacement story that would evolve.

The first key to the eventual Libyan narrative was the identification on Malta of Libyan agent al-Megrahi, aka Khalifah Abdusamad. It's unclear just when his presence there on December 21, under the alias, was known to the CIA. But it was by early 1989 most likely and they'd be the first to know. Since even before the bombing they were getting original tips from liar for hire Abdul Majid Giaka, who was recieving $1500 a month from the agency for his slim, low-level info. On the CIA's urging,  this onetime literature student was accepted by DoJ as a witness, just after he fabricated a major portion of the evidence in the 1991 indictments - all the really specific stuff. He was apparently paid $2 million in 1992 for his efforts as well as being resettled with his family in the US.

Among a handful of other allegations lodged against the CIA, one of interest is how their bomb timer expert "Orkin" helped FBI's "Tom" Thurman identify the suspicious PT/35(b), under mysterious circumstances. It was found to be from a MST-13 timer, made by Mebo, whose founder Edwin Bollier first stepped up in a January 1989 note to the CIA offering to blame Libya for money. His clues were bizarre, but he had supplied the highly specific and identifiable timers, like the one months later "found at Lockerbie." The later yet ID seems to be accurate, but something fishy abides in that transaction and perhaps others unseen. Thurman was physically there on the scene and behind the scenes at the beginning and frequently thereafter, for example. And the fragment is forensically almost certain to have been involved in no such explosion. The timer fragment also was reportedly the subject of a document -requested by Megrahi's defense - that was sealed by the UK government to protect the interests of an unnamed friendly nation.

But the vital heart of the provable intelligence frame-up was Giaka; even after leaving the agency, Vincent Cannistraro continued into the 1990s with ignorant or dishonest public pimping of the secret witness and his amazing ability to bust the case open. The agency's ignorance or dishonesty (as with the Scottish Crown) continued into insisting to the Zeist judges in 2000 that the witness was credible, and that the redacted parts of CIA cables held no secrets. In fact, they revealed that the agency knew Giaka's was a bogus story. They had already chosen to push it anyway, to create a false reality by which crippling and deadly sanctions on Libya were justified.

Mr. Poteat further prophesized to Stein, "As the layers are peeled away, we will see what was at the center of the early, and unexpected release, of this malingering convicted terrorist.” These professionals will surely know just when to stop peeling that onion and it'll be well before the rotten center. Just beneath the surface is not faked cancer, but Megrahi's assassinated second appeal. Just beneath that is evidence that the CIA, among others, manipulated the investigation to fit the crime to the selected villains.

The AFIO's origin was as a public relations face to help "explain" CIA excesses of the Cold War. They served to counter criticism of coups, cover-ups, operations gone sour, deception and disinformation. The AFIO is therefore a less than credible source when it comes to another apparent CIA cover-up - Vincent Cannistraro's brainchild, the Libya did it story line. If indeed the best-informed among them were involved in this almost mind-bogglingly bold confidence scheme, we can take no comfort that their public face at the AFIO is publicly expressing confidence in the operation.

"Take Taggs From Air Malta"

The Case Against Fhimah, part one
May 30 2010
edits June 5

Everyone who accepts Abdelbaset Ali al Megrahi's guilt for the PA103 bombing agrees he couldn't have acted alone. Speculation runs primarily upward to Col. Gaddafi, but also sidewise to his imagined ground level accomplices. Only one was ever clearly fingered, originally as a JSO (Libyan intelligence) operative: Lamin Khalifah Fhimah. It was decided he was working with Libyan Arab Airlines at Malta’s Luqa airport only as cover for his JSO plotting with Megrahi on Malta.

The 1991 indictments against both accused are based on Fhimah penetrating the airport system, up to and including getting the bomb case onto Air Malt flight KM180. As of the 2000 trial, the final Opinion of the Court says, “the Crown no longer suggest that the second accused was a member of the Libyan Intelligence Service,” though his LAA "cover" employment was still acknowledged. Aside from this curious reversal, the Crown maintained a string of “inferences” regarding Fhimah’s December 1988 activity. The Zeist judges considered these claims and rightly dismissed them as “speculation rather than inference.”

These supporting points will be dealt with separately, with this article focused on what the judges called “the principal piece of evidence against [Fhimah],” being the clues read from “two entries in his 1988 diary.” One of these pages is shown below.

It was in April 1991 that Scottish police retrieved Fhimah’s work diary “from the offices of Medtours, a company which had been set up by the second accused and Mr Vassallo.” with the best quote miners around, the investigation managed to glean these two entries, described in the final opinion's paragraph 84:

At the back of the diary there were two pages of numbered notes. The fourteenth item on one page is translated as “Take/collect tags from the airport (Abdulbaset/Abdussalam)”. The word ‘tags’ was written in English, the remainder in Arabic.

On the diary page for 15 December there was an entry, preceded by an asterisk, “Take taggs from Air Malta”, and at the end of that entry in a different coloured ink “OK”. Again the word ‘taggs’ (sic) was in English.

These were taken as a careless plotter jotting down clues of his plot in a diary he kept. He even wrote “tags” in English lettering to make sure the Brits he was targeting could come back and read it easily. The judges explain further:

The Crown maintained that the inference to be drawn from these entries was that the second accused had obtained Air Malta interline tags for the first accused, and that as an airline employee he must have known that the only purpose for which they would be required was to enable an unaccompanied bag to be placed on an aircraft.

The three Scottish judges rightly dismissed the bolded assertion: "it would be going too far to infer that he was necessarily aware that they were to be used for the purpose of blowing up anaircraft." Finally, they summarized their opinion on this evidence and inferences in paragraph 85:

There is no doubt that the second accused did make the entries in the diary to which we have referred. In the context of the explosive device being placed on KM180 at Luqa in a suitcase which must have had attached to it an interline tag to enable it to pass eventually on to PA103, these entries can easily be seen to have a sinister connotation, particularly in the complete absence of any form of explanation.
[…]
Had it been necessary to resolve this matter, we would have found it a difficult problem.

However due to a lack of any single clear outside clue, they could not read much into it. Giaka had stories, but the judges didn’t believe them, and otherwise it was nothing but Crown speculation:

While therefore there may well be a sinister inference to be drawn from the diary entries, we have come to the conclusion that there is insufficient other acceptable evidence to support or confirm such an inference, […] In these circumstances the second accused falls to be acquitted.

If the judges had sufficient clues before forcing them back to consider these entries, it sounds like they could well have accepted his guilt; they cite the entries as fairly suspicious given the “absence of any form of explanation.” But that’s a silly thing to expect – these are quick notes by Fhimah to Fhimah, to access his own brain. Of course he’s not going to explain the background of each note.

But some clues could be gathered by snooping around a bit, as famed reporter Ed Bradley did for a 60 Minutes segment in 1999 [transcript]. After explaining the supposed importance of the diary entries, and covering the lack of evidence for any suspicious suitcase coming from Malta, Bradley returned to those odd entries.

People here who knew Fhimah say he wanted to get his airline’s [Libyan Arab Airlines] baggage tags printed in Malta for less than it cost to print them in Libya. That way he could make a commission on the deal. They say he wanted the Air Malta tags as a sample to show the printer. And there are other notations in this diary that support that story. On December 10th Fhimah wrote “go to the printer.” Another note in the back of the diary says “contact the printer.”

It’s not jotted down right next to his alleged slip-up, but the non-terrorist explanation is to be found. The unusual lettering might suggest he was going to an English-speaking printer on Malta (Maltese and English are the official languages there). This distinct possibility lessens the clarity and importance of the central alleged clue. The other supporting guesses were weaker yet as evidence, and clearly it was no mere technicality that Fhimah was acquitted. There really was “no case to answer” as he plead. A little known fact is that Scots law allows judges three rulings: guilty, not guilty, and not proven (meaning likely guilty but not clear enough to say so). The judges chose the clearer statement “not guilty.”

And if Megrahi’s necessary airside accomplice were truly innocent of the charges, that leaves us with nothing but speculation as to who did assist the bomber. Because Megrahi couldn’t have acted alone, if he acted at all.